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LEAD ARTICLE
THE AGGREGATE AND IMPLIED POWERS
OF THE UNITED STATES
ROBERT J. REINSTEIN *
The conventional understanding of McCulloch v. Maryland is that an act
of Congress must be within the scope of specified enumerated powers or an
appropriate means to carry those specified powers into effect. This now classical
doctrine rests on a misunderstanding of McCulloch. It is also incomplete in failing
to account for important exercises of national power that cannot readily be tied to
specific enumerated powers or justified as means to effectuate those powers.
Several distinguished scholars, arguing that the classical means-ends
approach is incorrect, assert that Congress possesses an expansive power to
legislate for the national general welfare, or, as sometimes articulated, to address
all national necessities or exigencies. They rely, inter alia, on the General
Welfare Clauses of the Preamble and Article I, Section 8; conceptions of inherent
national sovereignty; the actions of the Constitutional Convention concerning
Resolution VI of the Virginia Plan; and the three provisions of the Necessary
and Proper Clause. Although these scholars present valuable insights, their
arguments for a national general welfare power are overbroad when evaluated
according to constitutional text, structure, and history.

* Dean Emeritus and Clifford Scott Green Professor of Law Emeritus, Temple
University Beasley School of Law. I am grateful to Tay Aspinwall, Randy Barnett, Daniel
Birk, Ellen Cookman, Jeffrey Dunoff, Jack Goldsmith, Craig Green, Duncan Hollis,
Michael McConnell, John Mikhail, Eric Nelson, Richard Primus, David Schwartz,
Matthew Steilen, and Harwell Wells for their very helpful suggestions and criticisms.
Of course, all errors in this article are mine. My thanks also to the participants at the
Originalism Conference at the University of San Diego and the Writers’ Workshop at
Temple Law School for their comments. I appreciate the excellent research assistance
of Kevin Todorow, Jude Joanis, and Catherine Cuff.
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This Article advances a theory, original to the literature, of how the enumerated
powers of the national government should be construed and applied in determining
the scope of national power. The Constitution vests four great aggregate powers in
the government of the United States–providing for the common defense; conducting
foreign relations; preventing and resolving disputes between the States and the
United States, and between the States themselves; and creating and maintaining a
national economic union. Virtually all of the specific enumerated powers of the three
branches are contained in these four clusters of power. These aggregate powers are
“ends” of the national government, and legislation that carries these powers into
effect are appropriate “means” of congressional authority.
The framework presented in this Article is based on construing the Constitution
as a whole and not as the collection of unrelated parts; the historical origin of the
enumerated powers in the long-standing distribution of powers between the imperial
British government and the colonial assemblies that was carried forward into the
Constitution; Hamilton’s arguments on the scope of national power in Federalist
23 and the opinion on the Bank of the United States; Marshall’s adoption of those
arguments in McCulloch and Story’s in his Commentaries; and Congress’s
authority to carry into execution not only specified enumerated powers but also “all
other Powers vested by this Constitution in the Government of the United States.”
This framework explains the validity of national powers that are outside of the
classical means-ends model. It respects federalism by giving Congress plenary
authority over four discrete areas that are essential to the Union, while allowing for
extensive legislative authority in the States and the people. And it has implications
for the separation of powers and the extent to which Congress may expand the
jurisdiction of the federal courts beyond the categories enumerated in Article III.
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INTRODUCTION
McCulloch has governed constitutional law for the two centuries
following its announcement. But the constitutional framework
established in that decision was hardly stated with precision. Consider
Chief Justice Marshall’s famous pronouncement of the framework for
judging the constitutionality of congressional legislation:
Let the end be legitimate, let it be within the scope of the
constitution, and all means which are appropriate, which are plainly
adapted to that end, which are not prohibited, but consist with the
letter and spirit of the constitution, are constitutional. 1

This Delphic injunction is fraught with ambiguity. Disputes have
regularly arisen over whether implied powers chosen by Congress are
“appropriate” or “plainly adapted” to executing a constitutionally
prescribed end. 2 And there is a more fundamental ambiguity: what are
the “ends” and “means” of national power? The decision has come to be
understood as requiring that an act of Congress must either be within
the scope of specified enumerated powers or must be legislation
calculated to carry those specified powers into effect. 3 In this
formulation, the “ends” are specific enumerated powers, and the
“means” are laws enacted to effectuate those powers.
This conventional understanding of McCulloch has gained strength
and acceptance through repetition, and it has become the classical
framework for determining the scope of congressional power. That
framework is flawed because it errs in treating the enumerated powers
as separate and distinct, and it cannot explain the validity of substantial
and concededly valid exercises of legislative power and, paradoxically,
of the decision in McCulloch itself.
This Article presents a “new” theory of national and congressional
power. I use quotation marks advisedly: this theory is new in the sense
of resting on a textual, structural, and historical construction of the
Constitution that is original in the literature. But this theory is actually
1. McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 421 (1819).
2. The disputes over the individual mandate in the Affordable Care Act and the
application of the Controlled Substances Act to state legislation authorizing medicinal
marijuana are two important recent examples of whether the means adopted by
Congress are plainly adapted or proper to carry out enumerated powers. Nat'l Fed'n
of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 567 U.S. 519, 532–37 (2012); Gonzales v. Raich, 545 U.S. 1
(2005). I explored these ambiguities in an earlier article. See Robert J. Reinstein, The
Limits of Congressional Power, 89 TEMP. L. REV. 1 (2016).
3. See United States v. Kebodeaux, 570 U.S. 387, 394 (2013); United States v.
Comstock, 560 U.S. 126, 126 (2010).
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quite old, having antecedents in pre-constitutional jurisprudence and
the writings of Alexander Hamilton that so heavily influenced the
Marshall Court. Instead of concentrating on specific enumerated powers,
the doctrine advanced in this Article posits that the Constitution vests four
aggregate powers in the government of the United States as a whole—
providing for the common defense, preventing and resolving national
and interstate conflicts, conducting foreign affairs, and creating and
maintaining an economic union. Each of those aggregate powers, whose
whole is greater than the sum of its parts, represents the legitimate “ends”
of national power. Under the Necessary and Proper Clause,4 Congress is
authorized to select all appropriate “means” that are designed to carry
out those aggregate powers.
The theory presented in this Article represents a different way of
construing and applying the constitutional grants of enumerated and
implied powers in all three branches of the national government. This
framework rejects the now conventional model’s arbitrary limits on the
scope of congressional power. It explains the validity of otherwise
anomalous national powers and provides a new reading of McCulloch
that focuses on how, specifically, the Court upheld the constitutionality
of the Bank of the United States. And, being centered on four clusters
of power essential to union, it provides an alternative, grounded in
federalism, to essentially indeterminate theories of a national regulatory
power (or a general welfare power) that are advanced by scholars who
have criticized limitations of the classical model.
The structure of this Article and a summary of my contentions are as
follows: Part I of the Article examines a number of national powers that
appear inconsistent with the classical framework—the general national
powers over foreign affairs, immigration and deportation, recognition,
passports, paper money as legal tender for all public and private debts,
the inherent power of each House of Congress to adjudicate and
punish non-members for contempt, the inherent power of the United
States, without enabling legislation, to enter into contracts and sue for
breach, and expansions of federal court jurisdiction beyond the
enumerated Article III categories. Those powers are not listed in the
Constitution as vested in any of the three branches of government and
cannot readily be viewed as implied powers that are being used to carry
out specified enumerated powers. Some of these powers appear to be
objects of national power, or “ends” in themselves; others appear to be
“means” to carry out those ends.
4. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 18.

8

AMERICAN UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 69:3

This is an impressive list of national powers that seem to be
independent of specific enumerated powers. Although the classical
means-ends approach can work very well in most cases, these national
powers collectively constitute a significant body of law that cannot be
disregarded as minor variations of traditional doctrine. Moreover, these
national powers are currently recognized and enforced by the Supreme
Court and are generally accepted as representing “good” constitutional law.
Even constitutional heirs of Thomas Jefferson are not prepared to wholly
reject the reality of such national powers. Thus, one of the most prominent
theorists of limited federal power states the dilemma with respect to a
national power over immigration: although such a power cannot be derived
from the specific enumerated powers, leaving immigration authority solely
to the individual states would lead to intolerable results.5
As discussed in Part I, the Supreme Court continues to enforce these
anomalous national powers but refuses to adjust the classical model to
account for the fact that they are part of the reality of constitutional
law. Instead, the Court has resorted to techniques of constitutional
avoidance, by stretching the means-ends approach beyond any
reasonable limit and by grasping at the extra-constitutional notion of
inherent national sovereignty.
Part II of this Article examines the contributions of scholars who,
observing that these anomalies are necessarily inconsistent with the
prevailing means-ends doctrine, assert that this doctrine is incorrect in
theory and practice. These scholars reject the doctrine that the specific
enumerated powers are exhaustive and argue that it should be
replaced by a congressional power to deal with all issues of national
import—described variously as a general welfare power, or power to
resolve problems beyond the cognizance of the individual States, power
to address national “necessities” or “exigencies,” or powers that are said to
inhere in national sovereignty. Although each scholar presents unique
arguments, common threads include reliance on the General Welfare
Clauses of the Preamble and Article I, Section 8, theories of sovereignty,
the “all other powers” provision of the Necessary and Proper Clause, and
Resolution VI in the Constitutional Convention.
These scholars present valuable insights, and I agree with many of
their arguments, including that the specified enumerated powers are
not exhaustive. However, I disagree with the conclusion that Congress
possesses a general welfare power or its various equivalents. Such a
5. Richard A. Epstein, Our Implied Constitution, 55 WILLAMETTE L. REV. 295,
329–31 (2017).
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national power is not supported by constitutional benchmarks of text,
history, and structure. The means-ends approach to national power
should not be entirely discarded. That approach is sound as far as it
goes because implied powers as means to carry out specific
enumerated powers would exist even if the Necessary and Proper
Clause had been omitted from the Constitution. 6 The reality and
legitimacy of the otherwise anomalous national powers are powerful
evidence that a more comprehensive doctrine of national power—one
that builds on the classical model—is necessary.
My analyses of these scholarly arguments is extensive, both out of
respect for their sophistication and because such analyses disclose
historical and doctrinal propositions (particularly regarding the
nature of sovereignty and the importance of the “all other powers”
clause) that underlay an alternative, comprehensive doctrine of the
scope of national power.
That comprehensive doctrine is proposed in Parts III and IV of this
Article. Viewing the Constitution as a whole, the various powers of the
government of the United States are related and inter-connected.
Virtually all of the enumerated powers of the national government are
contained in four clusters of national power that represent the central
purposes of an effective Union—common defense, national and
interstate relations, foreign affairs, and economic union. These four
clusters of enumerated national powers, vested in all three branches of
the government, are not only implicit in the text of the Constitution,
they derive from the history and purposes of the grants of national
power in the Constitution. With relatively few exceptions (the most
important being taxation), the specific enumerated powers were
components of the actual subject-matter distribution of powers in the
old British Empire under which Americans had lived and thrived for
more than a century. They were carried forward into the Constitution to
fulfill the principal purposes of the Union.
In Federalist 23, Alexander Hamilton identified the principal purposes of
the Union stated above.7 He then applied a methodology (and used
language) that would reappear in his opinion on the constitutionality of
the Bank of the United States and in McCulloch. Hamilton characterized

6. As Madison stated: “No axiom is more clearly established in law, or in reason,
than that wherever the end is required, the means are authorized; wherever a general
power to do a thing is given, every particular power necessary for doing it, is included.”
THE FEDERALIST NO. 44, at 221 (James Madison) (Terence Ball ed., 2003).
7. THE FEDERALIST NO. 23, supra note 6, at 106 (Alexander Hamilton).
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those purposes of the Union as the “ends” or “objects” of national authority
and insisted that Congress must have all powers that are necessary as
“means” to fulfill each of those purposes. In his Bank opinion, he argued
that several of the specific enumerated powers, when viewed in the
aggregate, created a more general fiscal power in Congress and that the
Bank was Congress’s agent in carrying out this fiscal power.8
Hamilton’s theory of aggregate fiscal power was adopted in McCulloch.
Instead of relating the Bank to specific enumerated powers, Marshall
upheld the constitutionality of the Bank as an instrument for carrying out
Congress’s general fiscal power. The theory of aggregate power advanced
in this Article is consistent with this understanding of McCulloch and was the
basis upon which Joseph Story, Marshall’s alter ego, justified the
constitutionality of the Bank in his Commentaries.9 The classical reading of
McCulloch circumscribes the scope of national powers in a manner that
Hamilton, Marshall, and Story did not.
This aggregate approach to the enumerated powers respects the
constitutional commitment to federalism by limiting the national
government’s comprehensive powers to four areas of essential national
concern while retaining a broad range of legislative authority in the States
and the people. If this theory is correct, it explains and provides criteria for
the scope and limits of congressional legislation. These four aggregate
powers are vested by the Constitution in the government of the United States
as a whole. They are “ends” of governmental power, and the enumerated and
implied national powers are “means” by which Congress can effectuate these
four comprehensive national powers. In the language of the Necessary and
Proper Clause, Congress is empowered to enact all legislation that is
necessary and proper “for carrying into execution . . . all other Powers vested
by this Constitution in the Government of the United States.”10
Part V discusses the application of this theory of aggregate and implied
powers to each of the national powers discussed in Part I. This part of the
Article examines the scope of congressional powers over foreign and
domestic affairs, the extent to which Congress may vest federal court
jurisdiction beyond the enumerated Article III categories, and some of
the separation of powers questions raised by the enforcement of
aggregate national powers.
8. Alexander Hamilton, Final Version of an Opinion on the Constitutionality of
an Act to Establish a Bank (Feb. 23, 1791), in 8 THE PAPERS OF ALEXANDER HAMILTON
132 (Harold C. Syrett ed., 1966) [hereinafter Hamilton, Bank Opinion].
9. 3 JOSEPH STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES
§§ 1257–1266, at 130–48 (1833) [hereinafter STORY, COMMENTARIES].
10. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 18.
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I. ANOMALOUS NATIONAL POWERS
In an impressive recent article, David Schwartz identified twelve
congressional powers which have been validated and enforced by the
Supreme Court but which, he claims, cannot be implied as means that are
necessary to carry out any enumerated power.11 My own list is different 12
but nevertheless substantial enough to call into question the general
validity of the conventional mean-ends approach to federal power.
A. A General National Foreign Affairs Power
It seems self-evident that the national government should regulate
and conduct foreign affairs, but no such general power is enumerated
in the Constitution. To be sure, many specific powers relating to foreign
affairs are vested in Congress, the President, and the Judiciary.
However, these specific textual foreign affairs powers are not
complete. 13 Nor has the Supreme Court suggested otherwise. Instead,
it asserted in Curtiss-Wright that the United States has a general foreign
affairs power that exists by virtue of an inherent national sovereignty that
is independent of the Constitution.14 This extra-constitutional doctrine,
although questioned by eminent authorities, remains the basis of a
general national power over foreign affairs.15 The Court has employed
11. David S. Schwartz, A Question Perpetually Arising: Implied Powers, Capable
Federalism, and the Limits of Enumerationism, 59 ARIZ. L. REV. 573, 624–44 (2017).
12. I do not include in this list a number of powers that are identified by Professor
Schwartz, namely acquiring territory by force or diplomacy, prohibiting private racial
discrimination by businesses engaged in interstate commerce, exercising eminent
domain, enacting federal criminal laws, imposing conscription, and legislating rules
of admiralty. See id. These powers can be exercised under a moderately liberal meansends approach. Professor Schwartz argues that such constructions represent a “false”
theory of enumerationism because they disregard the expressio unius tenet and
inappropriately invert constitutional means and ends. Id. at 644. For responses to these
arguments, see Reinstein, supra note 2, at 71–86.
13. See generally MICHAEL D. RAMSEY, THE CONSTITUTION’S TEXT IN FOREIGN AFFAIRS
(2007) (focusing on the text of the Constitution and arguing that foreign affairs
powers are textually incomplete and divided among multiple independent power
centers); Andrew Kent, The New Originalism and the Foreign Affairs Constitution, 82
FORDHAM L. REV. 757, 772–80 (2013) (discussing the Declare War Clause and
immigration as examples of incomplete textual foreign affairs powers).
14. United States v. Curtiss-Wright Exp. Corp., 299 U.S. 304, 315–19 (1936).
15. See LOUIS HENKIN, FOREIGN AFFAIRS AND THE UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION 13–
15, 16–21 (2d ed. 1996). Professor Henkin understood that the traditional McCulloch
approach could not explain many of the foreign affairs powers that were exercised by
the United States. Id. at 13–15. He was also uncomfortable with embracing the CurtissWright notion of extra-constitutional powers but did so reluctantly because it appeared
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this inherent power to authorize derivative implied congressional and
executive action in the sphere of foreign affairs. Examples of such
derivative national powers over foreign affairs, discussed below, are
immigration and deportation, recognition and passports.
B. Congressional Immigration and Deportation Powers
The practical need for a plenary federal power over immigration and
deportation seems undeniable, but the Constitution does not explicitly
vest either power in Congress. Through the Civil War, the voluntary
migration of foreigners was largely left to the States. 16 Whether a State
could constitutionally impose taxes or other restrictions on
immigration initially divided the Supreme Court but, after an
inconclusive start, 17 was then decided through the lenses of a dormant
Foreign Commerce Clause. 18
In 1875, Congress enacted the first major federal immigration law. 19
As is well-known to those who study or practice immigration law, the
problem is that the immigration laws lack clear textual support in the
Constitution: “Some aspects . . . may be implied from the Naturalization
Clause, the war powers clauses, the Foreign Commerce Clause, or
perhaps even the Migration and Importation Clause, but Congress
regulates a vast array of immigration-related matters and not all can be
easily implied from these other substantive powers.” 20
The first seminal (and notorious) decision, the Chinese Exclusion Case
in 1889, 21 set the pattern. As the title and date of the decision suggest,
this case involved the validity of a racist and nativist driven
congressional statute enacted during the era of Plessy v. Ferguson. 22 The
statute abrogated a treaty with China and excluded new Chinese
to be the only doctrine that would support a general national foreign affairs power. Id.
at 16–21. Justice Thomas and notable scholars have advocated a controversial
alternative doctrine—that residual gaps in foreign affairs powers are filled by the
Executive Vesting Clause. See infra notes 453-454 and accompanying text.
16. See Sarah H. Cleveland, Powers Inherent in Sovereignty: Indians, Aliens, Territories,
and the Nineteenth Century Origins of Plenary Power over Foreign Affairs, 81 TEX. L. REV. 1,
81–83, 98–99 (2002) (explaining how federal activity over immigration during the
antebellum era was minimal).
17. See The Passenger Cases, 48 U.S. (7 How.) 283 (1849).
18. Cleveland, supra note 16, at 107–09.
19. See Act of Mar. 3, 1875, ch. 141, 18 Stat. 477 (repealed 1974); see also Cleveland,
supra note 16, at 106.
20. Kent, supra note 13, at 775.
21. Chae Chan Ping v. United States (The Chinese Exclusion Case), 130 U.S. 581 (1889).
22. 163 U.S. 537 (1896), overruled by Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
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laborers from entering the United States. 23 Without explanation, the
Supreme Court did not accept the government’s invitation to use the
Foreign Commerce Clause—perhaps because the earlier cases
involved the regulation of transportation (in particular, commercial
navigation) rather than simply the movement of people, and
prohibiting the voluntary entry of foreigners into the United States
does not easily fit within the power to regulate “commercial
intercourse” 24 “with foreign Nations.” 25 Instead, the Court imported
language from a Marshall opinion that the law of nations gave every
sovereign the right to determine what foreigners could enter its territory
(while ignoring later statements in the opinion that this was a qualified
right).26 Having established this broad principle, the Chinese Exclusion
Act was upheld on the bases of the inherent and unqualified sovereign
power of any nation to exclude any citizen or subject of a foreign nation
from its territory, and also on the inherent national power over foreign
affairs.27 Four years later, the Court relied on those implied powers to
authorize plenary congressional authority to deport Chinese aliens.28
23. The Chinese Exclusion Case, 130 U.S. at 589.
24. See Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1, 189–90 (1824) (defining
“commerce” as all forms of “commercial intercourse”).
25. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3 (providing that Congress has the power “[t]o
regulate Commerce with foreign Nations”); see Cleveland, supra note 16, at 133–34.
Professor Cleveland suggests an additional reason: the Supreme Court might not have
wanted to expansively construe the Foreign Commerce Clause because it was
restricting the scope of the Interstate Commerce Clause during the same period. Id.
26. Schooner Exch. v. McFaddon, 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) 116, 116, 136–37 (1812).
This was a prize case decided under principles of the laws of nations on state-to-state
relations in the absence of governing legislation or treaties. U.S. citizens claimed title
to a French warship which, allegedly, the citizens had originally owned. Marshall
acknowledged the right of every nation to determine which foreigners could enter its
territory, but also said that the law of nations recognized certain exceptions to that
general principle. Id. He then construed the law of nations as providing the French
ship with an exemption from domestic court jurisdiction. Id. The delicacy of the case
as it related to foreign affairs appears in the first sentence of the report:
THIS being a cause in which the sovereign right claimed by NAPOLEON, the
reigning emperor of the French, and the political relations between the
United States and France, were involved, it was, upon the suggestion of the
Attorney General, ordered to a hearing in preference to other causes which
stood before it on the docket.
Id. at 116.
27. The Chinese Exclusion Case, 130 U.S. at 604.
28. See Fong Yue Ting v. United States, 149 U.S. 698, 707 (1893) (“The right of a
nation to expel or deport foreigners, who have not been naturalized, or taken any steps
towards becoming citizens of the country, rests upon the same grounds, and is as absolute
and unqualified as the right to prohibit and prevent their entrance into the country.”).

14
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National sovereignty over territory and the conduct of foreign
relations should be understood according to the jurisprudence of the
time. In the early Republic, the law of nations, which dealt principally
with the relations of nation-states, was considered part of the law of the
United States. 29 The doctrines of the law of nations were drawn from
the writings of continental theorists, 30 and both empowered and
constrained the foreign relations powers of the United States. 31 In the
late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, customary international
law (a second-cousin descendent of the law of nations 32) was
considered part of the law of the land, 33 and the exclusion and
deportation of Chinese aliens certainly affected (negatively) foreign
relations with China. To justify congressional exclusion and
deportation statutes, the Supreme Court during this era departed from
the McCulloch doctrine of enumerated powers and relied instead on two
powers of indefinite scope as derived from the law of nations—national
sovereignty over territory and foreign relations.34
The source of national immigration law is now uncertain. International
law becomes part of domestic law when it is a self-executing treaty or

29. See The Nereide, 13 U.S. (9 Cranch) 388, 423 (1815) (“[T]he Court is bound
by the law of nations which is part of the law of the land.”); Talbot v. Seeman, 5 U.S.
(1 Cranch) 1, 12–13 (1801) (“This court is now to decide by the law of nations, not by
[foreign] municipal regulations.”). See generally David M. Golove & Daniel J.
Hulsebosch, The Law of Nations and the Constitution: An Early Modern Perspective, 106 GEO.
L.J. 1593, 1616–23 (2018) (explaining how the law of nations was part of the law of the
land and was heavily relied on by the Founders).
30. The most important was Vattel. See EMER DE VATTEL, THE LAW OF NATIONS
(Joseph Chitty ed., 1854) (1758).
31. The Nereide, 13 U.S. (9 Cranch) at 418–20 (holding that the law of nations
prohibited the Executive’s seizure of cargo owned by a neutral on an armed British
merchant vessel during the War of 1812); Brown v. United States, 12 U.S. (8 Cranch)
110, 128–29 (1814) (holding that the Executive’s seizure of non-military property of
British nationals in the United States immediately following Congress’s declaration of
war was not authorized by the law of nations or the Constitution).
32. The law of nations differed from customary international law in two important
ways: the doctrines of the law of nations were drawn primarily from natural law, and
they were independent sources of national authority as well as constraints on that
authority. See infra notes 314–21 and accompanying text.
33. The Paquete Habana, 175 U.S. 677, 700 (1900) (“International law is part of
our law, and must be ascertained and administered by the courts of justice of
appropriate jurisdiction, as often as questions of right depending upon it are duly
presented for their determination.”).
34. See Cleveland, supra note 16, at 156–58.
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incorporated by a congressional statute.35 But in an era when legal
positivism exerts such a strong influence, the general enforceability of
customary international law is a matter of serious doubt.36 If international
law is not the basis of a federal immigration power, what is?
Consider a significant modern Supreme Court decision on the conflict
between national and state authority over immigration. Arizona v. United
States37 applied field preemption to hold unconstitutional Arizona statutes
relating to foreigners who entered the United States illegally under federal
immigration law.38 In affirming Congress’s plenary power over
immigration as now “well settled,” 39 the Court explained the
constitutional bases for congressional authority:
The Government of the United States has broad, undoubted power
over the subject of immigration and the status of aliens. This
authority rests, in part, on the National Government’s constitutional
power to “establish an uniform Rule of Naturalization,” Art. I, § 8,
cl. 4, and its inherent power as sovereign to control and conduct
relations with foreign nations. 40

The national immigration power was thus based on the combination of an
enumerated power (making a uniform rule of naturalization) and an
implied national power (conducting foreign relations). Interestingly, the
Court did not rely on an implied sovereign territorial power, perhaps because
it was based on the law of nations. Nor did the Court rely solely on the
newly-discovered Naturalization Clause, no doubt because, although
there is a certain overlap, the Naturalization Clause affords to foreigners
the full political rights of citizenship, while immigration and deportation
statutes exclude them from or regulate their conduct within the country’s
territory. 41 Thus, the Court added and emphasized the national
35. See Medellin v. Texas, 552 U.S. 491, 505 (2008); Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 548 U.S.
557, 601–02 (2006), superseded by statute, Military Commissions Act of 2006, Pub. L. No.
109–366, § 7(b), 120 Stat. 2600, 2636 (2006).
36. See JEFFREY L. DUNOFF ET AL., INTERNATIONAL LAW: NORMS, ACTORS, PROCESS
236–48, 306 (4th ed. 2015); RICHARD FALLON ET AL., HART AND WECHSLER’S THE FEDERAL
COURTS AND THE FEDERAL SYSTEM 712–22 (7th ed. 2015) [hereinafter HART &
WECHSLER]; Curtis A. Bradley & Jack L. Goldsmith, Customary International Law as
Federal Common Law: A Critique of the Modern Position, 110 HARV. L. REV. 815, 852 (1997).
37. 567 U.S. 387 (2012).
38. Id. at 395, 401, 403.
39. Id. at 395.
40. Id. at 394–95 (emphasis added).
41. See Schwartz, supra note 11, at 631. As Professor Schwartz explains more fully:
[N]aturalization refers only to the process of granting citizenship to foreignborn persons. It does not entail other rules for allowing foreign-born persons
to travel or reside in the United States, or the rules for deporting non-citizens.
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government’s “inherent power as sovereign” to conduct foreign relations
as a basis for the immigration laws.42
C. A General National Recognition Power
In Zivotofsky v. Kerry, 43 the Supreme Court considered the authority
of the national government to recognize foreign states and
governments as an issue of the separation of powers. 44 Was a national
recognition power shared by Congress and the President, or was it an
exclusive prerogative of the President? The Court decided the latter. 45
But the Court never examined a necessary preliminary question: how
does the Constitution vest a general power of recognition in the
government of the United States? This is another situation in which
the practical need for such a national instrument of foreign affairs
seems overwhelming. But it is not enumerated in the Constitution.
The Court began by stressing the importance of recognition.
Recognition can carry with it significant legal consequences—a
Because it is immigrants who seek to naturalize as citizens, a power to regulate
immigration might be plausibly defined to include naturalization, but not the
other way around. The power to admit, exclude, or deport aliens is not
necessary and proper to the power to establish citizenship requirements. The
two powers overlap to some degree, but their importance is comparable.
Id.; see also THOMAS A. ALEINIKOFF ET AL., IMMIGRATION AND CITIZENSHIP: PROCESS AND
POLICY 187 (4th ed. 1998) (distinguishing between “regulation of the physical entry of
aliens into the territory of the United States and regulation of the entry into the political
community of the United States through the extension of full political rights to
naturalized citizens”). For an argument that the Foreign and Interstate Commerce
Clauses could be the constitutional sources of most immigration laws, see Jennifer
Gordon, Immigration as Commerce: A New Look at the Federal Immigration Power and the
Constitution, 93 IND. L.J. 653 (2018).
42. Arizona, 567 U.S. at 394–95. Justice Scalia rejected both the Naturalization
Clause and an implied foreign affairs power as the constitutional bases for national
immigration laws. Id. at 418, 422 (Scalia, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part)
(naturalization power); id. at 423–24 (foreign affairs power). Instead, he endorsed a
sovereign territorial power, derived from the law of nations, as the constitutional basis
for both federal and state immigration laws, id. at 416–22, a seemingly peculiar
approach for a justice who otherwise professed a jurisprudence of legal positivism on
such issues. See, e.g., Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692, 739, 745 (2004) (Scalia, J.,
concurring in part and concurring in judgment) (“[T]he creation of post-Erie federal
common law is rooted in a positivist mindset utterly foreign to the American commonlaw tradition of the late 18th century . . . which applied the ‘law of nations’ . . . .”).
Scalia would have resolved these coordinate implied sovereign powers by requiring a
direct conflict between the federal and state statutes. Arizona, 567 U.S. at 424.
43. (Zivotofsky II), 135 S. Ct. 2076 (2015).
44. Id. at 2081.
45. Id. at 2085.
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recognized state or government may sue in United States courts, where
it enjoys foreign sovereign immunity and the act of state doctrine, and
it may make treaties and have commercial and diplomatic relations
with the United States. 46 For inexplicable reasons, the Court ignored
possible congressional power over recognition. 47 In fact, Congress has
recognized foreign states or governments as necessary and proper to
the powers to declare war 48 and regulate foreign commerce. 49 Focusing
entirely on the Executive, the Court found three enumerated powers that
supported a presidential recognition power—to receive foreign
diplomats, to appoint diplomats to represent the United States in
relations with other nations and governments, and to make treaties. 50
The Court’s reliance on these executive powers is certainly
questionable. The Reception Clause most probably imposed a ministerial
duty on the President, as head of state, to receive diplomats from
recognized states and governments, and the appointments and treaty
powers of the President are shared with the Senate. 51
My point here is not to question the separation of powers decision
in Zivotofsky II, although I believe that it is incorrect. Rather, my
submission is that the enumerated powers of Congress and the
President (even as generously construed) do not amount to a general
recognition power. 52 Recognition is ordinarily accomplished through
46. Id. at 2084.
47. See Jack Goldsmith, Zivotofsky II as Precedent in the Executive Branch, 129 HARV.
L. REV. 112, 118–20 (2015).
48. Robert J. Reinstein, Is the President’s Recognition Power Exclusive?, 86 TEMP. L. REV.
1, 35–41 (2013) (discussing 1898 Joint Resolution recognizing the independence of
the people of Cuba and directing the President to use military force to evict Spain
from the island).
49. See id. at 15–18 (discussing the Haitian Non-Intercourse Act of 1806); see also
Clark v. United States, 5 F. Cas. 932, 934 (C.C.D. Pa. 1811) (No. 2,838) (Washington,
J.) (holding that, notwithstanding Haiti’s declaration of independence and de facto
control over its territory, the Non-Intercourse Act constituted a binding American
recognition of the territory as a dependency of France).
50. Zivotofsky II, 135 S. Ct. at 2084–86.
51. See id. at 2113–14 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting); Robert J. Reinstein, Recognition: A
Case Study on the Original Understanding of Executive Power, 45 U. RICH. L. REV. 801, 810–
16 (2011).
52. Arguably, one might infer a general power of recognition from the Reception
Clause plus the commerce, war and treaty powers and the Necessary and Proper
Clause. The President’s reception of a foreign diplomat is certainly public evidence that
the diplomat represents a recognized government. But the decision to recognize that
government necessarily preceded the reception. That is what happened in President
Washington’s famous reception of Genet. See Reinstein, supra note 48, at 9–14. As for
the commerce and war and treaty powers, under the classical McCulloch doctrine
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a simple declaration that, in the view of the United States, a foreign
state is an independent member of the community of nations and/or
that a government is the legitimate authority of that state. 53 The United
States has recognized foreign governments without making treaties or
having commercial or diplomatic relations with those governments
(including the refusal of the President to receive their ambassadors), or
giving them the unqualified rights of foreign sovereign immunity or the
act of state doctrine. A contemporary example is Cuba.54 Conversely, the
United States does not recognize Taiwanese independence or the
government in Taipei that enacts and enforces law in Taiwan. But
Taiwan enjoys almost all of the benefits of a recognized state under the
Taiwan Relations Act. 55
In short, recognition is an implied national power that is more
general than any of the enumerated powers. What, then, is the source
of a general recognition power? In the early Republic, presidents
relied upon the authority of the law of nations. 56 With the apparent
demise of customary international law as an integral part of federal law,
a general recognition power became an instrument of the national
power over foreign policy. And, although the Court in Zivotofsky II may
have cut down the dicta in Curtiss-Wright of executive primacy in
making foreign policy, 57 the Court did not question that decision’s
extra-constitutional doctrine of the United States’ inherent sovereign
power over foreign relations.

recognition can be used as an implied power to carry out those enumerated powers.
But just as the creation of a national bank corporation to carry out Congress’s fiscal
powers did not denote a general national power to create corporations, the use of
recognition to effectuate certain enumerated powers does not denote a general
national power of recognition.
53. SATOW’S DIPLOMATIC PRACTICE § 6, at 71 (Sir Ivor Roberts ed., 6th ed. 2009); 3
JOHN BASSETT MOORE, A DIGEST OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 73 (1906).
54. See, for example, the Second Hickenlooper Amendment, 22 U.S.C.
§ 2370(e)(2), which generally prohibits Cuba from invoking the act of state doctrine
to contest expropriations of American property by the Castro regime.
55. 93 Stat. 14 (1979) (codified as amended at 22 U.S.C. §§ 3301–3316 (2012)).
The Court acknowledged as much. Zivotofsky II, 135 S. Ct. at 2094 (majority opinion).
For a detailed discussion of this statute, see Reinstein, supra note 48, at 42–50.
56. See David Gray Adler, The President’s Recognition Power, in THE CONSTITUTION AND
THE CONDUCT OF AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY 133, 133–57 (David Gray Adler & Larry N.
George eds., 1996); Robert J. Reinstein, Executive Power and the Law of Nations in the
Washington Administration, 46 U. RICH. L. REV. 373, 422–24 (2012).
57. Zivotofsky II, 135 S. Ct. at 2089–90.
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D. A General National Power over Passports
There is no enumerated power in the Constitution that authorizes
the issuance of passports. But the Executive issued passports since the
beginning of the Republic, 58 and Congress subsequently enacted
passport legislation. The modern passport system serves multiple
functions. As instruments of foreign policy, passports are official
diplomatic communications requesting safe conduct for Americans
abroad. They also regulate and constrain international travel.
Moreover, as a condition for entry into the United States, passports
help enforce national security and the immigration laws. Finally,
passports are used as conclusive evidence of identity and citizenship.
In Haig v. Agee, 59 the Supreme Court upheld the national passport
power on three bases. 60 First, relying on the extra-constitutional
sovereignty doctrine of Curtiss-Wright and the dicta in that case on the
pre-eminent authority of the President over foreign affairs, the Court
stated that this was an inherent power in the Executive. 61 Second, the
Court concluded that Congress did not divest this implied executive
power when it enacted passport legislation.62 Third, apparently
recognizing an implied power in Congress over passports (albeit without
examining the source of that power), the Court upheld the authority of
the President to include non-statutory regulations in passports by relying
on historical practice and congressional acquiescence.63
This question over the source of the passport power was revisited in
Zivotofsky II. Justice Kennedy’s majority opinion operated on the
assumption that such a power exists as incident to a national sovereign
power over foreign relations. But four Justices were not satisfied with this
assumption. Justice Thomas argued that the passport power could not be
implied from any of Congress’s specific enumerated powers.64 According to
Thomas, issuing passports was part of the President’s residual power over
58. For a discussion of the military use of “safe conduct” passports within the
United States during the War of Independence and their subsequent use during
peacetime in the early Republic, see Calvin H. Johnson, The Dubious Enumerated Power
Doctrine, 22 CONST. COMMENT. 25, 39–42 (2005). The evolution of the passport system
from its primitive origins to its present design is discussed more fully at text
accompanying infra notes 445–54.
59. 453 U.S. 280 (1981).
60. Id. at 291–92, 296–99, 302.
61. Id. at 291–92.
62. Id. at 296–99.
63. Id. at 302.
64. Zivotofsky v. Kerry (Zivotofsky II), 135 S. Ct. 2076, 2097, 2103-05 (2015)
(Thomas, J., concurring in judgment and dissenting in part).
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foreign affairs that was implicitly contained in the Executive Vesting Clause
of Article II, Section 1.65 Accusing Thomas of advancing a theory of executive
power that was more suited to George III than to George Washington, Justice
Scalia, joined by the Chief Justice and Justice Alito, tried to fit a congressional
power over passports as incidental to five enumerated or implied powers of
Congress.66 Although Thomas and Scalia disagreed sharply on the source of
the passport power, each agreed in this inconclusive debate that this power
was somehow vested in the national government.
E. Paper Money as Legal Tender for All Public and Private Debts
The Constitution vested Congress with the power to coin money 67
and prohibited States from either coining money or issuing any paper
currency as legal tender. 68 But the Constitution neither authorized nor
prohibited Congress from issuing paper money as legal tender. In light
of the abuses of paper money during the Confederation period, the lack of
national authority appears to have been both understandable and deliberate;
in fact, the Confederation Congress’s power to issue bills of credit on the
authority of the United States was one of the few legislative powers in the
Articles that the Convention did not transfer to Congress.69 But the
Convention left a gap by not imposing an explicit prohibition on Congress.
The national government first issued paper money as legal tender
during the Civil War. The extraordinary costs of the war quickly depleted
the Treasury’s specie reserves. Upon the urgent recommendation of
Secretary of the Treasury, Salmon Chase, Congress authorized the
issuance of hundreds of millions of dollars of paper money, which, not
backed by specie, had no inherent value. By legislative fiat, Congress
created that value by declaring this paper money to be legal tender for all
private and public debts (that is, creditors were legally obligated to accept
it as payments on debts).

65. Id. at 2097–103.
66. See id. at 2116-18, 2123–26 (Scalia, J., dissenting). Justice Scalia relied on the
foreign commerce, naturalization and territorial powers, section 5 of the 14th
Amendment, and the implied power over migration deduced from the 20-year ban on
congressional prohibition of the international slave trade. Id.
67. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 5.
68. Id. art. I, § 10, cl. 1 (“No State shall . . . coin Money; emit Bills of Credit; make
any Thing but gold and silver Coin a Tender in Payment of Debts . . . .”).
69. See 2 THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787 at 308–11 (Max
Farrand ed., 1911) [hereinafter FARRAND] (recounting how the Convention struck the
clause proposed by the Committee of Detail authorizing Congress to “emit bills on the
credit of the United States” from the list of enumerated powers).
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The constitutionality of these laws was tested after the Civil War, and
these cases produced deep divisions in the Supreme Court. In the first
such case, Hepburn v. Griswold,70 the Court held the legal tender statutes
unconstitutional by a 4-3 vote in a majority opinion written ironically by
Chief Justice Salmon Chase.71 Chase used the McCulloch framework and
held that the use of paper money as legal tender, particularly as applied to
pre-existing private debts, was not necessary and proper for the execution
of any enumerated congressional power (including the war powers).72
The Hepburn Court had only seven Justices. After Ulysses Grant was
elected president, he appointed two Justices, and, in Knox v. Lee, 73 the
reconstituted Court reversed its earlier decision by a 5-4 vote and
upheld the legal tender statutes. 74 Justice Strong’s majority opinion
adverted at length to the existence of unspecified powers of Congress
that derived from national sovereignty, to the importance of
interpreting congressional power consistently with the broad objects
of the Constitution, and to the validity of applying the enumerated
powers in the aggregate rather than individually. 75 Ultimately,
however, Strong used a conventional McCulloch approach and upheld
the statutes as necessary to sustain the Union’s war efforts. The Court
could not second-guess Congress’s choice of means—that a national
currency of paper money was necessary to support the war and would
be more effective as legal tender for both future and pre-existing
public and private debts. 76 However, the decision in Knox v. Lee was
equivocal because Justice Strong’s majority opinion, and Justice
Bradley’s key concurrence, 77 ultimately upheld the constitutionality of
the legal tender statutes as incident to the war powers. 78
70. 75 U.S. (8 Wall.) 603 (1869).
71. Id. at 625.
72. Id. at 620–25. Foreshadowing the Lochner era, Chase wrote that the use of paper
money as legal tender violated the spirit of the Constitution because it impaired the
value of contracts and effectively took property without due process of law. Id. at 622–25.
73. (Legal Tender Cases), 79 U.S. (12 Wall.) 457 (1870) (deciding two cases—Knox
v. Lee and Parker v. Davis—in a consolidated decision).
74. Id. at 553–54.
75. Id. at 531–39.
76. See id. at 540–44. Strong also rejected the claim that the statutes violated the
spirit of the Constitution. The value of contracts and property were always dependent
upon future events, including the effects of future legislation. Id. at 544.
77. Id. at 554 (Bradley, J., concurring).
78. See id. at 567 (providing the fifth affirmative vote, Bradley cautioned that the
power of issuing paper money as legal tender was a “power not to be resorted to except
upon extraordinary and pressing occasions, such as war or other public exigencies of
great gravity and importance . . .”).

22

AMERICAN UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 69:3

The general validity of paper money as legal tender was not resolved
until 1884. In Juilliard v. Greenman, 79 the Court held (8-1) that Congress
had the unqualified power to issue paper money as legal tender—
during times of peace as well as national emergency, and for all public
and private debts, whether pre-existing or prospective. 80 Justice Gray
adopted the approach suggested, but not ultimately used, by Strong
and Bradley in Knox v. Lee. Under McCulloch, the Constitution should
be viewed as a whole, and the enumerated powers should be construed
in the aggregate and not independently of each other: “The breadth
and comprehensiveness of the words of the Constitution are nowhere
more strikingly exhibited than in regard to the powers over the
subjects of revenue, finance, and currency . . . .” 81 Combining the
taxing and spending, borrowing, commerce, and coining powers with
the Necessary and Proper Clause produced a general fiscal, monetary,
and currency power in Congress. This meant that Congress could
create a national currency and had the choice of means in deciding
upon the nature of that currency. If required by national exigency,
Congress could issue paper money as legal tender for all private and public
debts. As for the determination of a national exigency, Gray again invoked
McCulloch—that was a political question to be decided by Congress.82
Julliard v. Greenman is a departure from the classical McCulloch doctrine of
implied powers. The Court did not assert that paper money as legal tender
was necessary and proper to carry out one or more specific enumerated
powers. Instead, it aggregated certain of the enumerated powers to produce
a broader and more encompassing fiscal and monetary power and then held
that the legal tender statutes were appropriately related to that larger
aggregate power.83 This theory of aggregating enumerated powers is
different than the classical understanding of McCulloch, and I will revisit it in
Parts III, IV, and V of this Article as a central component of a theory that
explains and justifies aggregate and implied national powers.

79. 110 U.S. 421 (1884).
80. Id. at 449–50.
81. Id. at 439.
82. See id. at 449–50. Sovereignty was mentioned only in relation to the common
practices of other nations in having a currency of paper money with legal tender, which
supported the appropriateness of this measure as carrying out a national fiscal and
monetary policy. See id. at 447, 450. For a discussion of the legal tender decisions, see
generally Gerard N. Magliocca, A New Approach to Congressional Power: Revisiting the
Legal Tender Cases, 95 GEO. L.J. 119 (2006).
83. See Julliard, 110 U.S. at 449–50.
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F. The Marshall Court and Two Implied National Powers
The Marshall Court upheld two powers that involved the contractual
rights of the United States. There is no enumerated power that authorizes
the United States, without enabling legislation, to enter into contracts or to
sue for damages and other relief in the event those contracts are breached.
Of course, Congress may vest those powers in the Executive under the
Necessary and Proper Clause. That is, if Congress enacts a tax or regulatory
law within the scope of its powers, it may, under the Necessary and Proper
Clause, authorize the Executive, acting in the name of the United States, to
enter into whatever contracts are needed to effectuate that law and to sue
and recover damages for breaches of those contracts. But what if Congress
enacts such a tax or regulatory law, but does not authorize the government
to make and enforce contracts in order to carry out that law? In United States
v. Tingey,84 the Court held that, even in the absence of such enabling
legislation, the United States has the inherent right to make contracts that
are otherwise within the scope of national power.85 And in Dugan v. United
States,86 the Court held that the United States has the inherent rights, again
without enabling legislation from Congress, to sue to enforce its contracts
and to recover damages for breach of contracts to which it is a party.87 The
Court based both decisions on inherent national sovereignty.
G. Expansions of Federal Court Jurisdiction
The previous sections dealt with national powers that exceed enumerated
legislative powers and cannot easily be justified as means to carry out those
specific powers. The present Section discusses the analogous existence of
national powers that exceed enumerated judicial powers.88
The Supreme Court has repeatedly stated that neither Congress nor the
Court itself may expand the judicial power of the United States to cases
or controversies beyond the nine categories that are enumerated in
Section 2 of Article III.89 However, the Court has never invalidated an act
of Congress on that ground. In several noteworthy situations, it has
tortured the language of specific enumerations to effect that expansion.
84. 30 U.S. (5 Pet.) 115 (1831).
85. Id. at 127–28.
86. 16 U.S. (3 Wheat.) 172 (1818).
87. Id. at 181.
88. This Section builds on an excellent article by Gil Seinfeld, Article I, Article III
and the Limits of Enumeration, 108 MICH. L. REV. 1389 (2010).
89. The earliest expression of this principle appears to be Bank of United States v.
Deveaux, 9 U.S. (5 Cranch) 61, 72 (1809). For a collection of the cases and scholarship
discussing this principle, see Seinfeld, supra note 88, at 1408–11.
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1.

Corporations as citizens
Section 11 of the Judiciary Act of 1791 90 provided for federal trial
court jurisdiction when the “suit is between a citizen of the State where
the suit is brought, and a citizen of another State.” 91 This statute
implemented the Article III category of controversies between
“Citizens of different States.” 92
Under the plain terms of the statutory grant and of Article III,
corporations should not be able to invoke the diversity jurisdiction. In
an 1809 contract action brought by the Bank of the United States,
Chief Justice Marshall began by stating the obvious, that “a corporation
aggregate, is certainly not a citizen,” 93 but then planted the seeds for a
contrary result. Marshall posited that a corporation represents its
owners and hypothesized that perhaps there might be complete
diversity between all of the Bank’s owners and the opposing party. The
case was remanded to determine whether this remote hypothesis was
true. 94 Following a “long and tortuous evolution of the law” 95 during
the antebellum era, the Court turned this hypothetical into a
conclusive legal presumption that the owners were citizens of the State
of incorporation. 96 The Court maintained that it was enforcing a policy
of equal protection:
The right of choosing an impartial tribunal is a privilege of no small
practical importance, and more especially in cases where a distant
plaintiff has to contend with the power and influence of great
numbers and the combined wealth wielded by corporations in
almost every State. It is of importance also to corporations
themselves that they should enjoy the same privileges, in other
States, where local prejudices or jealousy might injuriously affect
them. 97

90. Ch. 20, § 11, 1 Stat. 73, 78 (1789).
91. Id.
92. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2; see Judiciary Act of 1791 § 11. The statutory grant of
jurisdiction did not completely cover this Article III category of cases because it required
the plaintiff to sue in his or her state of citizenship, contained an amount in controversy
requirement, and appeared to require complete diversity between the parties.
93. Deveaux, 9 U.S. (5 Cranch) at 86.
94. Id. at 91–92.
95. Nat’l Mut. Ins. v. Tidewater Transfer Co., 337 U.S. 582, 604, 618 n.12 (1949)
(Rutledge, J., concurring).
96. The culminating decisions were Marshall v. Baltimore & Ohio Railroad Co., 57
U.S. (16 How.) 314 (1853), and Ohio & Mississippi Railroad Co. v. Wheeler, 66 U.S. (1
Black) 286 (1861).
97. Marshall, 57 U.S. (16 How.) at 329.
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These decisions have been characterized as resting on a “complete
fiction,”98 but they are still good law. The transformation of corporations
into citizens was first accomplished by judicial fiat. This framework
changed in 1958, when Congress declared that corporations are citizens,
and sometimes citizens of more than one State.99 The conversion of
corporations into citizens for purposes of the Article III diversity
jurisdiction is now based on congressional legislation.
2.

Tidewater
In 1805, the Marshall Court held that the District of Columbia was not
a State within the meaning of the diversity statute and of Article III. 100
Perhaps emboldened by a vague suggestion in that opinion that Congress
might somehow correct this,101 Congress amended the diversity statute in
1940 to include citizens of the District of Columbia. 102
The 1940 statute was enacted to fill a perceived unfair gap in the
diversity jurisdiction enumerated in Article III by providing citizens of
the District of Columbia with the same access to the federal courts as
was enjoyed by citizens of States. 103 In Tidewater, 104 a majority of the
Supreme Court strongly endorsed this congressional policy but was
unable to coalesce on a legal principle that would allow Congress to
correct Article III’s apparent shortcoming. 105
The statute was upheld through an unusual confluence of minority
opinions. Two Justices, in an opinion by Rutledge, would have held, in
effect, that if the term “[c]itizens” in the Article III diversity clause
could be interpreted to include corporations, then the term “State” in
that same clause can be interpreted to include the District of
98. Carden v. Arkoma Assocs., 494 U.S. 185, 193–94 (1990).
99. See Act of July 25, 1958, Pub. L. No. 85–554, § 2, 72 Stat. 415 (codified as
amended at 28 U.S.C. § 1332(c)(1) (2012)) (“[A] corporation shall be deemed a
citizen of any State by which it has been incorporated and of the State where it has its
principal place of business.”). Congress amended this statute in 2011 by changing “any
State” to “every State and foreign state.” See 28 U.S.C. § 1332(c)(1).
100. Hepburn & Dundas v. Ellzey, 6 U.S. (2 Cranch) 445, 452–53 (1805).
101. Id. at 453 (“It is true that as citizens of the United States . . . it is extraordinary
that the courts of the United States, which are open to aliens, and to the citizens of
every state in the union, should be closed upon them. But this is a subject for legislative
not for judicial consideration.”).
102. See Act of Apr. 20, 1940, ch. 117, 54 Stat. 143.
103. See Charles W. Davidson, Comment, Diversity Jurisdiction for Citizens of The District
of Columbia, 9 OHIO ST. L.J. 309, 313–14 (1948) (describing the purpose of the amendment
to put D.C. citizens in the same position as those of States in regard to diversity jurisdiction).
104. Nat’l Mut. Ins. v. Tidewater Transfer Co., 337 U.S. 582 (1949) (plurality opinion).
105. Id. at 603–04; id. at 625–26 (Rutledge, J., concurring).
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Columbia. 106 This argument would have effected less of an expansion
in Article III jurisdiction than the corporation cases but was rejected
by the majority because, well, one legal fiction did not justify another,
particularly a new one that would overrule a Marshall Court decision.
Three Justices, in an opinion by Jackson, would have held that
Congress may vest subject matter jurisdiction in the federal courts over
all cases involving conduct that could be, but was not, regulated under
any of Congress’s Article I powers. 107 This theory was rejected by the
majority (including Rutledge) as violating the principle that
Congress’s authority to vest jurisdiction in the federal courts is limited
by the Article III enumerations. As applied to Congress’s plenary
power over the District, Jackson’s argument would modestly expand
federal court jurisdiction beyond the Article III enumerations. 108
However, as applied to all of the Article I powers, particularly the
commerce power, this theory would encompass innumerable cases
involving conduct over which Congress had not legislated and was still
governed by state law. 109 The result would be a massive and indefinite
expansion of congressional power to vest jurisdiction beyond the
supposed limits of Article III.
Jackson’s and Rutledge’s positions were rejected by a majority of the
Court, but the respective minority votes combined to produce a
decision in favor of the statute’s constitutionality. The result was a
congressional expansion of federal court jurisdiction beyond the
specifically enumerated diversity and arising under categories.
3.

Osborn and its progeny
Osborn 110 was a case brought by the Bank of the United States in a
federal circuit court. Ohio had imposed a confiscatory tax on the Bank
and state officials then proceeded to seize its assets. The Bank sought
an injunction against state actions that appeared unconstitutional
under McCulloch. The initial question in the case was the extent to
which the circuit courts had original jurisdiction over cases in which
the Bank was a party.

106. Id. at 620–23 (Rutledge, J., concurring).
107. Id. at 590–94, 619.
108. Jackson’s and Rutledge’s arguments would also presumably apply to the
Territories.
109. The classical decisions expanding the commerce power pre-dated Tidewater. See
Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111 (1942); United States v. Darby, 312 U.S. 100 (1941).
110. 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 738 (1824).
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Osborn itself involved a federal question that would almost certainly
arise in the litigation—the constitutionality of Ohio’s tax and the
seizure of the Bank’s assets. Although brought as a trespass action, this
could be a strong case for arising under jurisdiction because the Bank
would have to prove that state officials acted unconstitutionally to
obtain the relief that it sought. The weakest case for the arising under
jurisdiction was, as Marshall noted, a typical contract action such as
Osborn’s companion case. 111 Over Justice Johnson’s dissent, the Court
held the arising under jurisdiction extended to the unrestricted right
of the Bank to enforce all of its contracts in federal trial courts.
There was an obvious need for a neutral federal court forum for
cases in which the Bank was a party. The Ohio tax on the Bank and the
seizure of its assets exemplified intense state hostility against this
federally chartered corporation. Leaving the Bank at the mercy of state
court judges and juries who shared those biases could endanger the
Bank’s effectiveness and possibly its existence. But as in the
corporation cases and Tidewater, it was easier to articulate a policy
argument for original federal court jurisdiction than a defensible
principle to uphold that jurisdiction.
Marshall’s major premise was that the Bank’s right to make and
enforce contracts would not exist but for federal law. The
congressional charter not only created the Bank but authorized it to
make contracts and to sue for their enforcement:
The charter of incorporation not only creates [the Bank], but gives
it every faculty which it possesses. The power to acquire rights of any
description, to transact business of any description, to make
contracts of any description, to sue on those contracts, is given and
measured by its charter, and that charter is a law of the United States.
This being can acquire no right, make no contract, bring no suit, which is
not authorized by a law of the United States. It is not only itself the mere
creature of a law, but all its actions and all its rights are dependent
on the same law. 112

Charter provisions were thus said to form the “original ingredient[s]”
of, and the Bank was “compelled” to prove charter authorization for,
every contract claim. 113 Marshall clinched this argument through his
111. See id. at 823 (“Take the case of a contract, which is put as the strongest against
the Bank.”). The companion case of Bank of the United States v. Planters’ Bank of Georgia,
22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 904 (1824), was a contract action brought by the Bank in a federal
circuit court.
112. Osborn, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) at 823 (emphasis added).
113. Id. at 824–25.
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common device of a rhetorical question: “Can a being, thus constituted,
have a case which does not arise literally, as well as substantially, under
the [federal charter]?” 114
The answer to this rhetorical question is “yes,” because it is simply false that
the Bank could “acquire no right, make no contract, bring no suit, which is
not authorized by a law of the United States.”115 Those were common law
rights that existed independently of the charter or any other federal law.
Marshall would have the readers of his opinion believe that the
Bank’s capacities to make contracts were expressly authorized by the
charter. There was no such clause in the charter.116 Of course the congressional
charter established the Bank as a corporation. But the Bank’s general
contractual rights and obligations117 were no different than if it had been
operated as a sole proprietorship or partnership: they were products of the
common law. As the then-leading contemporary authority on corporate law
stated, all corporations had the same inherent capacities as natural persons
to make contracts and to sue for their enforcement.118 These capacities had
been recognized by the common law at least since the 1600’s,119 and, based
on a presumptive equation of corporate and natural rights, did not have to
be authorized by charter.120 The Supreme Court had already applied this
114. Id. at 823.
115. Id.
116. See Act of Apr. 10, 1816, ch. 44, 3 Stat. 266. The Bank’s charter contained a
catch-all clause and a clause authorizing the Bank to purchase and sell real and
personal property with an aggregate limit of $55 million. § 7, 3 Stat. at 269. Those
clauses did not constitute a general right to make contracts. See Bank of Columbia v.
Patterson’s Adm’r, 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) 299, 306 (1813).
117. There were clauses in the charter authorizing certain contacts related to
banking. Other clauses placed limitations on certain contacts, such as incurring debt
up to $35 million. See §§ 9, 11, 3 Stat. at 270–74. If the Bank’s directors or officers made
a contract contrary to those charter provisions, they could be held personally liable;
but such charter violations would not nullify the common law validity of the contract
as against the party with whom the agreement was made. Fleckner v. Bank of the U.S.,
21 U.S. (8 Wheat.) 338, 353–55 (1823); see Bank of Columbia, 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) at 299.
118. 1 STEWART KYD, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF CORPORATIONS 69–70 (1793). I use
the term “capacities” rather than “rights” to include cases brought against the Bank.
119. Samuel Williston, History of the Law of Business Corporations before 1800, 2 HARV.
L. REV. 105, 117 (1888).
[T]he conception of a corporation as a legal person, a conception going back
farther than can be definitely traced, involves necessarily the consequence that
before the law the corporation shall be treated like any other person. To this
consequence there is a necessary exception in regard to such rights and duties
as require an actual person for their subject.
Id.
120. Id. at 120–21.
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common law principle to corporations.121 Just as natural persons did not
need statutory authority to make contracts or to sue to enforce those
contracts, neither did the Bank of the United States.
The Second Bank’s charter included a “sue and be sued” clause
providing that:
[T]he subscribers to the said bank of the United States of America .
. . by that name shall be . . . made able and capable, in law, . . . to sue
and be sued, plead and be impleaded, answer and be answered,
defend and be defended, in all state courts having competent
jurisdiction, and in any circuit court of the United States . . . . 122

The most natural reading of this clause is that it codified the Bank’s
common law juridical capacities to sue and be sued and identified the
federal courts in which such actions could be heard (the circuit courts)
and, by exclusion, those in which it could not (the district courts). This
“sue and be sued” clause did not purport to vest jurisdiction, but
Marshall converted it into a jurisdictional grant with an ingenious
argument of legislative history. 123
Even if this generous construction of a “sue and be sued” clause was
correct, 124 that simply raised the Article III arising under problem. A
case does not arise under a jurisdictional statute. What law would a
court with jurisdiction apply in deciding contract actions in which the
Bank sued or was sued? In contract actions brought by or against the
121. Bank of Columbia, 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) at 306 (“The act incorporating the Bank
of Columbia (act of Maryland, 1793, ch. 30) contains no express provision authorizing
the corporation to make contracts. And it follows, that upon principles of the common law,
it might contract under its corporate seal.”). But see Carlos M. Vásquez, The Federal “Claim”
in the District Courts: Osborn, Verlinden, and Protective Jurisdiction, 95 CALIF. L. REV. 1731,
1740–41 (2007) (accepting Marshall’s contention that in the absence of charter provisions
the Bank would not have the capacity to make contracts, sue or be sued).
122. § 7, 3 Stat. at 269.
123. Osborn, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) at 817–18. The argument went as follows: The First
Bank’s charter contained a general sue and be sued clause, but the Court had held
that this language was not specific enough for a congressional intent to vest original
jurisdiction in federal trial courts. See Bank of the United States v. Deveaux, 9 U.S. (5
Cranch) 61, 85–86 (1809). In the Second Bank’s sue and be sued clause, Congress
specifically included lawsuits in the circuit courts. This change in wording was
construed to mean that Congress intended to vest original circuit court jurisdiction
over all cases in which the Second Bank was a party.
124. But see id. at 878–79 (Johnson, J., dissenting). Justice Scalia argued that
Marshall’s construction of the Bank’s sue and be sued clause was incorrect. Scalia
adopted the more natural reading of the clause as affirming the Bank’s juridical
capacity to sue and be sued and specifying the particular federal court in which such
actions could be brought. Am. Nat’l Red Cross v. S.G., 505 U.S. 247, 271–72 (1992)
(Scalia, J., dissenting).
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Bank in federal trial courts, general common law principles would be
applied. 125 Such common law rules of decision were not viewed as
federal law and were not binding on state courts. 126 Thus, contract
actions brought by or against the Bank in state courts would be
governed by state common law. Most notably, contract actions brought
against the Bank in state court, which were not removable, would be
decided by local judges and juries applying state common law. 127
Strikingly, Marshall applied general common law principles to
uphold the validity of the Bank’s right to sue in Osborn itself. The
defendants did not challenge the Bank’s capacity to bring lawsuits—
that challenge would have been frivolous. They did, however, challenge
this lawsuit, on the ground that the Bank’s attorneys had not proven that
the corporation had authorized the action under seal. Marshall gave two
responses: first, as a matter of general common law, the actions of
corporations could be valid even when not under seal. 128 Second, the
principle that the Bank could act only pursuant to charter authorization
was immaterial to the Bank’s right to bring this action: applying a
common law equivalence, the proof necessary to sustain the Bank’s
lawsuits was deemed the same as in cases brought by natural persons.129
The Osborn opinion is doctrinally inscrutable, but as a foundational
constitutional interpretation by the great Chief Justice, it was prone, as
125. See Bank of Columbia, 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) at 306–07. This case was a breach of
contract action brought in the Circuit Court for the District of Columbia. The
defendant corporation asserted that it was not bound by a contract made by certain
directors in non-compliance of the charter. After stating that the corporation had the
inherent common law right to make contracts under seal, the Court interpreted
general common law to provide that a contract made by officers of the corporation
not under seal is binding on the corporation when otherwise made within the scope
of their authority. See also Mechs.’ Bank of Alexandria v. Bank of Columbia, 18 U.S. (5
Wheat.) 326, 337–38 (1820). In a decision issued one year before Osborn, the Court
stated that this general common law principle of apparent authority applied to Bank
of the United States contracts. Fleckner v. Bank of the United States, 21 U.S. (8
Wheat.) 333, 353–55 (1823). However, because the Bank’s contract in Fleckner was
made in Louisiana, the Court held that the Louisiana Civil Code and principles of the
civil law governed (those turned out to be the same as general common law
principles). Id. at 357–59.
126. See HART & WECHSLER, supra note 36, at 580.
127. See id. State statutes regulating contractual rights would supersede the
common law in actions brought by or against the Bank in federal as well as state court.
See Fleckner, 21 U.S. (8 Wheat.) at 359. On the non-removability of those actions, and
its significance to theories of protective jurisdiction, see infra notes 476–79 and
accompanying text.
128. Osborn, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) at 829 (citing Bank of Columbia, 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) at 299)).
129. Id. at 829–31.
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it were, to endure for ages to come. Osborn became the authority for
upholding statutes interpreted as providing original jurisdiction in federal
trial courts over all cases by or against federally-chartered railroads130 and
banks,131 the American Red Cross,132 and against foreign states and their
instrumentalities under the Federal Sovereign Immunities Act.133
The corporation cases, Tidewater and Osborn and their progeny, are
inconsistent with the principle that Congress cannot vest the federal
courts with jurisdiction that goes beyond the specific categories
enumerated in Article III. Accepting the idea that these decisions are
appropriate interpretations of the diversity and arising under
enumerations comes at the cost of pretending that language does not
matter. Corporations are not citizens, the District of Columbia is not a
State, and lawsuits presenting no federal question do not arise under
federal law. These jurisdictional statutes, still considered valid, are
exercises of national powers that transcend specific enumerations.
This is a substantial list of powers that are generally viewed as within
national authority but are not justified under the classical enumeration
approach identified with McCulloch. The next part of this Article describes
scholarly arguments that would jettison this classical approach in favor of
a general national legislative power in Congress. Such a power would
enable Congress to legislate for the general welfare, or, as alternatively
expressed, for national purposes or exigencies.

130. See Pac. R.R. Removal Cases, 115 U.S. 1, 11 (1885).
131. See, e.g., Fed. Intermediate Credit Bank of Columbia v. Mitchell, 277 U.S. 213,
214 (1928); Sowell v. Fed. Reserve Bank of Dallas, 268 U.S. 449, 455–56 (1925).
132. See Am. Nat’l Red Cross v. S.G., 505 U.S. 247, 257 (1992).
133. See Verlinden B.V. v. Cent. Bank of Nigeria, 461 U.S. 480, 497 (1983) (holding
that the need to interpret the jurisdictional provisions of the Foreign Sovereign
Immunities Act vested arising under jurisdiction in every case brought under the act).
Verlinden is more complicated than the typical circular argument that the
interpretation of a jurisdictional statute makes a case arise under federal law. Foreign
sovereign immunity arose out of the law of nations, see Schooner Exch. v. McFaddon,
11 U.S. (7 Cranch) 116, 135 (1812), and evolved into judicially-created matters of
comity. See Verlinden, 461 U.S. (7 Cranch) at 486. Although phrased in jurisdictional
terms, FSIA adopted the restrictive scope of foreign sovereign immunity as a matter of
substantive law. Nevertheless, the Supreme Court’s assertion in Verlinden that
substantive law must be interpreted in every FSIA case is incorrect. In some cases, the
application of one of the Act’s exceptions will be obvious; in others, it will have been
waived by contract or litigation behavior. See Seinfeld, supra note 88, at 1423–25;
Vásquez, supra note 121, at 1740–41.
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II. SCHOLARLY THEORIES ON THE SCOPE OF NATIONAL POWER
A. A National Regulatory Power?
William W. Crosskey’s treatise on American constitutional law was
published in 1953. Crosskey asserted that Congress has a general
national legislative power. 134 He argued that the enumerated powers
of Congress must be viewed as a whole and not as discrete subjects; 135
that the list of enumerated powers is not exhaustive; 136 that “all
legislative power [herein] granted” does not mean “only the legislative
powers granted”; 137 that the Tenth Amendment also does not preclude
a general national legislative power because it omits the term
“expressly”; 138 that the Preamble states the “objects” of congressional
legislation and that the enumerated powers are some, but not all, of
the means necessary to carry those objects into effect; 139 that the “all
other powers” portion of the Necessary and Proper Clause vests
additional powers in the “Government of the United States as a whole”; 140
and that the Common Defense and General Welfare Clause in Article
I, Section 8 is a broad substantive grant of national regulatory power. 141
Crosskey appears to be the first scholar to make a comprehensive
argument that Congress has the power to legislate for the general
welfare, but his theory did not leave an imprint on the development of
constitutional law. In recent articles, distinguished scholars have taken
up where Crosskey left off. Although their principal approaches and
doctrinal arguments are somewhat different, David S. Schwartz, 142

134. 1 WILLIAM WINSLOW CROSSKEY, POLITICS AND THE CONSTITUTION IN THE HISTORY
XIII, XIV (1953).
135. Id. at 375.
136. Id. at 375–78, 381–83.
137. Id. at 389.
138. Id. at 678–90.
139. Id. at 391–92.
140. Id. at 381–83, 391–93.
141. Id. at 394–97, 501–08.
142. Professor Schwartz rejects the doctrine of enumerated congressional powers
as fatally flawed in theory and not followed in practice. Using constitutional practice
as the guiding criterion, he advances a theory of “capable federalism” by which
Congress can address all problems that are national in scope, particularly those beyond
the capacity of individual States. Schwartz, supra note 11, at 626.
OF THE UNITED STATES ch.
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Robert Cooter and Neil Siegel, 143 Calvin Johnson, 144 Richard Primus, 145
Robert J. Kaczorowski 146 and John Mikhail 147 have advanced creative
and well-thought constitutional theories to establish a congressional
power to legislate for the general welfare. These scholars do not assert
that Congress has unlimited legislative power of the kind possessed by
the States. Their submission is that Congress can legislate for all
national purposes or exigencies. For most of these scholars, the
existence of anomalous national powers such as those described
previously is important evidence that the traditional means-ends
approach is incorrect and that Congress may legislate to address all
issues of national import.
These thoughtful scholars have identified flaws in the classical
theory of enumerated and implied powers. They offer several
persuasive constitutional theses, and my views are closer to them than
to those who hold that every act of Congress must be related to a
specific enumerated power.

143. Professors Cooter and Siegel apply a law and economics approach to the
problem of collective action and present a construct of federalism centered on the
existence of harmful externalities caused by the actions of individual States that
require a national resolution by Congress under the authority of the General Welfare
Clause. Robert D. Cooter & Neil S. Siegel, Collective Action Federalism: A General Theory
of Article I, Section 8, 63 STAN. L. REV. 115, 119 (2010).
144. Professor Johnson argues that the General Welfare Clause, although a spending
power, gives Congress the power to enact all laws that are national in nature when
combined with the Necessary and Proper Clause. Johnson, supra note 58, at 62–74.
145. Professor Primus’s thesis is that there is no sphere of state autonomy that is
necessarily outside the scope of national power and the important constraints on
national power are the process limits in the structure of the federal government and
not the specifications of powers. Richard Primus, The Limits of Enumeration, 124 YALE
L.J. 576, 579 (2014).
146. According to Professor Kaczorowski, the original understanding was that the
national government possesses implied powers that derive from inherent national
sovereignty, that the scope of those powers are determined by the ends or objects for
which Congress was created, which are found in the Preamble as well as enumerated
powers, and that Congress has the authority to address all national necessities or
exigencies. Robert J. Kaczorowski, Inherent National Sovereignty Constitutionalism: An
Original Understanding of the U.S. Constitution, 101 MINN. L. REV. 699, 701–02 (2016).
147. In two impressive articles, Professor Mikhail asserts that the source of implied
national powers to provide for the general welfare is the “all other powers” provision
of the Necessary and Proper Clause. John Mikhail, The Constitution and the Philosophy of
Language: Entailment, Implicature, and Implied Powers, 101 VA. L. REV. 1063, 1068–69
(2015) [hereinafter Mikhail, Entailment]; John Mikhail, The Necessary and Proper Clauses,
102 GEO. L.J. 1045, 1055 (2014) [hereinafter Mikhail, Necessary and Proper].
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First, as a matter of undeniable reality, national powers that go beyond
specific enumerations do exist. Therefore, we need to look beyond the
classical model under which the limit of congressional authority is the
relation of a law to specific enumerated powers.148 Second, the
enumerated powers should be construed as a whole and not as discrete
and unrelated powers, so that powers of the government of the United
States are sufficient to fulfill the purposes of the Union. 149 Third, the text
of the Constitution does not preclude the existence of such national
powers. The “herein granted” term in the Legislative Vesting Clause
simply begs the question of the extent to which non-enumerated and
implied national powers are vested by the Constitution.150 And, under
Madison’s leadership, the First Congress rejected attempts to insert the
term “expressly” in the Tenth Amendment. If unspecified legislative
power can be implied as a means to effectuate specific enumerated
powers, there is no a priori reason why other implied powers cannot also
be vested in the national government. Fourth, a textual foundation for
congressional power to enforce broad national powers is contained in the
Necessary and Proper Clause. Congress is given the power to pass all laws
that are necessary and proper to carry into effect not only the powers
enumerated in Article I, Section 8, but “all other Powers vested by this
Constitution in the Government of the United States, or in any Department or
148. See, e.g., Kaczorowski, supra note 146, at 701–02, 777–78; Mikhail, Necessary and
Proper, supra note 147, at 1051–52; Primus, supra note 145, at 588–91, 634–42; Schwartz,
supra note 11, at 624–44.
149. See, e.g., Cooter & Siegel, supra note 143, at 156–58; Kaczorowski, supra note
146, at 763–64; Mikhail, Necessary and Proper, supra note 147, at 1105–06, 1120–22, 1130;
Primus, supra note 145, at 621–22.
150. The most natural reading of the term is that Congress (and not the President,
the Judiciary, or either House of Congress) possesses those legislative powers that are
listed in the Constitution. Although the absence of a “herein granted” term in the
Executive Vesting Clause has been an argument for expansive executive power, I am
not aware of an argument that its presence in the Legislative Vesting Clause is a
limitation on congressional power.
In Gibbons v. Ogden, Marshall stated that “[t]he enumeration presupposes something
not enumerated[.]” 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1, 195 (1824). This enigmatic statement might
mean that there are residual areas of state regulation that are always beyond national
authority. See United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 553, 566–67 (1995); David A.
Strauss, Does the Constitution Mean What It Says?, 129 HARV. L. REV. 1, 45 (2015). Read
contextually, however, Marshall appears to have been referring to a concurrent state
power over commerce. Richard Primus, The Gibbons Fallacy, 19 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 567,
568–70 (2017). Or the statement might simply be a truism: listing certain powers
means that others are not listed. That says nothing about the extent of implied powers,
which “depend[s] on a fair construction of the whole instrument.” McCulloch v.
Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 406 (1819).
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Officer thereof.”151 To the extent that such national powers—for example,
the general national power over foreign affairs—are vested in the
government of the United States, the “all other powers” clause provides for
congressional enforcement.
However, acceptance of these principles does not establish that Congress
possesses a general welfare power or, as it is also called, a power to deal with
all national needs and exigencies. Although each scholar presents distinct
arguments, there are common assertions that are presented to justify a
national regulatory power—that such a power emanates from the General
Welfare Clauses of the Preamble and/or Article I, inherent national
sovereignty, the “all other powers” clause, or the adoption of Resolution VI
of the Virginia Plan. These arguments are substantial, but I do not believe
that they are supported by constitutional text, history and structure.
B. The General Welfare Clauses
There are two common defense and general welfare clauses in the
Constitution. One is in the Preamble, and the other is in Article I,
Section 8. Scholars who argue that Congress has the authority to
legislate for the general welfare rely on either or both. 152
1.

The Preamble
The Preamble to the United States Constitution states:
We the People of the United States, in Order to form a more perfect
Union, establish Justice, insure domestic Tranquility, provide for the
common defense, promote the general Welfare, and secure the
Blessings of Liberty to ourselves and our Posterity, do ordain and
establish this Constitution for the United States of America.

The Preamble certainly states the goals (perhaps more precisely the
hopes) that the members of the Convention sought to achieve when
they proposed the Constitution. But the Constitution is a law, and the
Framers, many of whom were well-trained attorneys, drafted that
document with knowledge of the common law rules of construction

151. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 18 (emphasis added). See generally Mikhail, Entailment,
supra note 147; Mikhail, Necessary and Proper, supra note 147.
152. See, e.g., Cooter & Siegel, supra note 143, at 170–75 (relying on art. I, § 8);
Johnson, supra note 58, at 62–74, 96 (same); Kaczorowski, supra note 146, at 763–64,
771–72 (relying on both); Mikhail, Entailment, supra note 147, at 1098, 1102-03 (relying
on Preamble); Schwartz, supra note 11, at 594–98 (relying on both).
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that governed the interpretation of laws.153 One settled rule was that
preambles to laws did not themselves create powers or rights.154 That did
not mean that preambles should be disregarded as mere rhetoric. A law
with multiple provisions must be viewed as a whole,155 and preambles
should be consulted for the purpose of interpretation—to clarify any
ambiguous terms in specific powers and rights contained in laws. 156
Even the nationalist Joseph Story, in his classic Commentaries on the
United States Constitution, emphatically denied that the Preamble was a
source of national power. 157 To Story, the Preamble lent support for
liberally interpreting the general language of each enumerated
power. 158 This is also how Hamilton’s supporters employed the
Preamble in the great debate in Congress over the constitutionality of
his proposed Bank of the United States, 159 and how Marshall used the
Preamble in McCulloch in asserting that the Constitution was created
by the people of the United States, and not by the States. 160
2.

Article I, Section 8, Clause 1
The first clause of Article I, Section 8 states:
The Congress shall have Power To lay and collect Taxes, Duties,
Imposts and Excises, to pay the Debts and provide for the common
Defense and general Welfare of the United States; but all Duties,

153. See, e.g., David Thomas Konig, Why the Second Amendment Has a Preamble: Original
Public Meaning and the Political Culture of Written Constitutions in Revolutionary America, 56
UCLA L. REV. 1295, 1324–37 (2009).
154. Milton Handler et al., A Reconsideration of the Relevance and Materiality of the
Preamble in Constitutional Interpretation, 12 CARDOZO L. REV. 117, 125–27 (1990)
(explaining the common law rule that preambles do not create powers or rights but
should be used to interpret specific provisions of the Constitution).
155. 1 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *59.
156. Id. *60.
157. See 1 STORY, COMMENTARIES, supra note 9, § 462.
158. Id.
159. 2 ANNALS OF CONG. 1909 (1791) (statement of Rep. Ames) (after justifying the
Bank as a means to carry out enumerated powers, stating that the Preamble shows that
the Bank is not “repugnant to the spirit and essential objects” of the Constitution); id.
at 1921 (statement of Rep. Boudinot) (stating that the purposes of the Constitution as
set out in the Preamble should be used in interpreting the specific powers vested in the
national government); id. at 1950–51 (statement of Rep. Gerry) (applying Blackstone’s
rules to construction to argue that the purposes set out in the Preamble supported a liberal
interpretation of the Necessary and Proper Clause). Hamilton, who was the oracle of
Federalist constitutionalism, did not rely on the Preamble in his constitutional defense of
the Bank. See infra notes 167–68, 264–68, 392–401 and accompanying text.
160. McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 403–05 (1819). For a further
discussion of the Preamble, see infra Section II.D.2.
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Imposts and Excises shall be uniform throughout the United
States. 161

A version of Clause 1 was contained in the Articles of Confederation.
Article VIII vested Congress with the following power:
All charges of war, and all other expences that shall be incurred for
the common defence or general welfare, and allowed by the united
States in congress assembled, shall be defrayed out of a common
treasury, which shall be supplied by the several States . . . . 162

One of the least controversial decisions of the Convention was to vest
Congress with powers that the Confederation Congress possessed
under the Articles. 163 Article VIII was plainly a spending power, and it
was incorporated into Clause 1 of Article I, Section 8. The Convention
made a momentous change by transferring the source of national
revenues from the States to Congress. However, by vesting the taxing
power in Congress, the Convention did not transform spending for the
“common defense and general welfare” into a regulatory power. The
argument that Clause 1 provides Congress with the regulatory
authority to enact legislation for the general welfare—as opposed to
being a purpose for which taxes may be used—is inconsistent with the
origin of the clause.
During the ratification debates, some Anti-Federalists made the
regulatory interpretation of the General Welfare Clause as part of their
arsenal of worst-case scenarios by which the Constitution would lead to
a consolidated national government. But no Federalist accepted this
argument. In Federalist 41, Madison insisted that the Common Defense
and General Welfare Clause was a spending power and adamantly
denied that it provided a general regulatory power to Congress. 164 After
the Constitution was ratified, Hamilton confirmed this understanding
of the Clause. In his 1791 Report on Manufacturing, 165 Hamilton urged
Congress to provide financial support (in the form of bounties) for the
country’s nascent manufacturing sector. Hamilton located the
constitutional basis for the bounties in the General Welfare Clause, but

161. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 1.
162. ARTICLES OF CONFEDERATION OF 1781, art. VIII, ¶ 1 (emphasis added).
163. 1 FARRAND, supra note 69, at 47; 2 FARRAND, supra note 69, at 21–22.
164. THE FEDERALIST NO. 41, supra note 6, at 201–02 (James Madison).
165. Alexander Hamilton, Final Version of the Report on the Subject of
Manufactures (Dec. 5, 1791), in 10 THE PAPERS OF ALEXANDER HAMILTON 230 (Harold
C. Syrett ed., 1966) [hereinafter HAMILTON PAPERS].
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he stressed that this clause did not vest Congress with regulatory power
over manufacturing or anything else. 166
Hamilton’s opinion on the constitutionality of the Bank is more
important. It was a private letter addressed to one person, President
George Washington, who happened to have chaired the Constitutional
Convention. Hamilton’s opinion to Washington, which later became
the blueprint for McCulloch, stated, as his principal argument, “a
criterion of what is constitutional and of what is not so”:
This criterion is the end to which the measure relates as a mean. If
the end be clearly comprehended within any of the specified powers,
& if the measure have an obvious relation to that end, and is not
forbidden by any particular provision of the constitution—it may
safely be deemed to come within the compass of the national
authority. 167

As applied to the incorporation of the Bank: “[I]t is affirmed that
[the Bank] has a relation more or less direct to the power of collecting
taxes; to that of borrowing money; to that of regulating trade between
the states; and to those of raising, supporting & maintaining fleets and
armies.”168 Hamilton did not rely on the General Welfare Clause as
constitutional authority for the Bank. Instead, he told Washington that
this Clause stated the purpose of taxation. The Clause prevented Congress
from applying national revenues for local purposes, but it was not limited
to spending for carrying out express national legislative powers.169
After the Constitution was ratified, Federalists and Republicans
disagreed on the scope of the General Welfare Clause. Hamilton and
Story asserted that Congress could spend for all national purposes. 170
Madison and Jefferson insisted that congressional spending must be
166. Id. at 302–04.
167. Hamilton, Bank Opinion, supra note 8, at 107.
168. Id. at 121.
169. Id. at 126–28. This should be a sufficient response to Professor Crosskey’s
unsupported accusation that Madison and Hamilton were being disingenuous in
Federalist 41 and the Report on Manufacturing, respectively. See 1 CROSSKEY, supra note
134, at 400–03, 406–07. Moreover, the Bank’s supporters in Congress did not rely on
the General Welfare Clause. See 2 ANNALS OF CONG. 1906–09 (statement of Rep. Ames)
(arguing that the Bank was necessary and proper to execute the taxing, borrowing,
commerce, war and army and navy powers); id. at 1911–12 (statement of Rep. Sedgwick)
(same); id. at 1921–22 (statement of Rep. Boudinot) (same); id. at 1946, 1948 (statement
of Rep. Gerry) (same). The clause is mentioned only in passing. See id. at 1912 (statement
of Rep. Sedgwick) (stating that Congress could borrow money to pay the debts and
provide for the common defense and general welfare); id. at 1948 (statement of Rep.
Gerry) (Congress can tax to provide for the common defense and general welfare).
170. 2 STORY, COMMENTARIES, supra note 9, §§ 904–927, at 367–95.
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limited to objects within the enumerated powers, although the third
member of the Virginia Dynasty, President James Monroe, surprisingly
adopted the Federalists’ more liberal construction of the spending
clause. 171 But the common ground of this debate, which was ultimately
resolved in favor of the Federalist position, 172 was that the General
Welfare Clause is a spending, and not a regulatory, power.
Does the text of the General Welfare Clause nevertheless support a
regulatory interpretation? Only if the Clause is interpreted as vesting
three unconnected powers in Congress: (1) “[T]o lay and collect
Taxes, Duties, Imposts and Excises”; (2) “[T]o to pay the Debts”; and
(3) “[To] provide for the common Defence and general Welfare of the
United States.” 173 However, textually, “to pay the Debts and provide for
the common Defense and general Welfare of the United States,” is a
single term. As such, it clearly appears to be a spending power because
paying the debts cannot be interpreted otherwise. This provision
becomes two powers only when commentators add the word “to” as a
means of dividing this term into separate powers. And the regulatory
power interpretation becomes even more problematic considering the
final provision of Clause 1: “but all Duties, Imposts and Excises shall be
uniform throughout the United States.” 174 A natural reading of Clause
1 as a whole is that Congress is given the power to lay and collect taxes
with two limitations: those revenues may be used only for national
purposes (paying the debts and providing for the common defense
and general welfare), and certain taxes (duties, imposts and excises)
must be uniform throughout the United States.
Calvin Johnson presents a different argument. Acknowledging that
the General Welfare Clause represents a purpose for which national
revenues can be used, Johnson argues that the application of the
Necessary and Proper Clause to the taxing and spending power

171. James Monroe, Views of the President of the United States on the Subject of
Internal Improvements (May 4, 1822), in 2 A COMPILATION OF THE MESSAGES AND
PAPERS OF THE PRESIDENTS 1789–1897 at 152–55 (James D. Richardson ed., 1898)
[hereinafter Richardson, MESSAGES].
172. See, e.g., Steward Mach. Co. v. Davis, 301 U.S. 548, 587–90, 598 (1937); United
States v. Butler, 297 U.S. 1, 65–66 (1936).
173. See Schwartz, supra note 11, at 597. Or by restoring Gouverneur Morris’s
notoriously unsuccessful semi-colon, see MAX FARRAND, THE FRAMING OF THE
CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES 182–83 (1913).
174. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 1.
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produces a general regulatory power and that the enumerated powers
are examples of this power. 175
There certainly is no wall that separates taxing, spending, and
regulation. The taxing power can be used for regulatory purposes, as
it was in one of the first acts of Congress, when differential duties were
applied to imports in part to protect American manufacturing. 176 And
the spending power, when combined with the Necessary and Proper
Clause, can support national legislation that is beyond the scope of any
other enumerated power. 177 But that does not mean that these powers
can create a general national regulatory power, of which the
enumerated powers are examples. Certain enumerated powers cannot
reasonably be derived from taxing and/or spending powers, even
when supplemented by the Necessary and Proper Clause—such as a
power to “declare war,” a power to enact a “uniform Rule of
Naturalization,” 178 or laws that “[secure] for limited Times to Authors
and Inventors the exclusive Right to their respective Writings and
Discoveries.” 179 And Johnson’s theory does not seem applicable to a
general foreign affairs power or national powers of immigration,
deportation, and recognition. 180
This analysis accounts for the relationship of the General Welfare
Clauses in the Preamble and in Clause 1. Applying the Preamble as an
interpretative device to resolve ambiguity in the scope of an
enumerated power favors a broad construction of Clause 1. This would
support the Hamilton-Story position that Clause 1 applies to spending
for all national purposes, and not merely to funding the other
enumerated powers. But Clause 1 is not ambiguous on whether it is a

175. Johnson, supra note 58, at 62–68, 69–75, 96.
176. Act of July 4, 1789, ch. 2, 1 Stat. 24.
177. See, e.g., Sabri v. United States, 541 U.S. 600, 607 (2004) (upholding, under the
Spending and Necessary and Proper Clauses, a congressional statute that prohibited
bribery of state and local officials of entities that receive at least $10,000 in federal funds).
178. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 4, 11.
179. Id. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
180. Patrick Henry played the slavery card in his penultimate oration in the Virginia
Ratification Convention, asserting that the General Welfare Clause would empower
Congress to abolish slavery. Edmund Randolph responded that the clause did not give
Congress any power to emancipate slaves, and that it would “violate every rule of
construction and common sense” to separate it from taxing and spending. 3 THE
DEBATES IN THE SEVERAL STATE CONVENTIONS ON THE ADOPTION OF THE FEDERAL
CONSTITUTION 599–600 (Jonathan Elliot ed., 2d ed 1836) [hereinafter ELLIOT’S
DEBATES]; see PAULINE MAIER, RATIFICATION: THE PEOPLE DEBATE THE CONSTITUTION,
1787–1788 296 (2010).
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spending or regulatory power. The weight of historical evidence and the
particular language of Clause 1 combine to eliminate any such ambiguity.
C. Inherent National Sovereignty and Federalism
1.

Sovereignty and governmental power
Sovereignty was a principal feature of the Supreme Court’s late
nineteenth century jurisprudence. Most of the implied national
powers that exist today have their origins in conceptions of national
sovereignty that became important features of constitutional law
during that period. Robert Kaczorowski asserts that inherent national
sovereignty was not a latter-day invention of the Supreme Court but is
a principle of constitutional law as originally understood and with roots
in the Marshall Court. 181
The idea of sovereignty as unlimited authority was developed by
legal theorists beginning in the sixteenth century in response to the
emergence of European nation-states. 182 If sovereignty is defined in its
usual sense of connoting unlimited authority,183 the government of the
United States is not a sovereign entity because the national government
possesses limited powers. The state governments are also not sovereign
entities because they do not have important powers that are attributes of
sovereignty (such as engaging in war, raising armies and navies and making
treaties). And the national and state governments together are also not
sovereign in the sense of possessing unlimited power because every American
constitution places prohibitions on the exercise of governmental power.
The writings of a number of European theorists strongly influenced
American political thought on constitutionalism184 and federalism,185 with
Vattel perhaps being the most influential.186 But European theorists

181. Kaczorowski, supra note 146, at 705–06; see also Mikhail, Necessary and Proper,
supra note 147, at 1074–78, 1096–1101.
182. Jean Bodin was the first major theorist of sovereignty and asserted that a state
was truly sovereign only if it possessed unlimited power. Julian H. Franklin, Sovereignty
and the Mixed Constitution: Bodin and His Critics, in THE CAMBRIDGE HISTORY OF POLITICAL
THOUGHT, 1450–1700 at 307 (J. H. Burns ed., 1991).
183. This continues to be its usual definition. See, e.g., James J. Sheehan, The Problem
of Sovereignty in European History, 111 AM. HIST. REV. 1, 2 (2006).
184. BERNARD BAILYN, THE IDEOLOGICAL ORIGINS OF THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION 27 (1967).
185. ALISON L. LACROIX, THE IDEOLOGICAL ORIGINS OF AMERICAN FEDERALISM 124–26 (2010).
186. ANDREW C. MCLAUGHLIN, A CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES 33
(1935); PETER ONUF & NICHOLAS ONUF, FEDERAL UNION, MODERN WORLD: THE LAW OF
NATIONS IN AN AGE OF REVOLUTIONS 1776–1814 at 11 (1993). American pamphleteers
were attracted to Vattel, whose English-language edition of The Law of Nations was
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disagreed on the sources of sovereignty, on whether sovereignty and
government were coterminous, and, if they were not, on their proper
relation.187 To complicate matters further, modern philosophers disagree
among themselves about what the historical theorists really meant.188 The
term “sovereignty,” which does not appear in the Constitution, is a peculiarly
elusive concept when applied to the operations of government.189
Nevertheless, this abstract term of political science significantly affected
the development of American constitutionalism and federalism, a process
that began during the crises that gave rise to the War of Independence.190
The attempts to define and operationalize the concept of sovereignty and
its relation to government continued through the Constitutional
Convention and ratification of the Constitution. These debates, and their
resulting conclusions, illuminate the origins of American federalism, the
sources of the enumerated powers, the reasons why the specific
enumerated powers were listed in the Constitution, and the constitutional
basis for a doctrine of aggregate national powers.191

published 1759. Vattel emphasized that sovereignty meant the equality and
independence of each state in its relations with other states. VATTEL, supra note 30, bk. I,
§§ 4–6, at 2–3; see ONUF & ONUF, supra, at 16–18. He maintained that the inviolate right
of a state to fully control its territory and inhabitants both internally and as against external
forces was not a determinant of the internal structure of a state’s government. Vattel
denied that the governing power must be vested in one person or entity: each state is
free to allocate governing powers as it sees fit, VATTEL, supra note 30, § 26, at 8, and the
allocation of those powers is expressed in the state’s constitution, which “determines the
manner in which the public authority is to be executed.” Id. § 27, at 8–9.
187. For insightful and provocative analyses of these differences, see RICHARD TUCK,
THE SLEEPING SOVEREIGN: THE INVENTION OF MODERN DEMOCRACY (2015).
188. For example, scholars debate whether Bodin declared that unlimited power
necessarily was concentrated in and identified with a single individual or entity. See,
e.g., Franklin, supra note 182, at 298–99 (arguing that this was Bodin’s position); TUCK,
supra note 187, ch. 1 (arguing that it was not Bodin’s position).
189. For arguments that, as applied to the actual functioning of government,
sovereignty is an abstraction that operates only to simplify or confuse arguments over the
operation and allocation of governmental powers, see Jack N. Rakove, Making a Hash of
Sovereignty, Part II, 3 GREEN BAG 2D 51, 56–59 (1999); Craig Green, Creating American
Land: A Territorial History from the Albany Plan to the U.S. Constitution 21–28, 41–48
(2018) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Princeton University) (on file with author).
190. See Gordon S. Wood, The Problem of Sovereignty, 68 WM. & MARY Q. 573 (2011).
191. I am not claiming that the leaders of the American Revolution or the members
of the Constitutional Convention or the Federalist supporters of the Constitution
discovered the “correct” relationship of sovereignty to government. The narrative that
follows is intended to highlight the theories of sovereignty and their relations to
government that the revolutionary and founding generations used in developing and
defending the Constitution.
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2.

Sovereignty and the Revolution
According to Forrest McDonald, “what broke apart the empire was
an inability to agree on the locus and nature of sovereignty.” 192 This
view has been expressed by other leading American 193 and British 194
historians. Given the multiple causes of the Revolution, this is surely
an overstatement. At the same time, the increasingly belligerent and
intractable debates over sovereignty that arose during the crises
beginning in the 1760s certainly helped to ignite the flammable
disputes that resulted in a revolution and left a lasting imprint on
American constitutionalism.
British imperial authorities (the King, ministers, and most members
of Parliament) were unyielding that the central principle of the British
constitution was the complete sovereignty of the Parliament at
Westminster. 195 According to the imperial authorities, unlimited
parliamentary power was established by the Glorious Revolution of
1688. 196 And unlimited power meant that any act of Parliament,
applying anywhere in the Empire, was by definition constitutional. 197
However, the doctrine of unlimited parliamentary power diverged
from the actual manner in which the American colonies were
governed. As a matter of practice, the colonial assemblies managed the
internal affairs of their colonies largely without parliamentary
interference from the time of the settlements until the crises that
began in the 1760s. 198 Whether out of indifference or the need to
attend to greater priorities in governing Great Britain and the rest of a
far-flung empire, Parliament had left control over the American

192. FORREST MCDONALD, STATES’ RIGHTS AND THE UNION: IMPERIUM IN IMPERIO,
1776–1876 at 4 (2000).
193. See, e.g., ANDREW C. MCLAUGHLIN, THE FOUNDATIONS OF AMERICAN
CONSTITUTIONALISM 163 (1932); JOHN PHILLIP REID, CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY OF THE
AMERICAN REVOLUTION: THE AUTHORITY OF RIGHTS 208–28 (1986); GORDON S. WOOD,
THE CREATION OF THE AMERICAN REPUBLIC 344–45 (1998).
194. See, e.g., H. T. Dickinson, The Eighteenth-Century Debate on the Sovereignty of Parliament,
in 26 TRANSACTIONS OF THE ROYAL HISTORICAL SOCIETY 189, 189 (1976) (“In the final analysis
the most serious point at issue between the mother country and her colonies rested on a
fundamental disagreement over the nature and location of sovereignty.”).
195. JOHN PHILLIP REID, CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY OF THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION:
THE AUTHORITY OF LAW 142 (1993).
196. BAILYN, supra note 184, at 198–202.
197. 1 BLACKSTONE, supra note 155, at *156–57.
198. See BAILYN, supra note 184, at 202–04; JACK P. GREENE, PERIPHERIES AND CENTER:
CONSTITUTIONAL DEVELOPMENT IN THE EXTENDED POLITIES OF THE BRITISH EMPIRE AND
THE UNITED STATES, 1607–1788 at 40–41 (1986).
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colonies mainly to the prerogative powers of the Crown (that is, the
King and his ministers). 199 Acting through royal governors and the
Privy Council, the Crown vetoed or disallowed colonial legislation and
issued “instructions” to the governors that were to be enforced as law. 200
Americans resented such negations of self-government, particularly
because a double standard was in operation. With the emergence of
parliamentary supremacy, the royal prerogatives were constrained to a
considerable extent within Great Britain, but those prerogatives were
applied with full force in the colonies. 201 And the colonists knew from
Blackstone and other sources that, whatever the actual strength of
these prerogatives within Great Britain, the King continued to hold
these discretionary powers throughout the Empire as a matter of law. 202
Significantly, vetoes and disallowances of colonial legislation were
not frequent, 203 and royal instructions to the colonial governors were

199. GREENE, supra note 189, at 55.
200. A disallowance power applied to three colonies. Kinvin Wroth, Documents of the
Colonial Conflict Part I—Sources for the Legal History of the American Revolution, 69 L. LIBR.
J. 277, 280, 282–83 (1976).
201. The actual powers that the Crown could exercise through these prerogatives
within Great Britain had substantially diminished in the decades following the
Glorious Revolution. The emergence of parliamentary supremacy meant that the royal
prerogatives became subject to law. In theory, the King could veto any legislation that
infringed on his prerogatives, but as Parliament obtained supremacy over the Crown,
the royal veto disappeared as a matter of political reality, if not legal theory, with the
last royal veto of legislation occurring in 1707. ERIC NELSON, THE ROYALIST
REVOLUTION: MONARCHY AND THE AMERICAN FOUNDING 21–22 (2014). The situation in
America was very different. Until the crises that began in the 1760s, Parliament largely
ceded the administration of the colonies to the Crown. By royal assertion and
parliamentary default, the political reality was that prerogative powers as they were
practiced before the Glorious Revolution remained alive and well in the colonies.
202. 1 BLACKSTONE, supra note 155, at *144–46, *250–79. Even with the decline of
actual prerogative power within Great Britain, Blackstone identified two methods by
which the Hanoverian monarchs were nevertheless able to exercise substantial
authority. First, the King appointed ministers who operated a vast patronage system
that gave the Crown major influence over Parliament. Id. at *335–37. Second, the
Crown commanded a permanent standing army. In the century between the Glorious
Revolution of 1688 and the Constitutional Convention of 1787, Britain fought six wars
over 48 years. The power that this army put at the disposal of the Crown was “more
than equivalent to a thousand little troublesome prerogatives.” Id. at *336.
203. JACK P. GREENE, NEGOTIATED AUTHORITIES: ESSAYS IN COLONIAL POLITICAL AND
CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY 176–77 (1994). Until 1760, only 265 cases were brought from
all thirteen colonies to the Privy Council for review. These included appeals from the
royal courts established in the colonies and inter-colonial disputes and compacts as
well as challenges to colonial legislation. MCLAUGHLIN, supra note 186, at 10.
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successfully resisted. 204 There were, however, sporadic major conflicts
between colonial self-government and the prerogative to negative
legislation. As loyal subjects of the King, Americans acknowledged the
legality of the negatives and blamed abuses on ministerial
corruption. 205 Americans also accepted the King’s broad prerogative
powers over important external affairs (war and peace, army and navy,
foreign affairs, inter-colonial conflicts, the western and crown lands
and commerce).206 And, at least until the eve of the Revolution, Americans
acquiesced in the several acts of Parliament affecting the colonies that
regulated matters common to the Empire—navigation, commerce, piracy,
the post office, naturalization, and currency—again blaming perceived
abuses on ministers and royal governors.207 The net effect was that the
colonial assemblies substantially regulated the internal affairs of the colonies,
while their external affairs were controlled primarily by the Crown and
intermittently by Parliament. The list of powers exercised by the
metropolitan government over the colonies should look familiar. As
discussed later, this list is remarkably similar to the enumerated powers vested
by the Constitution in all three branches of the United States.
Before the crisis in the 1760s, the colonists were satisfied with governing
their internal affairs and did not overtly challenge the abstract doctrine of
parliamentary sovereignty.208 The colonies prospered under this
204. On the unwillingness or inability of the royal governors to exert control over
the colonial assemblies, see GREENE, supra note 203, at 60, 172–73. One reason for this
lack of real imperial authority was that the royal governors were dependent on the
colonial assemblies for their salaries and for the expenses of colonial administration.
Another was that the patronage system that was used by the Ministry in England to
exert control on the House of Commons was not replicated in the colonies. Id. at 87.
205. NELSON, supra note 201, at 21–22.
206. MCLAUGHLIN, supra note 186, at 13. The central authorities were also taking
charge of Indian affairs and trade and were preparing to develop new colonies.
Andrew C. McLaughlin, The Background of American Federalism, 12 AM. POL. SCI. REV.
215, 217 (1918) [hereinafter McLaughlin, Background].
207. BAILYN, supra note 184, at 208–10; MCLAUGHLIN, supra note 193, at 143–45. The
pre-crisis acts of Parliament that affected the colonies were the 1651 Navigation Acts
(as amended through 1696); the 1700 Piracy Act; the 1708 act fixing the value of
foreign coin; the 1710 establishment of the post office; the 1740 Naturalization Act;
the 1741 application of the Bubble Act to the colonies (requiring corporations to be
chartered by the Crown or Parliament, the act was aimed at trading companies); and
the 1751 act prohibiting the issuance of paper money in New England. GREENE, supra
note 198, at 36–37, 55–62; MCLAUGHLIN, supra note 186, at 11–12. As late as 1774, the
Continental Congress acknowledged Parliament’s authority over external commerce
“from the necessity of the case.” MCLAUGHLIN, supra note 193, at 144–45. Commerce
was also regulated by the Crown independently of parliamentary legislation.
208. GREENE, supra note 203, at 70–71.
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arrangement209 until it broke down when Parliament began imposing taxes
and legislation upon the colonies. To defend their claims of autonomy over
taxation and legislation against this new and powerful parliamentary threat,
American leaders 210 engaged in a sustained discourse over sovereignty
and power, resulting in the development and assertion of constitutional
theories that were simultaneously archaic and radical.
American leaders knew that parliamentary supremacy had emerged in
Great Britain from the Glorious Revolution and its aftermath, but they
denied that it resulted in parliamentary sovereignty over the colonies.211
They claimed that the Glorious Revolution confirmed the historic principle
of the English constitution that no government, including the King-inParliament, possessed unlimited (and therefore arbitrary) power.
American leaders were fond of quoting from Vattel:
It is asked, whether [the legislators’] power extends to the
fundamental laws—whether they may change the constitution of the
state? . . . [T]he authority of these legislators does not extend so far,
and . . . they ought to consider the fundamental laws as sacred, if the
nation has not, in very express terms, given them power to change
them. For the constitution of the state ought to possess stability . . . .
In short, it is from the constitution that those legislators derive their
power: how can they change it, without destroying the foundation of
their own authority? 212

What, then, was the constitution that applied to the American
colonies? Many American leaders asserted that the constitution under
which they lived was the ancient constitution under which the King
established the colonies in the seventeenth century through royal
grants and charters. 213 Under those grants and charters, the settlers
agreed to be subject to the royal prerogatives in return for the King’s
protection and his guarantee that they would forever be entitled to the
209. Adam Smith famously stated that the colonies operated autonomously in the
British Empire and the “liberty to manage their own affairs [in] their own way, seem
to be [one of] the two great causes of the[ir] prosperity.” 2 ADAM SMITH, AN INQUIRY
INTO THE NATURE AND CAUSES OF THE WEALTH OF NATIONS 319 (C.J. Bullock ed., P.F.
Collier & Son 1909) (1776).
210. I use the term “American leaders” to denote influential politicians and
pamphleteers who defended American autonomy against imperial intrusions.
211. BAILYN, supra note 184, at 46–47.
212. VATTEL, supra note 30, bk. I, § 34, at 11; see MCLAUGHLIN, supra note 193, at
122–23. Two early examples of American leaders quoting from Vattel are James Otis’s
ground-breaking 1764 pamphlet, The Rights of British Colonies, and Richard Bland’s
influential 1766 pamphlet, Inquiry into the Rights of the British Colonies. BAILYN, supra note
184, at 178 (Otis); LACROIX, supra note 185, at 79 (Bland).
213. BAILYN, supra note 184, at 224–26.
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same fundamental rights as the subjects who lived in England. 214
Moreover, the British constitution developed historically through
customary practices, which in turn made fundamental laws and
rights. 215 Representation in the legislature was one of the most
important English rights, and Americans were represented only in
their colonial assemblies. 216
Although American constitutional arguments were somewhat
inconsistent and were rejected by imperial authorities as inconceivable
in denying the unlimited power of Parliament, 217 these arguments were
nonetheless plausible. 218 The constitutional precedents upon which
they frequently relied were Ireland and Scotland (the latter before the
1707 Acts of Union)—self-governing nations with their own
parliaments connected to England by a common monarch.219 The

214. Id. at 77–84; REID, supra note 193, at 132–35. Relatedly, under standard
contract law, the people (i.e., the settlers) agreed to migrate to America in reliance on
the King’s promise that they and their descendants would continue to enjoy all of the
rights of English subjects. REID, supra note 193, at 139–53.
215. GREENE, supra note 203, at 25–35; see also BAILYN, supra note 184, at 68–69, 77–
84, 182–83 (fundamental rights were not granted by government; they were
immemorial as established by custom and secured by the constitution).
216. REID, supra note 195, at 84–87 (explaining how rationales for “virtual”
representation in the House of Commons were inapplicable to the colonies); REID,
supra note 193, at 45.
217. Id. at 218–19.
218. Scholars who support these constitutional assertions include: BAILYN, supra
note 184, at 68–69, 77–84, 224–26; GREENE, supra note 203, at 25–39; GREENE, supra
note 198, at 36–37, 40–41, 44–47, 144–47; LACROIX, supra note 185, at 14–18 (2010);
MCLAUGHLIN, supra note 186, at 14–15; MCLAUGHLIN, supra note 193, at 99, 114–22;
REID, supra note 195, at 35–36; REID, supra note 193, at 70–78, 135–42; Barbara A. Black,
Constitution of Empire: The Case for the Colonists, 124 U. PA. L. REV. 1157 (1976). Even
after the Constitution was ratified, Americans argued that imperial authorities and
apologists (such as Blackstone) misinterpreted the British constitution in asserting
parliamentary sovereignty. 1 WORKS OF JAMES WILSON 159–88 (James D. Andrews ed.,
1896) [hereinafter WILSON WORKS].
219. REID, supra note 195, at 87–90, 120–24. On the influence of the Scottish
experience and the Scottish Enlightenment to colonial legal thought, see James E.
Pfander & Daniel D. Birk, Article III and the Scottish Judiciary, 124 HARV. L. REV. 1613,
1631–42 (2011). These precedents confirmed the position of American leaders that
the Glorious Revolution did not diminish their claims to legislative autonomy. That
revolution had established legislative supremacy over the Crown. But which
legislature? If the colonies were equivalent to Ireland and Scotland, as claimed
according to the charter, custom and consent, the legislature would be the colonial
assembly. And this legislative authority would operate in conjunction with the royal
prerogatives because the King could veto any acts of the assembly. My thanks to Daniel
Birk for this point.
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foundation of pre-revolutionary constitutionalism thus became that
legislative power over internal affairs was vested in the colonial assemblies,
subject to the Crown’s prerogatives, while the metropolitan government
necessarily regulated matters relating to the empire as a whole.220
The American arguments over sovereignty presented an
irreconcilable conflict with prevailing imperial doctrine. The notion of
divided sovereignty defied the age-old axiom that “imperium in imperio is a
solecism in politics.”221 There could be only one sovereign over the British
Empire, and that sovereign was Parliament. Thus, the 1766 Declaratory
Act proclaimed that Parliament had the unlimited power to tax and
legislate over the colonists and their assemblies “in all cases
whatsoever.”222 To imperial authorities, the American constitutional
arguments, presented with increasing vehemence and absolutism as the
crises unfolded, were plainly dangerous as rationales for independence.223
The American response was to decouple sovereignty from
government. The people were sovereign, not the legislature; 224 as a
people, Americans had never consented to the taxing or legislative
authority of any government entity except their own legislatures, 225
which possessed the same authority as the parliaments of Ireland and
pre-1707 Scotland. 226 In 1774 and 1775, with separation not yet
declared, American leaders such as James Wilson, John Dickinson,
James Iredell, John Adams, and Thomas Jefferson asserted that the
colonies were independent states, governed by their colonial legislatures
and connected to the Empire through the broad and legitimate
superintending authority of the King.227 According to this constitutional

220. BAILYN, supra note 184, at 228; GREENE, supra note 203, at 39; MCLAUGHLIN,
supra note 186, at 14–15; REID, supra note 195, at 94.
221. LACROIX, supra note 185, at 14, 103.
222. Id. at 59.
223. GREENE, supra note 203, at 76. According to John Philip Reid, the taxes and
the Coercive Acts (called the Intolerable Acts by Americans) were less important in
their actual impact on the colonies than in the precedents they set for unlimited and
arbitrary parliamentary authority. REID, supra note 193, at 228–29.
224. REID, supra note 193, at 70–71.
225. REID, supra note 195, at 153–56.
226. Vattel again proved useful: “Two sovereign states may also be subject to the
same prince, without any dependence on each other, and each may retain all its rights
as a free and sovereign state.” VATTEL, supra note 30, bk. I, § 9, at 8.
227. LACROIX, supra note 185, at 87–90, 118–20.
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doctrine, the British Empire was an “imperial federation of sovereign
states sharing and establishing unity in a single monarch.”228
By claiming absolute power over the colonial assemblies, the
Parliament at Westminster became the enemy of American autonomy
and self-government. Many American leaders, adhering to the ancient
constitution, wanted the King to reassert his prerogative powers
(including the veto) and protect the rights of his British-American
subjects from arbitrary parliamentary rule. 229 But George III rejected
those pleas, as would have any British monarch at that time, and declared
the Americans in a state of rebellion and outside of his protection.230
“What made George III into the final target of American wrath was not
his desire to fasten a royal autocracy upon his once grateful subjects, but
rather his conscientious support for the claims of Parliament.”231 In
declaring independence, sovereignty in the people, and not in
government, became the talismanic ideology of the Revolution.
3.

Sovereignty and the Confederation
The Confederation was a transitional period during which the colonies
became independent states without a consensus over sovereignty.232 On
May 15, 1776, the Continental Congress directed that new state
governments should be formed through constitutions “under the authority
of the people.”233 The eleven state constitutions in effect when the

228. BAILYN, supra note 184, at 224; see also GREENE, supra note 198, at 153–54;
LACROIX, supra note 185, at 118–20.
229. NELSON, supra note 201, at 22–28. Eric Nelson also discusses how American
leaders asserted two overlapping but conflicting constitutional theories during this
penultimate period (representation and authorization). Id. at 148. See also REID, supra
note 195, at 152–56.
230. REID, supra note 195, at 157–60.
231. Jack N. Rakove, Making a Hash of Sovereignty, Part I, 2 GREEN BAG 2d 35, 38
(1999); see also NELSON, supra note 201, at 108–10. Many Americans (Jefferson being a
noteworthy exception) were deluded into believing that the King reluctantly acquiesced
in enforcing parliamentary legislation over the colonies. As a British historian of the
Revolution stated, George III “never wavered” from a determination to use coercion,
including military force, to bring the colonies under imperial control. PIERS MACKESY,
THE WAR FOR AMERICA, 1775–1783 at 23 (John Shy ed., Bison Book ed. 1993).
232. ONUF & ONUF, supra note 186, at 135–36; see also J.G.A. POCOCK, THE
MACHIAVELLIAN MOMENT: FLORENTINE POLITICAL THOUGHT AND THE ATLANTIC
REPUBLICAN TRADITION 516–17, 523 (1975) (stating that there was no consensus on the
meaning of a “State” as the term was used in the Articles. For example, did “State”
mean “people” or “government”?).
233. JACK N. RAKOVE, THE BEGINNINGS OF NATIONAL POLITICS: AN INTERPRETIVE
HISTORY OF THE CONTINENTAL CONGRESS 148 (1979).
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Constitutional Convention met authorized the general power of legislation,
but each of those constitutions also imposed prohibitions on legislative
power234—either in a Bill of Rights,235 in guarantees of specific rights in
constitutional text,236 or in providing for a separation of powers that
ensured the independent powers of the judiciary. 237 Two other States
(Connecticut and Rhode Island) did not enact written constitutions and
instead continued under their original seventeenth century royal charters,
which guaranteed forever to the inhabitants of those States the
fundamental rights of the English law.238
However, the status of the state constitutions was uncertain. With two
notable exceptions (Delaware and Massachusetts), the state constitutions
were enactments of the state legislatures. As acts of the legislatures, it was far
from clear that these constitutions were “fundamental law[s]” that were
supreme to “ordinary” acts of legislation.239 Like English precedents that
were also enacted by the legislature (such as the venerated English Bill of
Rights), “these new constitutions implied nothing about any separation
between ‘sovereign’ and ‘government’ . . . [T]he ‘government’ was the
‘sovereign,’ insofar as its acts constituted the fundamental rules of society.”240
The Confederation was an attempt at cooperative state sovereignty241—
a league of sovereign states joined together by treaty in which they ceded
certain powers over external affairs to a central supervising authority.
Viewing the Articles through the prism of law of nations, each State
yielded a portion of its external sovereignty to Congress while retaining
its internal sovereignty.242 The Confederacy was a realization of Vattel’s
vision of a federal republic:
[S]everal sovereign and independent states may unite themselves
together by a perpetual confederacy, without ceasing to be, each
individually, a perfect state. They will together constitute a federal
republic: their joint deliberations will not impair the sovereignty of
234. See generally William C. Morey, The First State Constitutions, 4 ANNALS AM. ACAD.
POL. & SOC. SCI. 1 (1893).
235. Delaware, Maryland, Massachusetts North Carolina, Pennsylvania and Virginia.
236. South Carolina, New York, New Jersey, Georgia and New Hampshire.
237. New Hampshire, Georgia, Delaware, Maryland and Virginia.
238. CHARTER OF CONNECTICUT, para. 7 (1662); CHARTER OF RHODE ISLAND AND
PROVIDENCE PLANTATIONS, para. 1 (1663). Of course, the references to the King and
England were removed from the Charters.
239. JACK N. RAKOVE, ORIGINAL MEANINGS: POLITICS AND IDEAS IN THE MAKING OF THE
CONSTITUTION 96–98 (1996).
240. TUCK, supra note 187, at 184.
241. MCLAUGHLIN, supra note 186, at 119–20.
242. Id. at 126–29.

2019]

AGGREGATE AND IMPLIED POWERS OF THE UNITED STATES

51

each member, though they may, in certain respects, put some
restraint on the exercise of it, in virtue of voluntary engagements. A
person does not cease to be free and independent, when he is
obliged to fulfil engagements which he has voluntarily contracted. 243

Thus, the Articles provided: “Each State retains its sovereignty,
freedom and independence, and every power, jurisdiction and right,
which is not by this confederation expressly delegated to the United
States, in Congress assembled.” 244
But how would this federal republic be perpetual? Vattel thought
that it would be held together by the consciences of member-states to
honor their commitments and by a balance of power that would
overcome individual self-interest.245 However, notwithstanding the terms
of the Articles, 246 the state governments claimed complete sovereignty
and refused to obey congressional directives. With Congress lacking the
power to enforce its decrees against the States, the balance of forces upon
which Vattel’s confederation was predicated collapsed in the face of state
dominance over Congress247 that, if left unchecked, could threaten the
continued existence of the Union. 248
Popular sovereignty reemerged in two ways during the Confederation
period. First, the dominance of state sovereignty was undermined by state
legislatures abusing their powers and engendering resentment and
mistrust in their constituents, which in turn revived the attraction of
popular sovereignty. “In the contest between the states and the Congress
the ideological momentum of the Revolution lay with the states; but in
the contest between the people and the state governments it decidedly
lay with the people.” 249
Second, judges contributed to the movement towards popular
sovereignty by treating the state constitutions as superior to ordinary
legislation. During the Confederation period the courts of four States
243. VATTEL, supra note 30, bk. I, § 10, at 8. On the relation of the Confederation
to Vattel’s model confederacy, see ONUF & ONUF, supra note 186, at 1–26.
244. ARTICLES OF CONFEDERATION OF 1781, art. II.
245. ONUF & ONUF, supra note 186, at 14–16.
246. “Every State shall abide by the determinations of the United States in Congress
assembled, on all questions which by this confederation are submitted to them. And the
articles of this confederation shall be inviolably observed by every State . . . .” ARTICLES OF
CONFEDERATION OF 1781, art. XIII (emphasis added).
247. MCLAUGHLIN, supra note 186, at 134–35; ONUF & ONUF, supra note 186, at 132–34.
248. See 1 JOHN FISKE, ESSAYS HISTORICAL AND LITERARY: SCENES AND CHARACTERS IN
AMERICAN HISTORY 118 (1902) (describing vividly the Confederation’s serious
centrifugal problems and conflicts).
249. WOOD, supra note 193, at 362.

52

AMERICAN UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 69:3

(New Jersey, New Hampshire, New York, and North Carolina) held
legislation void as contrary to the state constitutions, and the courts of
Rhode Island and Connecticut nullified state statutes as violating rights
guaranteed by their charters. 250 For these judges, “the very idea of a
written constitution” meant that “[t]he sovereignty of the people was
substituted for the sovereignty of the crown.” 251
4.

Sovereignty and federalism
In actual operation, the British Empire can be viewed as an early
precursor of federalism in the distribution of powers between the
metropolitan government and the colonies. The Convention followed
this subject-matter distribution of powers and, as will be discussed
below, appears to have used the old British Empire as a model in the
enumerations of national powers.
The Convention created a new form of federalism under which
Congress and the state legislatures could independently and, each
through the authority of their respective constitutions, enact laws that
operated simultaneously on individuals. That concept was difficult to
understand. In opposing ratification, Anti-Federalists resurrected the
old imperial claim that there could be only one sovereign legislature
exercising supreme power. 252
The Federalist response was that under the Constitution, neither
Congress nor the state legislatures are fully sovereign: the powers of both
derive from the people. Although they were elitists, the Federalists accepted
that government must be “strictly republican” and that the people were the
only just source of all governmental power.253 As Marshall would later
restate the Federalist position, the Constitution itself embodied popular
sovereignty in declaring that it was ordained by “We the People of the
United States,” and in being ratified by conventions elected by the people
and not by the state legislatures.254 However abstract the doctrine might be,
sovereignty of the people became the touchstone of Federalist arguments

250. These cases are discussed masterfully in William Michael Treanor, Judicial
Review Before Marbury, 58 STAN. L. REV. 455, 474–89, 509 (2005). In addition, the
attorneys on both sides of the famous Virginia Prisoners Case, Virginia v. Caton, 8 Va.
(4 Call) 5 (1782), accepted judicial review, and that doctrine was endorsed by three of
the six judges (including George Wythe, one of the most prominent judges and
teachers of law in the United States). Treanor, supra at 489–96.
251. Morey, supra note 234, at 31.
252. WOOD, supra note 193, at 527–29.
253. Id. at 518, 528–33.
254. McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 403–04 (1819).
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for ratification,255 and, as Gordon Wood has written, the Federalists thereby
brought the ideology of the Revolution to fruition. 256 The Convention’s
answer to the intractable problem of sovereignty was that the people
possess ultimate power. 257 This construction of sovereignty was used not
only in McCulloch—with Marshall employing language that anticipated the
Gettysburg Address258—but also in the frequently neglected last four words
of the Tenth Amendment: “The powers not delegated to the United States
by the Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the States, are reserved to the
States respectively, or to the people.”259
The American theory of sovereignty thus became that the people, as the
ultimate sovereigns, had established constitutions that vested certain
sovereign powers in the national government and others in their state
governments, while retaining the remainder to themselves.260 As stated
before, the relation of sovereignty to government is elusive, and the doctrine
chosen by the Convention was one of many that could have been used (and
one that may not satisfy theorists upon whom the founding generation
otherwise relied and/or modern-day political scientists).261 But by locating
ultimate sovereignty in the people, as opposed to political entities or
governments, the Convention chose (or created) a doctrine that is the basis
of American constitutionalism and, most significantly, that explains
American federalism.262 To the extent that national powers exist, they are not
“inherent” in the national government independent of the powers vested by
the people in the Constitution. The sources of all national powers must be
expressly or impliedly the Constitution.

255. MCLAUGHLIN, supra note 186, at 161–62; RAKOVE, supra note 239, at 103.
256. WOOD, supra note 193, at 562.
257. SAMUEL H. BEER, TO MAKE A NATION: THE REDISCOVERY OF AMERICAN FEDERALISM 295–
301, 338–40 (1993); GREENE, supra note 198, at 203–04; MCLAUGHLIN, supra note 186, at 154–
55; MCLAUGHLIN, supra note 193, at 133, 161–62; WOOD, supra note 193, at 531–32, 599–600.
258. McCulloch, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) at 404–05 (stating that the United States
Constitution was “ordained and established” in the name of the people, and the
government that it created is “emphatically, and truly, a government of the people. In
form and in substance it emanates from them. Its powers are granted by them, and are
to be exercised directly on them, and for their benefit”).
259. U.S. CONST. amend. 10 (emphasis added).
260. MCLAUGHLIN, supra note 186, at 154–55, 161–62.
261. For example, Vattel asserted as first principles (as had Grotius) that sovereignty
was invested in government and that every citizen is subject to that authority. VATTEL,
supra note 30, bk. 1, §§ 1–2, at 1.
262. WOOD, supra note 193, at 599–600. On the relation of popular sovereignty to
national obligations and powers under the law of nations, see infra notes 314–21 and
accompanying text.
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5.

The Bank and Marshall Court Opinions
The preceding discussion emphasizes the difference between (1)
the national government being inherently sovereign, and (2) the
national government being vested by the Constitution with
enumerated sovereign powers. As Marshall explained, each
enumerated power appertains to sovereignty because it “may be
exercised to its utmost extent, and acknowledges no limitations, other
than are prescribed in the constitution.” 263
The Federalists understood this principle when they defended the
constitutionality of the Bank of the United States in the first Congress.
The principal argument of Hamilton and his supporters in Congress
was that the Bank was necessary to carry into effect several of the
sovereign powers that had been vested in Congress by the
Constitution. 264 Indeed, Hamilton went out of his way to refute
Attorney General Randolph’s contention that the Bank’s supporters
were relying on inherent national sovereignty:
To be implied in the nature of the federal government, says [Randolph],
would beget a doctrine so indefinite as to grasp at every power.
This proposition it ought to be remarked is not precisely, or even
substantially, that, which has been relied upon. The proposition
relied upon is this, that the specified powers of Congress are in their
nature sovereign—that it is incident to sovereign power to erect
corporations; & that therefore Congress have a right, within the
sphere & in relation to the objects of their power, to erect corporations. 265

However, some of the Bank’s supporters in Congress referred to a
general fiscal power in Congress, while the list of enumerated congressional

263. Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1, 196 (1824); see also id. at 197 (“[T]he
sovereignty of Congress, though limited to specified objects, is plenary as to those objects . . . .”).
264. Reinstein, supra note 2, at 22–25, 29–33. The Bank’s supporters in the House
addressed national sovereignty in response to the opponents’ claim that only a
sovereign could charter corporations. Their answer was that Congress had been vested
with enumerated sovereign powers and that, as shown by the use of national banks in other
nations, the Bank would be an appropriate means of executing those powers. See 2
ANNALS OF CONG. 1905–06 (1791) (statement of Rep. Ames); id. at 1911–12, 1913–14
(statement of Rep. Sedgwick); id. at 1921–22 (statement of Rep. Boudinot); id. at
1929–30 (statement of Rep. Smith). As summarized by Representative Smith, one of
the few Southern supporters of the Bank in the House, the Federalist position was not
that Congress could do whatever was deemed necessary or expedient for the nation.
Congress possessed the choice of means that were necessary to carry out its expressed
powers, and the degree of necessity was to be determined by each member of
Congress. Id. at 1936–37 (statement of Rep. Smith).
265. Hamilton, Bank Opinion, supra note 8, at 114.
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powers does not include such a general power.266 Hamilton developed this
as an alternative argument in his opinion to Washington, and it appears to
be the basis upon which Marshall upheld the constitutionality of the
Bank.267 Hamilton’s doctrine, as apparently accepted by Marshall, was that
the enumerated powers (that is, the specific sovereign powers vested in
Congress) relating to public finance and currency should be considered in
the aggregate and not individually. Viewing these enumerated powers that
way, Hamilton argued that they combined to vest an aggregate fiscal power
in Congress and that the Bank was Congress’s agent for effectuating this
power.268 This is a distinctive methodology for construing the scope of the
enumerated powers, and I will discuss this methodology and its implications
later in this Article.
Advocates of inherent national sovereignty rely on two other Marshall
Court decisions, discussed above.269 Sovereignty was employed in decisions
holding that the United States has the inherent right to enter into contracts
and to sue for breaches and damages, all without enabling congressional
legislation. These are implied powers of the United States, but they do not
derive from notions of inherent national sovereignty. Governments are
corporations and, as discussed previously, all corporations possessed those
rights at common law in the early Republic. Those rights had everything to
do with the common law equivalence of personal and corporate rights; they
had nothing to do with inherent national sovereignty.270 Why, then, did the
Supreme Court consider this power to be an attribute of sovereignty?
Because if the state courts or legislatures allowed all corporations, including
the States, to enter into contracts and sue for breach and damages, but

266. 2 ANNALS OF CONG. 1914–15 (1791) (Rep. Lawrence) (“[F]ull uncontrollable
power to regulate the fiscal concerns of this Union . . . .”); id. at 1929 (Rep. Smith)
(“[A]cknowledged right of Congress to control the finances of this country . . . .”); id.
at 1946 (Rep. Gerry) (“[O]bjects of the [Bank] were to render the fiscal administration
successful . . . .”).
267. Reinstein, supra note 2 at 33, 68–69.
268. McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 422–23 (1819); Hamilton,
Bank Opinion, supra note 8, at 132; see also Reinstein, supra note 2, at 33, 68–69 (describing
Hamilton’s aggregate power argument); Schwartz, supra note 11, at 608 (same).
269. See supra Section I.F.
270. See supra notes 117–21 and accompanying text. The Judiciary Act of 1789 gave the
lower federal courts jurisdiction over “all suits at common law where the United States” is
a plaintiff, with amount in controversy requirements. Ch. 20, §§ 9, 11, 1 Stat. 73, 77.
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denied those rights to the United States,271 they would be discriminating
against the United States in violation of the Supremacy Clause.272
The idea that national powers derive from the inherent sovereignty of
the government of the United States is not supported by the Bank debate
or the decisions of the Marshall Court. It is contrary to the theory of
sovereignty that was used to create and defend the Constitution.273
D. The “All Other Powers” Clause
One of John Mikhail’s important insights is that the Necessary and
Proper Clause consists of three separate and complementary clauses.
The first, “foregoing Powers” clause, authorizes Congress to enact laws
to carry into execution the enumerated powers in the first seventeen
paragraphs of Article I, Section 8. The second authorizes the same
congressional authority for “all other powers vested by this Constitution
in the Government of the United States,” and the third authorizes that
authority for all powers vested in “any Department or Officer

271. The Judiciary Act provided for concurrent jurisdiction in the state courts in
cases where the United States is a plaintiff. Ch. 20, §§ 9, 11, 1 Stat. 73, 77.
272. For twentieth century applications of this non-discrimination doctrine, see, for
example, Testa v. Katt, 330 U.S. 386 (1947); McKnett v. St. Louis & San Francisco Railway
Co., 292 U.S. 230 (1934); and Mondou v. New York, New Haven & Hartford Railroad Co.,
223 U.S. 1 (1912).
273. Anderson v. Dunn, 19 U.S. (6 Wheat.) 204 (1821), is sometimes cited as another
Marshall Court opinion on inherent sovereignty. The Court held that the House of
Representatives possesses the power to arrest, try and punish non-members who
commit acts of contempt in the presence of the House. Id. at 234–35. Justice Johnson
wrote that, although there was no express power given by the Constitution for either
House to punish non-members for contemptuous conduct, the House did have the
power to arrest and punish non-members who disrupted its proceedings. This was, he
said, an implied power that was not “substantive and independent” but was incidental
to a grant of power to the House. Id. at 225–26. But what was the principal
constitutional power? To Johnson, the answer was obvious: the House of
Representatives was given legislative power, the exercise of which required calm and
thoughtful deliberation. To carry out its deliberative legislative duties, the House must
necessarily be able to arrest non-members who disrupt its proceedings. This is the
classic means-ends approach of McCulloch. The term “sovereignty” does not appear in
the opinion, and Johnson stated that this principle applied to all legislative bodies and,
for the same reason, to the courts—but not to the executive branch. Id. at 227–28,
233–34. The serious constitutional problem is not the House’s implied power to cite a
non-member with contempt. It is the due process and separation of powers problem
incident to the House adjudicating the case and enforcing its decision. Since the
1930’s, Congress has relied on the courts to adjudicate and enforce contempt citations.
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thereof.” 274 Mikhail’s focus is the second clause. 275 According to
Mikhail, 276 and Crosskey before him, 277 this “all other powers” clause
necessarily refers to, and is the source of, powers in the government of
the United States as a whole that constitute a general welfare power.
The “all other powers” clause relates to powers in the national
government that are additional to the Article I, Section 8 powers vested
in Congress alone (the “foregoing Powers”) or those vested by the
Constitution elsewhere in Congress or in the Executive or Judiciary
(“any Department or Officer thereof”). But I disagree that the “all
other powers” clause creates such powers, that this clause proves that
such powers exist, or that those powers amount to a national general
welfare power. In my view, powers vested in the government of the
United States as a whole are created independently of the “all other
powers” clause. The clause is nevertheless important because, to the
extent that such national powers exist, the “all other powers” clause
provides a clear textual basis for congressional enforcement.
l.

Powers vested in the “Government of the United States”
One premise of the argument that the “all other powers” clause is
the source of implied national powers is that the Constitution does not
explicitly vest any powers in the government of the United States, as
opposed to Congress or any single branch. 278 Unless the “all other
powers” clause has no meaning, it must give Congress the power to
carry into effect non-enumerated powers of the United States. Thus,
the conclusion that the clause necessarily creates or confirms the
existence of indefinite national powers. But the premise of this
argument is incorrect. The Constitution vests four powers in the
government of the United States. The first three are contained in the
Guarantee Clauses and the fourth is the treaty power.
Article IV, Section 4 contains three guarantees:
The United States shall [1] guarantee to every State in this Union a
Republican Form of Government, and shall [2] protect each of them
against Invasion; and [3] on Application of the Legislature, or the
Executive (when the Legislature cannot be convened) against
domestic Violence.

274.
275.
276.
277.
278.

U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 18.
Mikhail, Entailment, supra note 147, at 1083.
Mikhail, Necessary and Proper, supra note 147, at 1050.
See supra notes 136–41 and accompanying text.
Mikhail, Entailment, supra note 147, at 1096–97.
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To be sure, the Supreme Court has interpreted the Republican
Guarantee Clause as vesting power solely in Congress. But dismissing
the Clause on this basis 279 is anachronistic—it presumes that the
Supreme Court’s latter-day interpretations of the Clause are correct.
But these decisions are contrary to the Clause’s language and
placement in the Constitution. The three Guarantee Clauses explicitly
vest powers in “[t]he United States,” not in any single branch of the
national government. And they are placed in Article IV, not in Article
I, which sets forth powers of Congress. Article IV has seven clauses that
set binding relations between the States themselves and between the
States and the United States. 280 The last three of these clauses (the
Guarantee Clauses) obligate the United States to change the
government of any State that is not republican in nature and to protect
each State from foreign invasion or internal violence.
The Guarantee Clauses cannot plausibly be read as vesting power in
Congress alone. Even the most strenuous objectors to presidential war
powers concede that the President, as commander-in-chief of the
armed forces, has the duty and power to use force without
congressional authorization to repel foreign invasions. 281 And the
Republican Guarantee is the only provision in the Constitution as
ratified in 1788 that gave the national government direct authority to
intrude into the internal operations of the States—even to the point of
changing state governments that are not republican in form. 282
279. Schwartz, supra note 11, at 598–99 (citing Texas v. White, 74 U.S. 700, 728–29
(1868), and Luther v. Borden, 48 U.S. 1, 42 (1849)). And, although the Guarantee
Clauses impose obligations on the United States, Mikhail, Entailment, supra note
147, at 1096 n.105, constitutional duties imply constitutional powers, as, for
example, the government’s duty to protect each State from invasion plainly
implies power to provide that protection.
280. The first four are the Full Faith and Credit, Privileges and Immunities,
Extradition, and Fugitive Slave Clauses. U.S. CONST. art. IV, §§ 1–2. These provisions
were designed to prevent interstate conflict (although the Fugitive Slave Clause had
exactly the opposite effect in practice). The fifth clause empowers Congress to admit
new states by legislation, while guaranteeing the territorial jurisdictions of the States.
Id. § 3, cl. 1. The sixth clause gives Congress the power to dispose of and regulate
territory or other property “belonging to the United States,” while not prejudicing the
claims of either “the United States, or of any particular State.” Id. § 3, cl. 2. And the
seventh clause contains the three guarantees of the United States. See id. § 4.
281. See, e.g., LOUIS FISHER, THE LAW OF THE EXECUTIVE BRANCH: PRESIDENTIAL POWER
311–12 (2014); see also Prize Cases, 67 U.S. (2 Black) 635, 668 (1863); United States v.
Smith, 27 F. Cas. 1192, 1230 (C.C.D.N.Y. 1806) (No. 16,342) (Paterson, J.).
282. At a minimum, the clause was seen as preventing military coups and
monarchical or hereditary state governments. THE FEDERALIST NO. 43, supra note 6, at
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Presidents have in fact used the Republican Guarantee Clause as a
source of power. President Lincoln relied on the clause to authorize
the extraordinary military measures that he took, without
congressional authorization, following the attack on Fort Sumter. 283
Lincoln also used the clause during the Civil War as a basis for
presidential reconstruction, 284 as did President Johnson following the
war. 285 And in 1872, President Grant issued a proclamation under the
Republican Guarantee Clause ordering the end of widespread mob
violence in Arkansas and recognizing one of two disputants as the
State’s governor. 286 Moreover, the case law is not as tidy as described in
Baker v. Carr. 287 In any event, the text, placement, and purpose of the
211–12 (James Madison). For arguments that the clause also ensures “dynamic, not
static, government,” because the necessary ingredients of republicanism (and the
emergence of anti-republican forms of government) could change over time, see
WILLIAM M. WIECEK, THE GUARANTEE CLAUSE OF THE U.S. CONSTITUTION 76 (1972). See
also AKHIL REED AMAR, AMERICA’S CONSTITUTION: A BIOGRAPHY 276–80 (2005); JACK M.
BALKIN, LIVING ORIGINALISM 241–42 (2011); Akhil Reed Amar, The Central Meaning of
Republican Government: Popular Sovereignty, Majority Rule, and the Denominator Problem, 65
U. COLO. L. REV. 749 (1994); Erwin Chemerinsky, Cases Under the Guarantee Clause
Should Be Justiciable, 65 U. COLO. L. REV. 849 (1994). But see Ryan C. Williams, The
“Guarantee” Clause, 132 HARV. L. REV. 602, 619 (2018) (arguing for a much more limited
scope of the clause).
283. See Abraham Lincoln, Message to Congress in Special Session (July 4, 1861), in
6 RICHARDSON, MESSAGES, supra note 171, at 20–31.
284. See Abraham Lincoln, Proclamation of Amnesty and Reconstruction (Dec. 8,
1863), in 6 RICHARDSON, MESSAGES, supra note 171, at 213–15 (this was Lincoln’s
famous 10 percent plan for Louisiana and Arkansas).
285. Charles O. Lerche, Jr., Congressional Interpretations of the Guarantee of a Republican
Form of Government During Reconstruction, 15 J.S. HIST. 192, 196 (1949); WIECEK, supra
note 282, at 189–91.
286. WIECEK, supra note 282, at 223.
287. 369 U.S. 186, 213–29 (1962). Luther v. Borden, 48 U.S. (7 How.) 1 (1849), was
a strange case with a convoluted history. See WIECEK, supra note 282, at 86–129
(providing a comprehensive look into the controversies and political climate leading
up to Luther and analyzing the opinion). The Supreme Court did state that
enforcement of the Republican clause was a political question for Congress. Luther, 48
U.S. (7 How.) at 56. But Congress had taken no action to recognize one of the
competing governments of Rhode Island. Id. at 35. President Tyler unilaterally
recognized one of the charter governments, and the Court held that the President had
power to enforce the Guarantee Clause temporarily. Id. at 43–44. Texas v. White, 74
U.S. (7 Wall.) 700 (1868), rejected a challenge to the constitutionality of the 1867
Military Reconstruction Act. Id. at 730–31. To become republican, Texas had to amend
its old constitution to take into account emancipation and providing for the security
of African-Americans. Id. at 728–29. Applying McCulloch, the Court then held that
Congress had broad discretion under the Necessary and Proper Clause to execute the
Guarantee Clause, limited only by means that are “either prohibited or unsanctioned

60

AMERICAN UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 69:3

Guarantee Clauses make clear that they were included in the
Constitution as important powers of the government of the United
States as a whole.
The treaty power is the other constitutional grant of authority to the
government of the United States. That power can be viewed as vesting
two separate powers in the President and Senate. But the language of
the treaty power, which provides that the President makes treaties “by
and with” the advice and consent of the Senate, requires the joint
action of the President and the Senate. In this respect, the treaty power
is different than the power to enact statutes. The latter power is vested
solely in Congress because no affirmative action of the President is
required for a congressional bill to become law. If the President takes
no action within ten days, the bill is law, and if the President vetoes the
bill, that veto can be overridden by Congress. On the other hand, a
proposed treaty negotiated by the President is a legal nullity if the
Senate takes no action or if a two-thirds majority is not mustered.
Moreover, under the law of nations, the President and Senate act as
the “Government of the United States” in making agreements with
other countries that are in the name of the United States and are
binding on the entire nation. 288
The Convention also gave the third branch a central role in treaty
enforcement. One of the most notable failures of the Confederation
Congress was its inability to enforce treaties against recalcitrant state
governments. 289 This had fourfold effects during the Confederation
period: drastically weakening the national authority of the
Confederation Congress, 290 creating the potential for individual States
to embroil the United States into disputes (and perhaps wars) with
foreign nations, 291 providing Great Britain with a wonderful excuse to
reciprocally violate the Treaty of Peace by refusing to evacuate the
Northwest military posts, 292 and presenting a serious obstacle for

by the Constitution.” Id. And the Court added that the President could provisionally
enforce the Guarantee Clause until Congress acted. Id. at 730.
288. VATTEL, supra note 30, bk. II, § 154, at 192.
289. Golove & Hulsebosch, supra note 29, at 1598–609; RAKOVE, supra note 233, at
342–45; RAKOVE, supra note 239, at 25–29.
290. BEER, supra note 257, at 215; EDMUND S. MORGAN, INVENTING THE PEOPLE: THE
RISE OF POPULAR SOVEREIGNTY IN ENGLAND AND AMERICA 252–53 (1988); RAKOVE, supra
note 233, at 342–45.
291. THE FEDERALIST NO.3, supra note 6, at 10–13 (John Jay); ONUF & ONUF, supra
note 186, at 125.
292. RAKOVE, supra note 239, at 27.
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American diplomats to successfully negotiate treaties with other
European nations. 293 The constitutional solutions were to make all
national treaties (including pre-existing ones) the supreme law of the
land, to impose on state court judges the duty of enforcing treaties that
conflicted with state constitutions and laws, 294 and to vest the Supreme
Court with appellate jurisdiction over “all Cases . . . arising under . . .
Treaties made, or which shall be made, under [United States]
Authority.” 295 As John Jay wrote in Federalist 3: “The wisdom of the
Convention in committing such questions to the jurisdiction and
judgment of courts appointed by, and responsible only to one national
Government, cannot be too much commended.” 296
This examination of the Guarantee Clauses and the treaty power is
inconsistent with the claim that the “all other powers” clause must be
the source of indefinite implied national powers. But that does not
mean that “all other Powers vested . . . in the Government of the United
States” are limited to these four explicit powers. Congress may also have
been given the power to carry into effect other national powers that are
impliedly vested, by other sources, in the government of the United States.
The problem is to identify the sources and scope of those powers.
2.

The “sweeping” clause
The corporate nature of the national government and the implied
powers of corporations arguably support the theory that the United
States has the inherent power to legislate for the general welfare of the
nation. 297 Under that theory, the national government has the
inherent power of a corporation to fulfill its objectives, which are said
to include the Preamble’s goal of promoting the general welfare 298 and
exercising the sovereign national powers (such as the inherent powers
of the United States to enter into contracts and sue for breaches,
control immigration, recognize foreign governments and issue paper
money as legal tender). 299
The “sweeping” clause was a familiar provision in corporate charters or
by-laws that enabled the corporation, whether private or governmental, to
293. ONUF & ONUF, supra note 186, at 106–08, 120–21.
294. U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2.
295. Id. art. III, § 2, cl. 1.
296. THE FEDERALIST NO. 3, supra note 6, at 10 (John Jay).
297. Mikhail Entailment, supra note 147, at 1068–69; Mikhail, Necessary and Proper,
supra note 147, at 1098–1100.
298. Mikhail, Necessary and Proper, supra note 147, at 1098, 1102–05.
299. Mikhail, Entailment, supra note 147, at 1082–83.
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take actions that were necessary to achieve the purposes of its
establishment.300 Identifying those purposes for business, religious, or
charitable corporations is usually not difficult. But governments are
different. Returning to principles of construction at the time of the
founding, the Constitution must be viewed as a whole to determine the
purposes of the national government. The Preamble’s broad aspirational
language could apply to many forms of government. The Articles of
Confederation, which created a purely federal government, had an
aspirational clause that contained provisions similar to the Preamble.301
The broader language of the Preamble could have applied to a revised
Articles that provided Congress with the taxing and commerce powers. A
consolidated national government with unlimited powers also could have
been established with the same preamble. So might the government of
Great Britain, with elections for the House of Commons and either
parliamentary supremacy over the Crown or a mixed constitution. The
purposes of national powers vested in the government of the United States
cannot be determined through the generalities of the Preamble.
The sweeping clauses of state constitutions used the language of “all
other powers necessary for the legislature.”302 That could certainly be a
source of indefinite implied powers because state constitutions typically
vested a general power of legislation, constrained only by negative
prohibitions. But the national government was vested with limited powers.
The Necessary and Proper Clause does not speak of “all other powers
necessary for the legislature.” It authorizes the Congress to carry into effect
“all other Powers vested . . . in the Government of the United States.” The
Convention’s decision to distribute governmental power between the
national and state governments means that we should examine the reasons
for vesting certain enumerated powers, and not others, in the government
of the United States. This is an important step in identifying the source and
identities of those “all other powers” that Congress is authorized to enforce.

300. Mikhail, Necessary and Proper, supra note 147, at 1121–23. During the
Confederation period, three state constitutions contained sweeping clauses. Id. at
1124–25 (citing Pennsylvania, Delaware, and Vermont).
301. ARTICLES OF CONFEDERATION OF 1781, art. III (“The said States hereby severally
enter into a firm league of friendship with each other, for their common defence, the security of
their liberties, and their mutual and general welfare, binding themselves to assist each other,
against all force offered to, or attacks made upon them, or any of them, on account of
religion, sovereignty, trade, or any other pretence whatever.” (emphasis added)).
302. Mikhail, Necessary and Proper, supra note 147, at 1124–25.
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3.

James Wilson and national powers
James Wilson was one of the most strongly nationalist members of
the Convention. During the Confederation period, Wilson defended
Congress’s actions that were not within its explicit powers under the
Articles by maintaining that Congress had the inherent power to legislate
for all objectives that were necessary for the nation.303 As the member of
the Committee of Detail who drafted the “all other powers” clause, Wilson
could have embedded that doctrine into the Constitution.304
However, there are several problems with this narrative. The actions
of the Confederation Congress outside of the scope of its express
powers were justified as matters of necessity but were of dubious
constitutionality. Marshall apparently felt that way, as he conspicuously
refused to rely on the national bank established by the Confederation
Congress as a precedent for Hamilton’s Bank of the United States. 305
In the ratification debates, there was little if any support for Wilson’s
pre-constitutional theory of Congress possessing indefinite power for
all national purposes. 306 Instead, Federalists advocating for the
ratification of the Constitution, led by Wilson himself, emphasized that
the new national government did not have an indefinite general
welfare power but was limited to exercising the enumerated powers. 307
In his famous state house speech, which became a prototype of
Federalist arguments for ratification, Wilson emphasized that, unlike
the state governments, which could legislate on any matter that was not
prohibited by their constitutions, the national government’s legislative
authority was limited to the powers vested by the Constitution. 308
Wilson repeated this constitutional formulation at the Pennsylvania

303. Wilson made this argument most forcefully in defending the establishment of
a national bank. See James Wilson, Considerations, on the Power to Incorporate the Bank of
North America, in 1 WILSON WORKS, supra note 218, at 549.
304. Mikhail, Necessary and Proper, supra note 147, at 1096–1101.
305. McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 423 (1819) (“Under the
confederation, Congress, justifying the measure by its necessity, transcended perhaps
its powers to obtain the advantage of a bank . . . .”).
306. See Cleveland, supra note 16, at 8–9.
307. RAKOVE, supra note 239, at 143–44; MAIER, supra note 180, at 78–81.
308. James Wilson, An Address to a Meeting of the Citizens of Philadelphia (Oct. 6,
1787), in 2 THE DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF THE RATIFICATION OF THE CONSTITUTION
167–68 (Merrill Jensen ed., 1976).
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ratification convention, 309 and it provided the intellectual basis by
which the Federalists reconciled sovereignty with federalism. 310
Without diminishing the importance of Wilson and the other most
strongly nationalist delegates (which included Madison), it is also easy to
overstate their influence in the Convention on highly contested issues.
They lost on core structural proposals—proportional representation in
the Senate, the election of Senators, and a congressional power to veto
state laws. Wilson himself conceded that the Constitution was a product
of “mutual concession and accommodation.”311 And, as discussed below,
the Committee of Detail could have included Gunning Bedford’s
resolution as an enumerated power. 312 That would have been a
straightforward way of explicitly granting a national regulatory power
to Congress—as opposed to concealing such a power in the second of
the necessary and proper clauses.
At the same time, Wilson did not reject the concept of implied
powers, either as a means to carry into effect specified powers or
substantively in a particular sphere of government. Wilson was a strong
advocate of the law of nations being part of the law of the United
States. 313 The consensus view of the founding generation—including
the otherwise legally antagonistic Thomas Jefferson and Alexander
Hamilton—was that the law of nations imposed mutual duties, and
corresponding powers to fulfill those duties, upon all members of the
community of nations on the principle of equal national sovereignty. 314
When the United States announced its entry as an independent member
of the community of nations, it assumed those duties and powers.315
309. 2 ELLIOT’S DEBATES, supra note 180, at 418–37. In his post-ratification Law
Lectures, Wilson related the enumerated powers in Article I, Section 8, to the several
goals in the Preamble. However, he prefaced those relationships by emphasizing the
“striking difference” between state constitutions and the national constitution, with
the latter limited to grants of enumerated power. According to Wilson, the
congressional powers related to the Preamble’s goal of promoting the general welfare
were contained in the Foreign and Indian Commerce Clauses and the Intellectual
Property Clause. 2 WILSON WORKS, supra note 218, at 56–59.
310. MAIER, supra note 180, at 108–10.
311. Id. at 79.
312. See infra text accompanying notes 327–30.
313. See Mikhail, Necessary and Proper, supra note 147, at 1126–27.
314. See Golove & Hulsebosch, supra note 29, at 1616–23. Thus, Republicans conceded
the constitutionality of the Alien Enemies Act as authorized by the law of nations, but they
argued that the Alien Friends Act was not so authorized and therefore needed to be
enacted pursuant to an enumerated congressional power. Id. at 1637–38.
315. DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE para. 32 (U.S. 1776). In his Law Lectures,
Wilson strongly asserted that the law of nations imposed binding obligations and
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During the Neutrality Crisis, the Washington administration, which then
included Hamilton, Jefferson, and Randolph, consistently applied the law
of nations as both a source of authority and a constraint on its actions,
while recognizing that ultimate power was in Congress.316 Because the
doctrines of the law of nations were considered enforceable by the
executive and the judiciary without implementing legislation, we would
now refer to these doctrines as federal common law. Inasmuch as these
powers and duties were vested in the government of the United States as
a whole, perhaps Wilson had the law of nations in mind when he drafted
the “all other powers” provision of the Necessary and Proper Clause.
However, would the law of nations as it existed at the founding
authorize the implied national powers discussed in this paper? It would
not. The law of nations was not a one-way street of enhanced
governmental power. Even as related to its principal sphere of
operation—state-to-state relations—it also imposed constraints on the
exercise of national powers. For example, the law of nations would not
authorize a discretionary recognition power as an instrument of
foreign policy, 317 which is how that power has been used at least since
the Wilson administration. 318 Indeed, the refusal of the United States
to receive an ambassador from a recognized government (such as
Cuba’s) would be a serious violation of the law of nations. 319 With
respect to bans on immigration and transit, the law of nations did not
clearly provide for a nation’s absolute right to exclude foreigners. 320
Moreover, the attempt by the Washington administration and federal
judges, including Wilson, to apply the law of nations domestically was an
abject failure. 321 And nothing in the law of nations would even
remotely authorize a national bank or paper money as legal tender.
corresponding powers on the United States. He reconciled this with popular sovereignty:
in declaring independence and creating the Republic, the people had voluntarily assumed
the law of nations, which is based on principles of natural law. 1 WILSON WORKS, supra note
218, at 129–41, 337–42. (This was Vattel’s “voluntary” law of nations).
316. See Reinstein, supra note 56 (discussing this in considerable detail).
317. See Adler, supra note 56, at 133–57.
318. See Green H. Hackworth, The Policy of the United States in Recognizing New Governments
During the Past Twenty-Five Years, 25 AM. SOC’Y INT’L L. PROC. 120, 124 (1931).
319. VATTEL, supra note 30, bk IV, § 78, at 462.
320. See Cleveland, supra note 16, at 83–84 (discussing Pufendorf and Vattel).
321. During the Neutrality Crisis, Secretary of State Jefferson instructed the United
States Attorney to institute non-statutory prosecutions against individuals for
committing hostile military acts against the belligerents (Britain, Spain and France) in
violation of the law of nations. Justice Wilson, along with Chief Justice Jay and Justice
Iredell, instructed grand juries to bring such indictments. These actions were

66

AMERICAN UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 69:3

I began the discussion by complimenting Professor Mikhail’s insight
that the second “all other powers” clause potentially relates to implied
national powers (which may well include strict adherence to the law of
nations). But in determining what “all other powers” were vested in the
government of the United States, we should examine the content and
scope of the powers that were specifically enumerated. Why were
certain powers, and not others, specifically enumerated as vested in the
national government? What are the purposes of these powers? Do the
reasons for which certain powers were enumerated, and their
purposes, provide the bases for determining the content of “other
powers” that were vested but not specifically listed? Answers to these
questions require an examination of the fate of Resolution VI of the
Virginia Plan in the Convention.
E. Resolution VI and Enumerated Powers
At the outset of the Convention, Edmund Randolph presented a
series of resolutions that the Virginia delegation proposed as the
framework of the new government. Resolution VI stated:
Resolved that each branch ought to possess the right of originating
Acts; that the National Legislature ought to be [e]mpowered to enjoy the
Legislative Rights vested in Congress by the Confederation & moreover to
legislate in all cases to which the separate States are incompetent, or in which
the harmony of the United States may be interrupted by the exercise of
individual Legislation; to negative all laws passed by the several States,
contravening in the opinion of the National Legislature the articles
of Union; and to call forth the force of the Union agst[] any member
of the Union failing to fulfill its duty under the articles thereof. 322

A common argument of scholars who seek to establish a national
general welfare power is that the enumerated powers viewed as a whole
are equivalent to the italicized portion of Resolution VI quoted above.323
The Convention modified or rejected every proposal in Resolution
VI except for the italicized portion. 324 No delegate objected to the
unsuccessful, as juries acquitted and grand juries refused to return indictments. This
forced Washington to seek (and obtain) statutory crimes in the Neutrality Act. See
Reinstein, supra note 56, at 434–40.
322. 1 FARRAND, supra note 69, at 21 (emphasis added).
323. See Cooter & Siegel, supra note 143, at 123–24; Johnson, supra note 58, at 49–
51; Mikhail, Necessary and Proper, supra note 147, at 1051–52.
324. The Convention decided that all revenue acts must originate in the House of
Representatives. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 7, cl. 1. The proposal that Congress could use
force to obtain compliance with the Constitution had no traction, and it was replaced
with the authority of Congress to legislate directly on individuals and not through the

2019]

AGGREGATE AND IMPLIED POWERS OF THE UNITED STATES

67

portion of Resolution VI proposing that Congress should have the
legislative powers of the Confederation Congress. The additional
proposal for a general national legislative authority was debated
sporadically in the Convention. Opponents of Resolution VI argued
that it would provide Congress with indefinite power. Supporters
argued that drafting a complete enumeration of the powers that
Congress should possess was impracticable. 325 The Convention held
the matter in abeyance until an agreement was reached on
representation in the House and Senate. Following the Great
Compromise, the Convention returned to Resolution VI. As modified
in a resolution offered by Gunning Bedford, Congress would be vested
with the legislative powers contained in the Articles of Confederation
and also the power “to legislate in all cases for the general interests of
the Union, and also in those to which the States are separately
incompetent, or in which the harmony of the U[nited] States may be
interrupted by the exercise of individual Legislation.” 326
Bedford’s resolution passed by a vote of eight States to two. 327 It was
sent to the Committee of Detail, along with twenty-two other
resolutions that the Convention had approved, with a direction that
the committee frame a constitution in conformance with these
resolutions. Within eleven days, 328 the Committee reported out a draft
constitution that contained an eighteen-paragraph list of enumerated
powers in Congress.329 The Committee’s proposed enumeration of
congressional powers and its exclusion of Bedford’s resolution apparently
provoked no opposition, although the extent of some of the proposed

intermediacy of the States. RAKOVE, supra note 239, at 180. The proposed negatives in
Congress and the Council of Revision (in Resolution VIII) were replaced by the more
limited judicial review of state and national legislation. LACROIX, supra note 185, at 158–66.
325. Although Madison was an author of the Virginia Plan, he expressed
ambivalence about which approach should be taken. See 1 FARRAND, supra note 69, at
53. For the argument that Madison consistently supported enumerating national
power, see LANCE BANNING, THE SACRED FIRE OF LIBERTY: JAMES MADISON AND THE
FOUNDING OF THE FEDERAL REPUBLIC 160, 454–55 (1995).
326. 2 FARRAND, supra note 69, at 26.
327. 2 id. at 27.
328. MCLAUGHLIN, supra note 193, at 153.
329. “To ‘the Legislative Rights vested in Congress by the Confederation,’ the
[Committee of Detail] proposed to add the power to lay and collect taxes, regulate
interstate and foreign commerce, establish a uniform rule of naturalization, subdue
rebellion within individual states, raise an army without relying on the states for the
recruitment of soldiers, and ‘to call forth’ the militia to enforce national laws and treaties
and to ‘suppress insurrections, and repel invasions.’” RAKOVE, supra note 239, at 178–79.
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powers was debated and changed.330 The Necessary and Proper Clause
was approved unanimously.331 With some later modifications, the
committee’s list of specific powers became Article I, Section 8.
Scholars are divided on the role of Resolution VI in the
Convention. 332 As Jack Rakove states, the “open-ended language [of
Resolution VI] may be viewed in two ways”: either as an “authentic
formula for a national government” that has no express limit on its
legislative power, or a “textual placeholder to be” later “modified or . .
. replaced by a list of particular powers.” 333
Which view is correct presents a puzzle. 334 The Committee of Detail
showed that it was practicable to enumerate the powers of Congress.
But why would nationalist supporters of the Bedford Resolution, who
opposed a specific list of congressional powers, accept the committee’s
enumerations? 335
The Committee of Detail’s proposed enumerations of national
legislative powers was almost certainly a method of effectuating
Resolution VI. Were it not, there surely would have been opposition to
this approach in the Convention. However, just as the role of
Resolution VI can be viewed in two different ways, so can the
relationship of the proposed enumerated powers and Resolution VI.
330. Id. at 84–89. The contested issues were whether Congress could tax exports,
whether a two-thirds vote in Congress should be required for navigation acts, and whether
Congress could prohibit the international slave trade. The outcome, which emerged from
a grand committee, was a prohibition on export taxes, rejection of a super-majority for
navigation acts and the twenty-year grace period for the slave trade. Id.
331. 2 FARRAND, supra note 69, at 344–45.
332. Jack Balkin joins the scholars discussed in this Article who argue that the
enumerated powers incorporated Resolution VI. BALKIN, supra note 282, at 145–46;
Jack M. Balkin, Commerce, 109 MICH. L. REV. 1, 6–15 (2010). Scholars who view the
enumerated powers as distinctive from Resolution VI include RAKOVE, supra note 239,
at 178–80, MICHAEL J. KLARMAN, THE FRAMERS’ COUP: THE MAKING OF THE UNITED
STATES CONSTITUTION 145–47, 203–04 (2016), and Kurt T. Lash, Resolution VI: The
Virginia Plan and Authority to Resolve Collective Action Problems Under Article I, Section 8, 87
NOTRE DAME L. REV. 2123, 2133 (2012).
333. RAKOVE, supra note 239, at 177–78.
334. For advocates of the doctrine that the Constitution should be interpreted
according to original public meaning, it should be immaterial which view of the
delegates’ intent is correct. The Convention held its deliberations in secret, and the
debates over Resolution VI (and even the existence of that resolution) were not known
to the public. What the public did know was that the Constitution listed specific powers
in Congress. See Lash, supra note 332, at 2152–53, 2156–57.
335. Madison’s notes are not helpful because they are particularly sketchy and
unreliable for the latter stages of the Convention. See MARY SARAH BILDER, MADISON’S
HAND: REVISING THE CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION 141–54 (2015).
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That is, the enumerated powers may be construed as a long-handed
version of Resolution VI’s sweeping language, thus amounting to a
congressional power to legislate for the general welfare. Or the
enumerated powers may represent the means selected by the
Convention to enforce those discreet areas of governance in which
“the separate States are incompetent, or in which the harmony of the
United States may be interrupted by the exercise of individual
Legislation.” 336 My reasons for advocating the latter position rest on
the origin and purposes the enumerated powers that are vested in all
three branches of the national government.
In Part III of this Article, I will present and elaborate upon two
assertions. First, the enumerated powers of the central (national)
government appear to have originated in and were carried forward from
the powers exercised by the central (imperial) government in the old
British Empire and recognized as legitimate by American leaders until the
outbreak of war. Second, those specific powers were not ends in
themselves. Rather, the enumerated powers were known means to carry
out the principal purposes of union—insuring the common defense,
governing foreign affairs, preventing and resolving jurisdictional disputes,
and regulating foreign and inter-state commerce.
Part IV of this Article examines constitutional structure and shows
that the specific enumerated powers are contained in four clusters of
power that correspond to the four principal purposes of the union
stated above. As argued by Hamilton in Federalist 23 and the Bank
opinion and by Marshall in McCulloch, the Constitution should be
construed as vesting these aggregate powers in the government of the
United States. Part V discusses these four aggregate powers and the
scope and limits of the implied powers of the United States that derive
from these aggregate powers.
III. THE ORIGINS AND PURPOSES OF NATIONAL POWERS
A. The Old British Empire as a Model
How was it possible for the Committee of Detail to so easily
enumerate the powers of the national government? Andrew C.
McLaughlin, whom Jack P. Greene has called the “doyen” of American
constitutional historians,337 provided an answer in an article published a

336. See 2 FARRAND, supra note 69, at 131–32.
337. GREENE, supra note 198, at 65.
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century ago.338 The constitutional system of the old British Empire (that is,
as it functioned before the crises beginning in the 1760s) operated as a
precursor to federalism, in which power was distributed by subject-matter
between the metropolitan authorities and the colonial assemblies. The
colonists denied the imperial power to secure revenues from them by direct
or indirect taxation. But if that power is added to the powers actually
exercised by the imperial authorities and acknowledged as legitimate in the
colonies up to the eve of the Revolution, there is a striking similarity with
the powers vested in the national government by the Constitution. 339
This apparent continuity in governance authority should not be surprising.
Americans had thrived under this governmental structure and rebelled when
imperial authorities moved to change it. The old British Empire provided a
model for the distribution of power between the national and state
governments. This model was partially adopted in the Articles of
Confederation and then was completed in the Constitution.
B. Central Powers in the Empire and the Confederation
As James Madison would later observe, American leaders believed
that “[t]he fundamental principle of the Revolution was, that the
Colonies were co-ordinate members with each other and with Great
Britain, of an empire united by a common executive sovereign, but not
united by any common legislative sovereign.” 340 To a considerable
extent, the transition of colonies into states maintained the
governance system that had actually existed in the colonies. 341 Even
before the Articles of Confederation were drafted, the Continental
Congress assumed most of the superintending jurisdiction that had
been exercised by the Crown. 342 The Articles formalized this
arrangement, giving Congress most of the powers that the Crown had

338. McLaughlin, supra note 206, at 215–17.
339. Id. at 217–18; see also MCLAUGHLIN, supra note 186, at 154–55, 180;
MCLAUGHLIN, supra note 193, at 100. Greene agrees with McLaughlin’s thesis. GREENE,
supra note 198, at 205. For the distribution of powers between the imperial center and
the colonial assemblies, see supra notes 159–68 and accompanying text.
340. James Madison, Report on Resolutions, House of Delegates, Session of 1799–
1800, Concerning Alien and Sedition Laws, in 6 THE WRITINGS OF JAMES MADISON 373
(Gaillard Hunt ed., 1906).
341. GREENE, supra note 198, at 165, 182.
342. PETER S. ONUF, THE ORIGINS OF THE FEDERAL REPUBLIC: JURISDICTIONAL
CONTROVERSIES IN THE UNITED STATES, 1775–1787 at 7 (1983).
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exercised over the colonies, according to the King’s prerogative
powers 343 or by executing parliamentary legislation. 344
The powers given to Congress in the Articles fell into the five
categories of power that the Crown had exercised over the colonies:
(1) common defense;345 (2) foreign relations;346 (3) other relations
external to individual States;347 (4) controversies between the States;348 and
(5) limited fiscal and monetary regulations.349 With respect to taxation, the
Articles adopted the mechanism that colonial leaders had proposed to
imperial authorities: Congress would issue revenue requisitions to the
States, and the state legislatures would have the taxing authority. 350
There were some notable omissions from the powers that the Crown
had exercised to the list granted to the Confederation Congress.
Congress was not given the power to veto or disallow state legislation.
Similarly, Congress did not have the power to raise armies: it could set
quotas, but recruiting was left to the States. Nor did Congress have the
343. See supra notes 199–207 and accompanying text.
344. MCLAUGHLIN, supra note 186, at 11–13; McLaughlin, supra note 206, at 217.
345. These included the powers of determining war and peace, building and
equipping a navy, appointing all superior officers in the army and all officers in the
navy, making rules and regulations for the land and naval forces and directing their
operations. ARTICLES OF CONFEDERATION OF 1781, art. IX, paras. 1, 4. Congress could
also determine the number of land forces and set requisitions for each State, but
raising the army was left to the States. Id. art. IX, para. 5. Similarly, Congress could
spend for the common defense and make requisitions to the States, but securing the
revenues was left to state taxation. Id. art. VIII.
346. These were the powers of sending and receiving ambassadors, making treaties
and alliances, issuing letters of marque and reprisal in time of peace, making rules for
captures on land and water and determining prize allocations, appointing courts to try
piracies and felonies on the high seas, appointing appellate courts in prize cases, and
determining war and peace. Id. art. IX, para. 1.
347. Congress could regulate the trade and affairs with Indians who were not
members of any State, id. art. IX, para. 4, and admit other colonies into the Union. Id.
art. XI. The Crown had assumed the former power and was preparing to exercise the
latter. Congress could also establish and regulate the post office, a function that the
Crown performed in executing parliamentary legislation. Id. art. IX, para. 4.
348. Congress could resolve all boundary and other disputes between two or more
States and decide cases of conflicting land grants. Id. art. IX, para. 2. Those functions
had been performed by the Privy Council.
349. These included the powers of coining money, regulating the value of national
and state coin, and fixing uniform weights and measures. Id. art. IX, para. 4. Congress
could also spend for the general welfare according to its own appropriations decisions,
provided that the revenues would be raised by the States, id. art. VIII, and had the
power to borrow money and emit bills on the credit of the United States (a
parliamentary power). Id. art. IX, para. 5.
350. McLaughlin, supra note 206, at 239.
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crucial power to regulate commerce, a power exercised by both the
Crown and Parliament that American leaders acknowledged as
legitimate until the eve of the Revolution. The unanimous consent of
the States to vest the commerce power in Congress was not secured,
probably because of special state interests in regulating commerce and in
deriving substantial revenues from import, export, and tonnage duties.351
Even with these omissions, 352 the powers that Congress possessed
were formidable, at least on paper. During the debates over ratifying
the Constitution, Anti-Federalists who opposed expanding
congressional power pointed out that its existing authority was
practically as extensive as the Crown’s. 353 The absence of congressional
powers to tax and regulate commerce was critical to the Confederation’s
demise. But even if those powers had been granted, the Confederacy
was doomed because of its governance structure.
C. National Powers in the Constitution
1.

Additions and allocations of powers
The Convention rejected the Vattelian structure of a league of
sovereign and independent states joined by treaty. The Convention’s
most important decision was to create a real government with the
power to act directly on individuals. With executive and judicial
branches empowered to directly enforce the Constitution and laws and
treaties of the United States, the Convention changed the nature of
federalism. American federalism now entailed not only continuing the
subject-matter distribution of power between the national and state
governments, but also distributing power within the branches of the

351. During the entire Confederation period, Congress was unable to secure the
unanimous consent of the state legislatures to regulate commerce or impose taxes on
imports. Such proposals were vetoed initially by Rhode Island and later by New York.
RAKOVE, supra note 233, at 337–42, 345–52.
352. The Articles also did not give Congress authority over the western territories.
However, in 1780, shortly before the Articles were ratified by all States, Congress
assumed control over the western territories. Virginia and other States then ceded
territory north of the Ohio River to the United States. This exercise of congressional
power was of dubious constitutionality, but as a matter of necessity it received the
acquiescence of the States. Id. at 339, 352–53. Joseph Story rationalized the
unauthorized actions that Congress took prior to 1781, when the Articles became
legally effective, as lawful by virtue of revolutionary necessity and of Congress then
representing the people and not the States. 1 STORY, COMMENTARIES, supra note 9,
§ 216, at 206–07.
353. RAKOVE, supra note 233, at 383.
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government and employing the federal courts as umpires to resolve
conflicts that would arise through the concurrent application of
national and state laws on individuals.
Every proposal for congressional power began with the assumption
that the new Congress would be vested with all of the legislative powers of
the Confederation Congress.354 That assumption was repeatedly ratified by
the Convention without dissent, but that unanimity masked an underlying
complication. Resolution VI of the Virginia Plan proposed that Congress
would inherit the legislative powers of the Confederation Congress, but
Resolution VII proposed that the executive powers of the Confederation
Congress would be vested in a national executive. If viewed according to
British theory and practice, most of the powers of the Confederation
Congress corresponded to the historical prerogatives of the Crown.355 But
the Convention did not follow British precedent in allocating power
between the executive and legislative branches.356 James Wilson set the tone
early in the Convention: “He did not consider the Prerogatives of the
British Monarch as the proper guide in defining the Executive powers.”357
The Convention agreed and modified Resolution VII to give the Executive
“power to carry into effect the national laws and appoint to offices in cases
not otherwise provided for.”358 With some important exceptions, most of
the powers of the Confederation Congress were vested in the national
legislature.359 This effected a massive transfer to the legislature of powers
that had been prerogatives of the Executive under the British constitution.
354. See supra notes 322, 326–27 and accompanying text. One important power
possessed by the Confederation Congress—to emit bills on the credit of the United States—
was struck from the list of enumerated powers late in the Convention. See supra note 69.
355. RAKOVE, supra note 233, at 383–84.
356. See Matthew Steilen, How to Think Constitutionally About Prerogative: A Study of
Early American Usage, 66 BUFF. L. REV. 557, 629–30 (2018).
357. 1 FARRAND, supra note 69, at 65.
358. Id. at 67 (internal quotation marks omitted).
359. The powers to make treaties and appoint judges and diplomats were vested in
the President and the Senate. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2. The duty to receive foreign
diplomats was assigned to the President. Id. art. II, § 3. The Judiciary also shared in the
foreign affairs power, being given jurisdiction in cases arising under the Constitution,
laws and treaties, cases affecting foreign diplomats, the admiralty and maritime
jurisdiction, and controversies between a State or its citizens and foreign states, citizens
and subjects. Id. art. III, § 2. The Convention did not transfer to the new Congress the
Confederation Congress’s power to direct the operations of the army and navy.
Instead, the President was made Commander-in-Chief of the armed forces. Id. art. II,
§ 2. The adjudication of conflicts between national and state authority, as well as
boundary and other disputes between two or more States, and controversies over
conflicting land grants, were vested in the Judiciary. Id. art. III, § 2, cl. 1.
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The Convention added essential enumerated powers. Congress was
given the powers to lay and collect taxes on individuals, raise and
support armies without the intermediacy of the States, regulate
interstate and foreign commerce, and have plenary control over the
territories. 360 All but one of these (taxing the colonists) had been powers
of the Crown in the old British Empire. 361 And, as the Convention drew
to an end, several more national powers were added, deriving from
historical antecedents of the old Empire, 362 experiences under the
Confederation, 363 or republican ideology. 364

360. Id. art. I, § 8, cls. 1, 3, 12; id. art. IV, § 3, cl. 2.
361. The Crown had exercised the powers to raise armies and control the western
lands; it also regulated commerce and executed parliamentary legislation on trade and
navigation. Of the other powers that the Committee of Detail added to the pre-existing
powers in the Articles, see supra note 299, all except nationalizing the militia had been
exercised by the Crown over the colonies in the old empire.
362. The patent and copyright powers, U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8, had been shared
by the Crown and Parliament. Statute of Monopolies 1623, 21 Jac. c. 3 (Eng.); Adam
Mossoff, Rethinking the Development of Patents: An Intellectual History, 1550–1800, 52
HASTINGS L.J. 1255, 1271–73 (2001). The plenary powers over the nation’s capital and
all nationally-owned places, U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 17, corresponded to the Crown’s
control of land owned by the King within the colonies. McLaughlin, supra note 206, at
218. The President’s powers of appointment (shared with the Senate) and pardon,
and his duties to receive foreign diplomats and faithfully execute the laws, U.S. CONST.,
art. II, §§ 2, 3, were all royal prerogatives and duties. The United States’ obligation to
protect each State from invasion and domestic violence, id. art. IV, § 4, tracked the
King’s fundamental duty under the British constitution to protect his subjects. The
Convention also partially resurrected the Crown’s prerogative to veto colonial
legislation, by giving the President a qualified veto over congressional legislation, but
no power to veto or disallow state legislation. Id. art. I, § 7.
363. In addition to the power to “call[] forth” the militia, Congress was given
substantial authority to regulate the state militias. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cls. 15, 16.
Near the close of the Convention, Congress was given the power to enact “uniform
Laws on the subject of Bankruptcies throughout the United States.” Id. cl. 4. Colonial
assemblies and state legislatures had enacted bankruptcy and insolvency laws, but there is
no consensus on what abuses precipitated the inclusion of this national power or what it
meant when it was ratified. See Jonathan C. Lipson, Debt and Democracy: Towards a
Constitutional Theory of Bankruptcy, 83 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 605, 624–35 (2008).
364. U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 4 (Republican Guarantee Clause). I omit from this
discussion powers relating to the internal structure of the national government,
including the distribution of federal and state authority over the composition of the
branches of the national government and the election or appointment of members to
those branches. The old empire did not provide a model for the distribution of those
powers, and the debates over those issues in the Convention and in the ratification
debates were particularly contentious.
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2.

The purposes of national powers
The analysis presented above is consistent with Andrew McLaughlin’s
thesis that the Convention had a ready model for enumerating the powers
of Congress. The predominance of enumerated powers that were derived
from the old British Empire is so great that perhaps one should ask, not
which powers were so derived, but which few were not. The first seventeen
paragraphs of Article I, Section 8 vested twenty-five specific powers in
Congress. Only four (taxation, the two militia clauses, and the
bankruptcy clause) did not correspond to powers exercised by the
central authorities in the old British Empire.
McLaughlin’s thesis also provides an explanation for the broad
acceptance of the enumerations presented by the Committee of Detail.
The proposed national legislative powers would be dominant within
specific spheres—common defense against external and internal
threats, foreign relations, trade and commerce, and preventing and
resolving conflicts between the States and between the United States
and the States. Each of these national spheres of authority would in
turn be supported by robust fiscal and monetary powers. This could
satisfy the nationalists because the United States was given powers to
achieve the principal purposes they sought to achieve in the
Constitution, which Hamilton identified in Federalist 23:
The principal purposes to be answered by the Union are these—The
common defen[s]e of the members—the preservation of the public
peace as well as against internal convulsions as external attacks—the
regulation of commerce with other nations and between the States—
the superintendence of our intercourse, political and commercial,
with foreign countries. 365

And Hamilton emphasized that national fiscal and monetary policy was
an essential prerequisite for achieving the principal purposes that were
at the core of Federalist ambition. 366
Those concerned with preserving large areas of residual state
autonomy could also be satisfied with the enumeration of powers
because although the United States would possess enormous powers
within certain spheres, those spheres were limited. 367 The States would
continue to have extensive authority over their internal affairs—
365. THE FEDERALIST NO. 23, supra note 6, at 106 (Alexander Hamilton); see also id.
NOS. 11–13 (discussing these purposes as central to an effective union).
366. This is the essence of Alexander Hamilton’s lengthy defense of virtually
unlimited congressional taxing and borrowing powers. See THE FEDERALIST NOS. 30–36,
supra note 6, at 137–68 (Alexander Hamilton).
367. RAKOVE, supra note 239, at 178–79.
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including general tort, contract, property, family, and criminal law. 368
The Convention reached a consensus that the way to promote the
“common defense and general welfare of the United States” was to vest
four discrete and formidable categories of powers in the government
of the United States. 369
IV. AGGREGATE POWERS OF THE UNITED STATES
A. The Four Clusters of National Power
Almost all of the specific powers vested in the national government
are designed to fulfill the four central purposes of the Union as
identified in Federalist 23. Many of the specific enumerated powers
serve more than one of these purposes. The powers to secure adequate
revenues through taxing and borrowing cut across every other national
power. The regulation of foreign and interstate commerce was not
only critical for economic prosperity, it also was an important
instrument of foreign policy and necessary to prevent and resolve
economic conflicts between competitive States. These and other
powers not only overlap in purpose but are also interdependent.
Americans were well aware of how Great Britain became the richest
and most powerful nation in the world. “Before the era of free trade,
commercial advantage was inseparably intertwined with military
strength. Britain’s position both as a commercial and a military world
power rested on command of the seas.” 370 Federalists also understood
commerce as “the most useful as well as the most productive source of
national wealth” 371 and that a viable commercial republic was
dependent upon credible foreign policies and an effective military. 372
One can of course view each enumerated power separately and then
debate its particular scope. Or one can view these powers collectively as
368. Responding to the abuses of state legislatures in issuing paper money as legal
tender and enacting private bankruptcy laws, the Convention proposed limited restraints
on the power of state legislatures to regulate contracts. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 10.
369. RAKOVE, supra note 239, at 240 (stating that theory of federalism developed by
the Constitution’s supporters “depended on a sharp distinction between the objects of
general and state government and the recognition that the responsibilities of Congress
were at once exalted but limited”). This theme was pressed in the ratification debates
by such leading Federalists as John Dickinson, John Jay, Oliver Ellsworth, Edmund
Randolph, and John Marshall. Id. at 240–41.
370. MAX M. EDLING, A REVOLUTION IN FAVOR OF GOVERNMENT 86 (2003).
371. THE FEDERALIST NO. 12, supra note 6, at 52 (Alexander Hamilton).
372. BEER, supra note 257, at 245–46 (emphasizing the interdependence of national
power, commerce and economic prosperity); EDLING, supra note 370, at 83–87 (same).
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constituting aggregate powers in the government of the United States.
The unmistakable pattern of national powers is that they are clustered
according to the essential purposes of the Union. There are four such
clusters of national powers, and they are distributed in all three branches
of the government. They are “other Powers” vested by the Constitution in
the government of the United States and can be enforced by Congress
pursuant to the second of the Necessary and Proper Clauses.
First, common defense. To protect national security against external
and internal threats, the Constitution vested eleven military powers in
Congress in nine clauses of Article I, Section 8, 373 plus the President’s
Article II power as Commander-in-Chief and the duties/powers of the
United States government as a whole in two of the Article IV Guarantee
Clauses. The purely national character of many of these powers was
secured by prohibiting, or requiring congressional approval for, their
concurrent exercise by the States. 374
Second, foreign affairs. The national authority over foreign relations
was vested in most of the military powers listed above, plus four other
congressional powers in Article I, Section 8, 375 three presidential
powers/duties in Article II, 376 and four categories of national judicial
power. 377 Again, this national authority was enhanced by prohibitions
on concurrent authority in the States. 378

373. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 1 (taxing to provide for common defense); id. cl.
2 (borrowing money); id. cl. 11 (declaring war, granting letters of marque and reprisal,
and making rules for captures); id. cl. 12 (raising and supporting the army); id. cl. 13
(providing for and maintaining the navy); id. cl. 14 (making rules to govern the
military); id. cl. 15 (calling forth the militia); id. cl. 16 (regulating the militia); id.
cl. 17 (exercising exclusive jurisdiction over national forts, magazines, arsenals
and dockyards). I include the power to borrow money because it relates directly
to effectuating the military powers. The Necessary and Proper Clause could be
added to each cluster.
374. Id. art. I, § 10, cls. 1, 3 (letters of marque and reprisal, keeping an army or navy
in peacetime, engaging in war).
375. Id. art. I, § 8, cl. 3 (regulating foreign commerce); id. cl. 5 (regulating value of
foreign coin); id. cl. 10 (defining and punishing [1] piracy and felonies on the high
seas and [2] violations of the law of nations).
376. Id. art. II, § 2, cl. 2 (making treaties and appointing diplomats with Senate
approval); id. cl. 3 (receiving foreign diplomats).
377. Id. art. III, § 2 (cases arising under treaties, affecting foreign diplomats,
admiralty jurisdiction and controversies between a State or its citizens and foreign
states, citizens or subjects).
378. Id. art. I, § 10, cls. 1, 3 (treaties, alliances, confederation or any other
agreements with a foreign power).
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Third, national and interstate relations. To prevent and resolve
controversies between the United States and the States, and between
the States themselves, the Constitution vested seven powers in
Congress 379 and six categories of judicial power in the federal courts. 380
These powers were supplemented by five requirements in Articles IV
and VI that were designed to set the constitutional relationship
between the United States and the States and ensure cooperation
between the States, 381 and one restriction on interstate action. 382
Fourth, national economic powers. The first eight clauses of Article
I, Section 8 gave Congress sixteen fiscal, monetary, and commercial
powers.383 The States were prohibited from exercising a number of these

379. Id. art. I, § 8, cl. 3 (regulating commerce among the States and with foreign
nations and the Indian tribes); id. cl. 4 (uniform rule of naturalization); id. cl. 17
(exclusive jurisdiction of a capital outside of the territorial jurisdiction of any State);
id. art. IV, § 2, cl. 1 (admission of new States); id. cl. 2 (control over United States
territory and property).
380. Id. art. III, § 2 (cases arising under the Constitution, laws and treaties of the
United States; controversies between two or more States, between a State and citizen
of another State, between citizens of different States, and between citizens of the same
State claiming under conflicting state land grants). These judicial powers mirrored the
jurisdictional authority of the Privy Council in the old British Empire.
381. Id. art. VI, cl. 2 (supremacy of Constitution, laws and treaties of the United
States); art. IV, §§ 1–2 (full faith and credit, privileges and immunities, extradition and
capturing fugitive slaves). The last of these provisions was one of the great mistakes of
the Convention. Instead of leading to cooperation between slave and free states, the
enforcement of this clause became one of the precipitating causes of the Civil War.
On the relationship between congressional powers and the anti-discrimination
provisions of Article IV, see generally Gillian E. Metzger, Congress, Article IV, and
Interstate Relations, 120 HARV. L. REV. 1468 (2007).
382. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 10 (prohibiting interstate compacts or agreements without
congressional consent). Intercolonial agreements had been made to settle territorial
claims, but those agreements were subject to the approval of the Crown through the
Privy Council. The practice of such intercolonial agreements continued during the
Confederation period, and the Articles did not require congressional approval. The
Convention restored the requirement of central approval apparently in response to
interstate agreements that disadvantaged other States. See Felix Frankfurter & James
M. Landis, The Compact Clause of the Constitution—A Study in Interstate Adjustments, 34
YALE L.J. 685, 692–93, 730–34 (1925).
383. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 1 (taxing, paying the debts, and spending for the
general welfare); id. cl. 2 (borrowing); id. cl. 3 (regulating commerce among the
several states, with foreign nations, and with the Indian tribes); id. cl. 4 (bankruptcy);
id. cl. 5 (coining money, regulating the value of domestic and foreign coin, setting
weights and measures); id. cl. 6 (punishing counterfeiting); id. cl. 7 (post office); id.
cl. 8 (patents and copyrights).
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and other economic powers.384 These powers and prohibitions were
reinforced by the Privileges and Immunities Clause of Article IV, the
admiralty and maritime jurisdiction of the federal courts, and the power
of the President to make commercial treaties with Senate approval. 385
Each cluster is not simply a collection of individual powers. The
specific powers in each cluster were drawn primarily from the
operating distribution of powers in the old Empire, and to a lesser
extent from experience in the Confederation. These powers were
designed to operate in combination to achieve the central purposes of
union as summarized in Federalist 23.
The Constitution vested four great aggregate powers (or comprehensive
enumerated powers) in the government of the United States. As in geometry,
a constitutional whole may be greater than the sum of its parts. This was a
doctrine that Hamilton expressed in Federalist 23 and his defense of the
Bank of the United States. It was dispositive in McCulloch.
B. Hamilton’s Theory of Aggregate Power
1.

Federalist 23
Federalist 23 is Alexander Hamilton’s essay on “[t]he necessity of a
Constitution, at least equally energetic as the one proposed, to the
preservation of the Union.” 386 The first step in determining the scope
of national power is to determine “the objects to be provided for by a
Federal Government.” 387 The essential tasks of the Constitution in a
“compound” republic are “to discriminate the objects” that are the
provinces of the national and state governments and provide each with
“the most ample authority for fulfilling the objects committed to its
charge.” 388 Hamilton then identified the four essential national
purposes stated above and insisted that the realization of those
purposes requires an aggregate approach to national power:
Shall the Union be constituted the guardian of the common safety?
Are fleets . . . and revenues necessary to this purpose? The
government of the Union must be empowered to pass all laws, and
to make all regulations which have relation to them. The same must

384. Id. art. I, § 10, cls. 1–3 (coining money, emitting bills of credit, issuing paper
money as legal tender, impairing the obligations of contracts, and taxing imports,
exports, or tonnage).
385. Id. art. IV, § 2, cl. 1; id. art. III, § 2, cl. 1; id. art. II, § 2, cl. 2.
386. THE FEDERALIST NO. 23, supra note 6, at 106 (Alexander Hamilton).
387. Id.
388. Id. at 108.
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be the case, in respect to commerce, and to every other matter to
which its jurisdiction is permitted to extend . . . . Not to confer in
each case a degree of power, commensurate to the end, would be . .
. improvidently to trust the great interests of the nation to hands,
which are disabled from managing them with vigour and success . .
..
Every view we may take of the subject . . . will serve to convince us,
that it is both unwise and dangerous to deny the Federal
Government an unconfined authority, as to all those objects which
are intrusted to its management. 389

Thus, for each of these national purposes, “[t]he means ought to be
proportioned to the end; the persons, from whose agency the
attainment of any end is expected, ought to possess the means by which
it is to be attained.” 390 In this formulation, the “ends” are the purposes
of governmental power, while the “means” are all of the powers
necessary to fulfill those purposes. But why cannot those means be predetermined in relation to those ends? Hamilton’s answer, with his
emphasis: “Because it is impossible to foresee or define the extent and variety of
national exigencies, or the correspondent extent [and] variety of the means
which may be necessary to satisfy them.” 391 Federalist 23 is the prescription
for Hamilton’s Bank opinion and for Marshall’s opinion in McCulloch.
2.

The Bank Opinion
In persuading Washington to sign the bill establishing the Bank of the
United States, Hamilton began his discourse on the scope of national
power by positing that the Constitution vested three types of power in the
national government—the enumerated powers, implied powers that were
means to effectuate the enumerated powers, and “resulting” powers.392 The
last category, he wrote, consisted of unspecified powers that derived from
the “whole mass” of enumerated powers considered as a whole. His
example: “[I]f the United States should make a conquest of any of the
territories of its neighbours, they would possess sovereign jurisdiction over
the conquered territory. This would rather be a result from the whole mass
of the powers of the [national] government . . . than a consequence of
either of the powers specially enumerated.”393
389. Id. at 108–09.
390. Id. at 107. This is the first appearance in The Federalist of the “ends” and
“means” of governmental power, terms that would become famous in McCulloch.
391. Id. at 106–07.
392. Hamilton, Bank Opinion, supra note 8, at 100.
393. Id.
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Hamilton’s principal argument relied on the first two types of
powers—that the Bank was constitutionally an implied power that was
a means “more or less direct” for carrying out several specific enumerated
powers394—facilitating Congress’s power to “collect taxes” by creating a
more “convenient medium” of exchange than metal species;395 being a
source for Congress to borrow money, particularly for emergencies such
as war (thus its role in raising and supporting armies and navies); and
promoting interstate and foreign commerce by increasing the circulation
of money throughout the United States. 396 In Hamilton’s pithy phrase:
“Money is the very hinge on which commerce turns.” 397
Hamilton also presented an alternative constitutional argument
founded on “aggregate” powers of Congress. That argument tracked
Federalist 23 and built on the statements of supporters in Congress that
the Bank was necessary to carry out the general fiscal powers of
Congress. 398 Returning to the concept of “resulting” powers, Hamilton
urged Washington to take an “aggregate view of the [C]onstitution.” 399
The Constitution vested in Congress the powers to lay and collect
taxes, appropriate those revenues for national purposes, borrow
money, coin money and regulate its value, set the value of foreign coin
and dispose of and regulate the properties of the United States.
Viewing those powers in combination meant that Congress possesses
an aggregate fiscal power: “That it is the manifest design and scope of the
constitution to vest in [C]ongress all the powers requisite to the effectual
administration of the finances of the United States.”400 National banks
“are [an] usual engine in the administration of national finances, & an
ordinary & the most effectual instrument of loans & one which in this
country has been found essential . . . .”401 Hamilton’s alternative argument

394. Id. at 121.
395. Madison argued that the Bank was not related to the taxing power because it
would not impose any taxes. This was a trap into which even sophisticated scholars
have fallen. See AKHIL REED AMAR, AMERICA’S UNWRITTEN CONSTITUTION: THE PRECEDENTS
AND PRINCIPLES WE LIVE BY 26–27 (2012). The enumerated power is to “lay and collect
taxes,” and Hamilton related the Bank to tax collection, not to tax imposition.
396. Hamilton, Bank Opinion, supra note 8, at 121–34.
397. Id. at 126.
398. See supra note 266.
399. Hamilton, Bank Opinion, supra note 8, at 132.
400. Id.
401. Id. The last reference in this quote is to the Bank of North America, which the
Confederation Congress chartered in 1781. That bank was used by Robert Morris to
ameliorate the disastrous economic consequences of the War of Independence. A
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was that a cluster of enumerated powers relating to national finance
created a more general fiscal power in Congress, and the Bank was a
legitimate means of carrying out this general fiscal power. Under this
theory, it was sufficient to relate the Bank to this aggregate power and not
necessarily to any specific enumerated power.
C. McCulloch and Aggregate Power
Many scholars have observed that the portion of the McCulloch opinion
dealing with the existence and scope of Congress’s implied powers
appears to be taken almost entirely from Hamilton’s opinion,402 which
Marshall himself had publicized.403 But which of Hamilton’s arguments
on the Bank’s constitutionality did Marshall adopt? He did recite, early in
this portion of the opinion, the specific enumerated powers upon which
Hamilton relied.404 Marshall then presented Hamilton’s analysis of
implied powers, including the breadth of congressional discretion in
choosing the means to carry out its enumerated powers.405 One would
expect that, following this general exegesis, Marshall would have upheld
the Bank by relating it to the specific enumerated powers. He did not.
Instead, here is Marshall’s explanation, in a single paragraph of the
lengthy opinion, of why the Bank is an appropriate means to carry out a
constitutionally authorized power of Congress:

product of the war, its congressional charter was not renewed in 1785, but
Pennsylvania made it a state-chartered bank.
402. See, e.g., Randy E. Barnett, Commandeering the People: Why the Individual Health
Insurance Mandate is Unconstitutional, 5 N.Y.U. J.L. & LIBERTY 581, 599 (2010) (stating
that Marshall could be accused of having “plagiarized” Hamilton’s opinion); see also R.
KENT NEWMYER, JOHN MARSHALL AND THE HEROIC AGE OF THE SUPREME COURT 292–93
(2001) (stating that Marshall “armed himself with Hamilton’s nationalist essays” and
drew upon his work in several opinions, including in McCulloch).
403. Marshall was the first person to publicize the Cabinet opinions on the
constitutionality of the Bank, which had been private letters submitted by Jefferson,
Randolph, and Hamilton to the President. 5 DUMAS MALONE, JEFFERSON THE PRESIDENT:
SECOND TERM, 1805–1809, at 358 n.35 (1974). George Washington willed voluminous
papers to his nephew, Justice Bushrod Washington, who collaborated with Marshall as
the latter wrote a multi-volume biography of their mutual idol. Those papers included
the Cabinet debate over the constitutionality of the Bank. Marshall summarized the
debate in the text and appended a long note that quoted verbatim many of Jefferson’s
and Hamilton’s key arguments. This is an example of journalism being the first draft
of history. 5 JOHN MARSHALL, THE LIFE OF GEORGE WASHINGTON 296–97 & app. n.3
(Philadelphia, G.P. Wayne 1807).
404. McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 407 (1819) (pointing to the
taxing, borrowing, commerce, war, and army and navy powers).
405. See id. at 407–22.
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If a corporation may be employed indiscriminately with other means
to carry into execution the powers of the government, no particular
reason can be assigned for excluding the use of a bank, if required for
its fiscal operations. To use one, must be within the discretion of
Congress, if it be an appropriate mode of executing the powers of
government. That it is a convenient, a useful, and essential instrument
in the prosecution of its fiscal operations, is not now a subject of
controversy. All those who have been concerned in the administration of our
finances, have concurred in representing its importance and necessity . . . .
The time has passed away when it can be necessary to enter into any
discussion in order to prove the importance of this instrument, as a means
to effect the legitimate objects of the government. 406

The decision in McCulloch thus appears to rest on Hamilton’s
aggregation of specific enumerated powers of Congress into a general fiscal
power and the relation of the Bank to that power. This is how Marshall
understood Hamilton’s argument,407 how he described the Bank’s
constitutional basis in McCulloch and in other decisions involving the
Bank,408 and how Joseph Story, Marshall’s alter ego, justified the
constitutionality of the Bank in his Commentaries.409
Hamilton’s aggregation theory relates the Bank to a group of specific
enumerated powers that expresses a broader national purpose when
considered collectively rather than individually. Under this conception, this
group of enumerated powers creates a more comprehensive enumerated
power—a general national fiscal and monetary power. In McCulloch, the
Bank’s constitutionality was not fastened on its relationship to any specific
enumerated powers. The Bank’s utility was a means of effectuating the
more general power that the specific powers collectively serve.

406. Id. at 422–23 (emphasis added).
407. 5 MARSHALL, supra note 403, app. n.3 at 11 (stating that Hamilton had argued
that the Bank was “a proper mean for the execution of the several powers which were
enumerated, and also contended that the right to employ it resulted from the whole
of them taken together”).
408. See Weston v. City Council of Charleston, 27 U.S. 449, 469 (1829) (“The bank
of the United States is an instrument essential to the fiscal operations of the
government . . . .”); Osborn v. Bank of the United States, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 738, 861
(1824) (“Why is it that Congress can incorporate or create a Bank? This question was
answered in the case of McCulloch v. The State of Maryland. It is an instrument which is
‘necessary and proper’ for carrying on the fiscal operations of government.”).
409. 3 STORY, COMMENTARIES, supra note 9, § 1262, at 134–35 (asserting that the
Bank was constitutional on the basis of Hamilton’s aggregation theory).
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D. The Validity of Aggregating National Powers
Hamilton’s aggregation theory provides the basis for a
comprehensive theory on the extent of national power and for an
understanding of the source and scope of implied national powers.
Marshall stated in McCulloch that the Constitution vests in Congress
“the great powers to lay and collect taxes; to borrow money; to regulate
commerce; to declare and conduct a war; and to raise and support
armies and navies.” 410 Immediately following this statement, Marshall
recognized that these “great” powers were in turn part of a larger set
of broader national powers: “The sword and the purse, all the external
relations, and no inconsiderable portion of the industry of the nation,
are entrusted to its government.” 411 The clusters of enumerated powers
described above constitute four comprehensive powers in the United
States: common defense, national and interstate relations, foreign
affairs, and economic union. These four comprehensive powers
account for virtually the entire jurisdiction of the government of the
United States, and they cut across all three branches. Because these
comprehensive powers are created through a combination of specific
enumerated powers of each of the three branches of government, they
constitute “other powers” vested in the government of the United States
as a whole. They are “ends” or “objects” of national power and, under the
“all other powers” provision of the Necessary and Proper Clause, Congress
may enact laws that are “means” of carrying them into effect.
This constitutional methodology is normatively superior to the
classical means-ends approach in setting the outer limits of national
power for the following reasons:
First, although both approaches are consistent with theories of
implied power that derive from the constitutional text, they differ in
how the enumerated powers of the national government are construed
and applied. The classical approach treats each enumerated power as
distinct. Of course, if an act of Congress meets the classical criteria—
either being within the scope of specific enumerated powers or an
appropriate means of carrying out those powers—the law is
constitutional. However, an act of Congress that does not meet those
criteria is not necessarily unconstitutional. The aggregation approach
uses the methodology of construing the Constitution as a whole, with the
recognition that the enumerated powers are related and interdependent.
Marshall correctly emphasized in McCulloch that precisely because “it is a
410. McCulloch, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) at 407.
411. Id.
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constitution we are expounding,” the scope of implied powers should
“depend upon a fair construction of the whole instrument.”412
Second, the clustering of virtually all of the enumerated national
powers is a product of history and the essential purposes of the Union.
The Constitution followed a revolution in which Americans supported
the actual subject-matter distribution of power arising out of the
ancient British constitution. Americans rebelled when imperial
authorities refused to honor the categorical scope and limits of such
power under which the colonies had prospered. That categorical
distribution of power appears to be the model for the enumerated
powers in the Constitution. This history explains the origins of the
enumerated powers and strongly suggests that they should be applied
in a categorical fashion. These four clusters of national power—
common defense, foreign affairs, national and interstate relations, and
trade and commerce—derive from and are indispensable to
maintaining the principal purposes of the Union as stated in Federalist
23. This foundation in history and purpose is the basis of American
federalism: the national government should be responsible for those
matters that bear upon the essential purposes of the Union, while
allowing for extensive legislative authority in the States and the people.
Third, the classical means-ends approach cannot explain the
constitutional validity of national powers that may not have been
perceived as necessary at the founding but are now acknowledged as
essential means of achieving central purposes of the Union. This
failure to make constitutional theory congruent with reality leads to
either a jurisprudence of avoidance—of stretching the enumerated
powers beyond recognizable limits or of calling forth the mystical spirit
of inherent national sovereignty—or the creation of a national general
welfare power. The comprehensive approach advocated in this Article
provides an obvious alternative: those “new” powers are the clusters of
enumerated powers vested in the government of the United States and
appropriate means of carrying them into effect.
Finally, the aggregation approach is not a stranger to constitutional
adjudication. The Supreme Court came very close to upholding the Legal
Tender Acts under that approach in Knox v. Lee,413 and then applied that
approach in Julliard v. Greenman.414 The strongest statement was by Justice
Strong in Knox. After reciting the language from McCulloch that
412. Id. at 406–07.
413. 79 U.S. (12 Wall.) 457, 536 (1870).
414. 110 U.S. 421, 440 (1884).
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Congress’s powers must be adaptable to future exigencies, Strong
emphasized that the power of the federal government may be deduced
from one of the enumerated powers or from a combination, asserting that
“[i]t is allowable to group together any number of [the powers] and
infer from them all that the power claimed has been conferred.” 415
Strong continued that “Congress has often exercised, without
question, powers that are not expressly given nor ancillary to any single
enumerated power” 416 and gave as one example the establishment of
the Bank of the United States. 417
In Julliard, Justice Gray emphasized that “[t]he breadth and
comprehensiveness of the words of the Constitution are nowhere more
strikingly exhibited than in regard to the powers over the subjects of
revenue, finance, and currency.”418 Significantly, Gray included the
interstate and foreign commerce powers as constitutive elements of this
aggregate power.419 Embracing congressional enforcement authority
under the “all other powers” clause, the Court held that the Legal Tender
Acts were “necessary and proper for carrying into execution the powers
vested by this Constitution in the government of the United States.”420
A similar approach has been taken by the Supreme Court in recognizing
non-textual constitutional rights in the States. A premier example is Printz
v. United States,421 which held that Congress cannot require state officials to
participate in the enforcement of federal law.422 The Court pointed to the
various provisions in the Constitution that vest or recognize rights in the
States. None of these provisions explicitly or implicitly prohibited Congress
from making state officials agents in federal law enforcement. However, the
Court (per Justice Scalia) did not view the constitutional rights of the States
individually. Instead, it held that collectively these rights created a broader
residual zone of state sovereignty.423 Referencing historical tradition and
the Convention’s decision to act directly upon individuals, instead of
through the intermediacy of the States, the Court found that this
implied sphere of state sovereignty was broad enough to include
independent decision-making in law enforcement.
415.
416.
417.
418.
419.
420.
421.
422.
423.

Knox, 79 U.S. at 534.
Id. at 535.
Id. at 537.
Julliard, 110 U.S. at 439.
Id. at 448.
Id. at 450 (quoting, not quite correctly, the “all other powers” clause).
521 U.S. 898 (1997).
Id. at 932–33.
Id. at 918–21.

2019]

AGGREGATE AND IMPLIED POWERS OF THE UNITED STATES

87

The analogy to Griswold 424 is also unmistakable. The Bill of Rights
includes an enumeration of several specific associational and privacy
rights. But the right claimed in that case—of married couples’ right to
engage in intimate sexual behavior in their homes—is not enumerated,
nor can it reasonably be implied from any of the specific guarantees.
Instead of examining each of these specific guarantees individually, the
Court (per Justice Douglas) viewed them collectively as creating a
broader sphere of privacy. Considering the intensely private nature of
the right being claimed, the importance of marital association and
historical tradition, the Court held that the Constitution’s broader sphere of
privacy protections encompassed this right.425
Of course, Printz and Griswold are controversial decisions. But they show
that the aggregation approach is not unprecedented and has been utilized
by Justices with very different constitutional ideologies.426
V. AGGREGATE AND IMPLIED POWERS: OF ENDS AND MEANS
A. Common Defense
The powers conferred on the national government to provide
military protection against foreign and domestic violence or threats of
violence are virtually complete. 427 The Constitution appears to provide
the government with all of the military powers possessed by the Crown
and Parliament during the colonial period. 428
However, there may be a gap in the enumerated powers relating to
common defense. Congress has the enumerated power to “declare War,”
but, as is well-known, the Convention substituted this term for “make War,”
424. Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
425. The determination that the Constitution creates an implied zone of privacy in
the home that insulates individuals from unjustifiable governmental intrusions had
been previously articulated by Justice Harlan in his memorable dissent in Poe v. Ullman,
367 U.S. 497, 522, 549–54 (1961) (Harlan, J., dissenting). Harlan focused particularly
on the protections for privacy in the home that are contained in the Third and Fourth
Amendments. Id. at 549.
426. If one requires a holding that is almost universally regarded as correct (pace
Justice Black), consider In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358 (1970). The Bill of Rights contains
many procedural protections for criminal defendants. But the requirement of proof
beyond a reasonable doubt is not an enumerated right, and it cannot be implied from
any single enumerated guarantee. But if the procedural guarantees in the Bill of Rights
are viewed collectively, they establish the common law accusatorial system of justice.
Proof beyond a reasonable doubt is an essential component of that system.
427. See supra notes 373–74 and accompanying text.
428. Some of these powers have become obsolete. Letters of marque and reprisal have not
been utilized since the nineteenth century, and the founding-era militia no longer exists.
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which had been in an earlier draft of the Constitution. This raises two
issues—whether Congress has the power to authorize military action that is
less than a “war” in the context of international law, and, if it does not,
whether the President as Commander-in-Chief of the armed forces
possesses that power. If the answer to both questions is no, a serious gap
exists in the Constitution.
In my view, no such gap exists because there is overwhelming evidence
that the congressional power to declare war includes both a formal
declaration and an authorization of military action against a foreign
nation.429 This was the position taken by Chief Justice Marshall in his first
Supreme Court opinion.430 That was also the consensus of the founding
generation—and that includes Alexander Hamilton, who was hardly a
shrinking violet concerning executive power.431 This answers the
revisionist advocates of the “declare” versus “make” war distinction. But
even if such a gap in the enumerated powers existed, it could be filled
through the doctrine of aggregate powers. The Constitution vested an
aggregate common defense power in the government of the United
States, and congressional authorization of military actions short of war is
plainly a means that is necessary to carry that power into effect.
B. Foreign Relations
The propensity of States to defy the law of nations and international
obligations pledged by Congress and the corresponding failure of the
Articles of Confederation to provide Congress with the ability to control the
foreign relations of the United States were major reasons for the creation

429. See, e.g., LOUIS FISHER, THE LAW OF THE EXECUTIVE BRANCH: PRESIDENTIAL POWER
308–20 (Stephen M. Sheppard ed., 2014); Kent, supra note 13, at 774; Saikrishna
Prakash, Unleashing the Dogs of War: What the Constitution Means by “Declare War,” 93
CORNELL L. REV. 45 (2007).
430. Talbot v. Seeman, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 1, 28 (1801) (stating that war powers are
vested in Congress for “general hostilities” or “partial hostilities, in which case the laws
of war, so far as they actually apply to our situation, must be noticed”).
431. When French naval vessels and privateers seized hundreds of American
merchant ships in 1798, thereby starting the Quasi-War, the Secretary of War asked
Hamilton what actions the Navy could take without congressional authorization.
Hamilton responded that the President could act defensively by ordering the Navy to
engage armed French ships within American territorial waters, convoy merchant ships
on the high seas, and, if attacked, respond with force. That, according to Hamilton,
was the limit of the Executive’s power to engage in military action; any additional
military actions had to be authorized by Congress. Letter from Alexander Hamilton to
James McHenry (May 17, 1798), in 21 HAMILTON PAPERS, supra note 165, at 461–62.
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of the Constitution.432 The Convention provided the government of the
United States with extensive powers over foreign affairs and prohibited the
States from exercising many of those powers.433 When Marshall wrote that
“all the external relations” of the United States are entrusted to the national
government, he expressed the view of the founding generation.
However, the specified enumerated powers over foreign affairs are
not complete, even when bolstered by the Necessary and Proper Clause.
As discussed in this paper, they do not include national control over
immigration, recognition, and passports. But the case for an aggregate
national power over foreign affairs is exceptionally strong, and each of
these subjects is integrally connected to that aggregate power.
The relationships of recognition and passports to the nation’s
foreign relations are obvious. The national immigration laws also have a
major, albeit not complete, relation to foreign relations. The decisions by
the United States concerning the extent to which citizens or subjects of
foreign countries will be allowed to enter our nation and how they will be
treated upon entry are themselves issues of foreign relations. We should
recall that significant national restrictions on immigration began with the
Chinese Exclusion Act which abrogated a treaty with China. And perhaps
there is no better example than the treatment of Japanese immigrants
and citizens before World War II. In 1924, Congress enacted laws
prohibiting Japanese immigration and denying the possibility of naturalized
citizenship to those Japanese who had entered before the proscriptions were
enacted.434 These laws sent a strong message to Japan that its citizens were
considered members of an inferior race, and this provoked considerable
hostility by the Japanese government towards the United States. More
generally, Justice Kennedy outlined the various relations of the immigration
laws to foreign policy in Arizona v. United States435:
Immigration policy can affect trade, investment, tourism, and
diplomatic relations for the entire Nation, as well as the perceptions
and expectations of aliens in this country who seek the full
protection of its laws . . . . Perceived mistreatment of aliens in the
United States may lead to harmful reciprocal treatment of American
citizens abroad.

432. See generally Golove & Hulsebosch, Law of Nations, supra note 29 (explaining
how the necessity for the United States to comply with its treaty obligations and the
law of nations was a principal and perhaps the most important reason for the drafting
and ratification of the Constitution).
433. See supra notes 375–78 and accompanying text.
434. See Hirabayashi v. United States, 320 U.S. 81, 96 n.4 (1943).
435. 567 U.S. 387 (2012).
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It is fundamental that foreign countries concerned about the
status, safety, and security of their nationals in the United States
must be able to confer and communicate on this subject with one
national sovereign, not the 50 separate States . . . . This Court has
reaffirmed that ‘[o]ne of the most important and delicate of all
international relationships . . . has to do with the protection of the
just rights of a country’s own nationals when those nationals are in
another country.’ 436

Of course, immigration statutes also prescribe the terms by which
foreigners can become citizens of the United States, and this portion
of the immigration power is more closely connected to the enumerated
congressional power of making uniform rules of naturalization. Justice
Kennedy was correct in upholding the immigration laws as necessary to
effectuate the combination of the naturalization and foreign affairs
powers. His mistake was to base the foreign affairs power on the erroneous
concept of inherent national sovereignty.
Why would the Convention omit national powers over immigration,
recognition, and passports? We do not have any convincing evidence
of the reasons for those omissions. One plausible explanation is that
there was no felt need to include these powers.
The Constitution’s omission of a general recognition power and the
absence of any discussion about recognition in the Convention and
ratification debates should not be surprising. The pressing goal of the
infant and vulnerable Republic was to be recognized by European nations;
the United States had neither the need nor the status to “recognize”
longstanding European states or their monarchical governments.437 The
Framers did not anticipate the post-ratification convulsions brought on by
the French Revolution, the successful Haitian slave uprising, and the
independence movement in Latin America, all of which forced the
national government to make recognition decisions.438
As for immigration, the felt necessity was to encourage migration to a
vast and sparsely populated country. If undesirable immigrants did
enter the United States, their continued presence in the country could
be safely left to the several States. 439 And the colonial grievance was not
that the imperial authorities had failed to enact restrictions on
immigration. It was the opposite—imperial authorities had
436. Id. at 395 (quoting Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52, 64 (1941)).
437. See Golove & Hulsebosch, supra note 29, at 1622–23.
438. Robert J. Reinstein, Slavery, Executive Power and International Law: The Haitian
Revolution and American Constitutionalism, 53 AM. J. LEGAL HIST. 141, 195–217 (2013).
439. See Cleveland, supra note 16, at 81–83, 98–99.
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“endeavoured to prevent the population of these States; for that
purpose obstructing the Laws for Naturalization of Foreigners;
refusing to pass others to encourage their migrations hither, and
raising the conditions of new Appropriations of Lands.” 440 This
grievance not only emphasized the importance of encouraging, and
not restricting, immigration; it also showed how Americans viewed
naturalization laws as instruments of foreign policy.
The Convention’s omission of a passport power is more difficult to
explain because the lack of that power in Congress under the Articles
of Confederation was a source of embarrassment and debate. This
omission may also seem peculiar given the many governmental
functions that the modern passport system serves—requesting safe
conduct, regulating international travel, enforcing national security
and the immigration laws, and proving identity and citizenship. 441
However, the passport system at the time of the founding bore little
resemblance to the modern era. The connection with foreign policy was
the one commonality, as passports always requested safe passage for the
bearers.442 But passports in the early Republic were not mandatory; they
were issued at the request of applicants, and such requests and issuances
were rare.443 Passports did not regulate international travel, nor were they
required for entry into the United States.444 Moreover, until an 1856
statute gave sole authority to the Secretary of State, they were also issued
by governors, mayors, and notaries public.445 Finally, passports were not
identity documents because they did not contain the signature or
description of the bearer, 446 nor were they proof of citizenship. 447 The
rudimentary nature of passports and the essentially ministerial

440. THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE para. 9 (U.S. 1776).
441. See supra Section I.D.
442. CRAIG ROBERTSON, THE PASSPORT IN AMERICA: THE HISTORY OF A DOCUMENT 26
(2010).
443. Id. at 92. Through the 1830’s, fewer than five hundred passports were issued
annually. Id. at 128.
444. Id. at 16.
445. Id. at 131. The 1856 law also contained the first requirement that passports
could be issued only to citizens. Id. at 140.
446. Id. at 59, 65.
447. Id. at 16; see also Urtetiqui v. D’Arcy, 34 U.S. (9 Pet.) 692, 699 (1835) (holding
that a passport issued by the Secretary of State is not by itself sufficient evidence of
citizenship).
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function performed by executive officials during peacetime 448 may be
the reasons that a passport power was not included in the Constitution.
Another plausible reason for the omission of these powers from the
Constitution is that the law of nations, to which the early Republic was
fused, governed recognition, immigration, and safe passage. Thus,
when the Neutrality Crisis arose, Washington drew upon the authority
of the law of nations, including in his decision to recognize the French
revolutionary government. 449 And when otherwise desirable foreign
policy decisions towards Britain or France were not authorized by the
law of nations, Washington refused to take them. 450
These explanations are plausible but ultimately constitutionally
irrelevant. A central teaching of Federalist 23 and McCulloch is that the
government of the United States must have the authority to use whatever
implied powers are necessary “for exigencies which, if foreseen at all, must
have been seen dimly, and which can be best provided for as they occur.”451
When national controls over immigration, recognition, and passports were
considered necessary to effectuate the aggregate foreign affairs powers of
the United States, Congress could enact legislation that is “plainly adapted”
to legitimate constitutional ends pursuant to the “all other powers”
provision of the Necessary and Proper Clause. 452
This approach to national powers over foreign affairs militates against a
prominent and controversial theory advanced by Justice Thomas and
notable scholars.453 According to this theory, the President has a general
“executive power” over foreign affairs, limited only by Article I powers
vested in Congress. The residual powers of foreign affairs—those that are
not authorized by specific enumerated powers—are embedded in the
448. The issuance of “safe conduct” passes during war is related to the Congress’s
aggregate common defense powers and/or the President’s powers as Commander-in-Chief.
449. Reinstein, supra note 56, at 422–24.
450. Id. at 441–45.
451. McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 415 (1819).
452. I had trouble writing this sentence because immigration policies (state and
national) have been infected by the illegitimate ends of nativism, religious bigotry, and
racism from the earliest statutes and regulations through the present. Of course, it is
a truism that all power can be abused. But that dismal history should at least caution
that only principled legal constraints, such as taking seriously evidence of purposeful
discrimination, and not unfettered political discretion, can prevent those viruses from
doing yet more damage. But see Trump v. Hawaii, 138 S. Ct. 2392 (2018).
453. Zivotofsky v. Kerry (Zivotofsky II), 135 S. Ct. 2076, 2097 (2015) (Thomas, J.,
concurring in judgment and dissenting in part). Thomas relied heavily on Saikrishna
B. Prakash & Michael D. Ramsey, The Executive Power over Foreign Affairs, 111 YALE L.J.
231 (2001). William W. Crosskey has made a similar argument. See 1 CROSSKEY, supra
note 134, at 415–19.
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Executive Vesting Clause of Article II. This theory of residual presidential
power over foreign affairs has been criticized,454 and I will not rehearse
those criticisms here. However, if the analysis presented in this paper is
correct, there are no “residual” foreign affairs powers beyond the
cognizance of Congress. All such powers are vested in the government of
the United States as a whole and can be carried into execution by Congress
under the “all other powers” provision of the Necessary and Proper Clause.
C. National and Interstate Relations
The powers vested in the government of the United States to prevent
and resolve disputes between the United States and the States, and
between the States themselves, combine to create an aggregate power
that is extensive. 455 Adapting the practice of the Privy Council in the
old Empire, the national judiciary was given a central role in providing
an impartial forum for resolving and preventing disputes between
national and state authority and between the States. Such conflicts can
result from the local biases of state court judges and juries. As Justice
Story stated with remarkable candor: “The constitution has presumed
(whether rightly or wrongly we do not inquire) that state attachments,
state prejudices, state jealousies, and state interests, might sometimes
obstruct or control, or be supposed to obstruct or control, the regular
administration of justice.” 456
However, the enumerated Article III jurisdictional categories do not
comprehensively cover all cases and controversies that can produce
national or interstate conflicts. As discussed previously, 457 nonresidents of a State are provided the neutral forum of a federal trial
court under the diversity jurisdiction only when their cases are between
“Citizens of different States.” 458 Corporations are not “citizens,” and
under the language of this enumeration, should not be able to invoke
454. Justice Thomas’s position was severely (even scornfully) criticized by Justice
Scalia in Zivotofsky II, 135 S. Ct. at 2116–18, 2123–26 (Scalia, J., dissenting). The leading
scholarly critique is Curtis A. Bradley & Martin S. Flaherty, Executive Power Essentialism
and Foreign Affairs, 102 MICH. L. REV. 545 (2004). Two recent articles present additional
originalist challenges to the Executive Vesting Clause theory. See Julian Davis
Mortenson, Article II Vests the Executive Power, Not the Royal Prerogative, 119 COLUM. L.
REV. 1169, 1173–74 (2019); Steilen, supra note 356, at 641–52.
455. See supra notes 379–82 and accompanying text.
456. Martin v. Hunter’s Lessee, 14 U.S. (1 Wheat.) 304, 347 (1816); see also Bank of
U.S. v. Deveaux, 9 U.S. (5 Cranch) 61, 67 (1809) (referring to jurisdictional grants in
Article III in cases “[w]here state tribunals could not be supposed to be impartial”).
457. See supra Section I.G.
458. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2, cl. 1.
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the diversity jurisdiction. Residents of the District of Columbia or
national territories assuredly are not citizens of “States.” Their cases
also seem necessarily outside of the Article III diversity jurisdiction.
Similarly, lawsuits by or against the Bank of the United States and other
federally created corporations do not appear to “arise under” federal
law when the claims for relief and defenses are all issues of state law.
But the results of these cases are still considered good law, and they
reflect the reality that the specifically enumerated judicial powers in
Article III are not exhaustive—just as the specifically enumerated
legislative powers in Article I are not exhaustive. The language of Article
III does not require a contrary conclusion. The Article III Judicial Vesting
Clause simply identifies the branch of government that exercises the
judicial power of the United States. By omitting the term “herein
granted,” it is, if anything, phrased somewhat more broadly than the
corresponding Article I Legislative Vesting Clause. Article III also provides
that the judicial power “shall extend” to nine categories of cases; it does
not state that the judicial power “shall extend only” to those categories.
Under the aggregate theory of the enumerated powers proposed in
this Article, Congress can vest the federal courts with jurisdiction over
cases in which there may be substantial interstate or national bias in
local tribunals. That is, the enumerated powers, taken as a whole, vest
the national government with the authority to counteract local biases,
which can engender friction between the States and between the
United States and the States. A principal “object” or “end” of national
power was to prevent such friction from undermining the Union. The
most peaceful and effective means of realizing that end is utilizing the
federal courts as neutral umpires. Congress therefore has the power
under the Necessary and Proper Clause to vest the federal courts with
original jurisdiction over such cases.
1.

Verlinden and Tidewater
The Federal Sovereign Immunities Act (FSIA) is a very strong case
for expanded federal court jurisdiction. The Act explicitly vests subjectmatter jurisdiction in the federal courts over all cases brought against
a foreign state or its instrumentalities. The Article III problem arose in
litigation between foreign entities over contract claims that were not
governed by federal law. In Verlinden, 459 Chief Justice Burger
maintained that all cases brought under FSIA necessarily requires the
District Courts to decide whether one of the statutory exemptions to
459. Verlinden B.V. v. Cent. Bank of Nigeria, 461 U.S. 480 (1983).
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foreign sovereign immunity applied and therefore arises under the
FSIA. 460 This argument is unpersuasive 461 and unnecessary. Nativist
hostility towards foreign states and their instrumentalities—and
particularly against certain countries—has been present in the United
States since the Founding. The appearance that such prejudice infects
the decisions of local courts could create friction between States and
the United States and adversely affect the exercise of the aggregate
national powers over foreign affairs. Burger suggested as much:
“Actions against foreign sovereigns in our courts raise sensitive issues
concerning the foreign relations of the United States, and the primacy
of federal concerns is evident.” 462 FSIA is a necessary and proper means
by which Congress effectuated two aggregate national powers.
Tidewater 463 is also a strong case for expanded jurisdiction. One
premise of Article III is that local prejudice against non-residents can
subvert the administration of justice. This principle underlay the First
Congress’s implementation of the diversity jurisdiction to include citizens
of States and of foreign nations.464 Congress made a deliberate decision
in 1940 to include the citizens of the District of Columbia within that
principle.465 Of course, one can argue that the Founders’ concerns about
local biases against non-residents are vestigial. I doubt that was true either
in 1940, when this statute was passed, or in the present era of red and blue
states and of a resurgence of “America First” nationalism. In any event,
that is a decision for Congress to make.
In drafting Article III, the Convention addressed six categories of
potential local biases that were known at the time of the Founding. It is
difficult to imagine that the Convention gave deep thought to federal
jurisdictional issues relating to the District of Columbia, which did not
then exist except as a vague idea. Nor to the problems resulting from
the intersection of foreign governments and entities, foreign affairs, and
federal court jurisdiction. Interpreting the specific categories of Article III
as being forever exclusionary imputes to the Framers clairvoyance or
indifference to the authority of Congress to deal with new situations that
call for the application of underlying constitutional values.

460. Id. at 498.
461. See note 133, supra.
462. Verlinden B.V., 461 U.S. at 493.
463. Nat’l Mutual Ins. v. Tide-Water Transfer Co., 337 U.S. 582 (1949).
464. See Judiciary Act of 1789, ch. 20, § 11, 1 Stat. 73, 78.
465. See James E. Pfander, The Tidewater Problem: Article III and Constitutional Change,
79 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1925 (2004).
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2.

The corporation cases
The antebellum corporation cases are wrong, but not because
Congress lacked the power to provide a neutral federal court forum to
counteract potential local biases for or against corporations. The
problem was that Congress did not exercise that power. Whether the
diversity privilege should be extended to corporations is a difficult policy
decision. Proponents argue that it is necessary for a level playing field;
opponents argue that it provides business interests with special
preferences.466 The Supreme Court claimed that it was adopting the former
policy and invented a legal fiction to override the statutes that Congress
enacted. These are policy decisions for Congress to make. The Necessary
and Proper Clause vests Congress, and not the Supreme Court, with
the authority to vest the lower federal courts with jurisdiction beyond
the Article III enumerations.
The separation of powers issue concerning corporations and the
diversity jurisdiction was changed in 1958, when Congress declared that a
corporation is a citizen of the States of its incorporation and principal
place of business. This statute apparently responded to uncertain case law
on the locus of corporate citizenship by creating the curious but
pragmatic concept of dual state citizenship.467 Of course, Congress does
not have the power to naturalize corporations or other business entities.
But the statute represents a policy decision by Congress to apply federal
court jurisdiction to cases that present the potential of local biases.
Congress’s aggregate power over interstate relations justifies extending
the diversity jurisdiction to corporations.
3.

Osborn
As discussed previously in Section I.G.3 of this Article, the Osborn
decision is untenable as written. However, the situation confronting
the Bank seemed to present an attractive case for protective
jurisdiction. When Congress chartered the Second Bank of the United
States, its advocates had substantial cause to anticipate biased fact-finding
and applications of the law from state court judges and juries.468 By the time

466. See HART & WECHSLER, supra note 36, at 1530–31.
467. See id. at 1536. The Class Action Fairness Act is another example of a
jurisdictional statute that resolved these competing policies in favor of corporations.
See Pub. L. No. 109–2, 119 Stat. 4 (2005) (codified at 28 U.S.C. §§ 1711–1715 (2012)).
468. The 1791 congressional vote on the First Bank’s charter divided on NorthSouth lines. Lingering hostility towards the First Bank was a factor in the failure of
Congress to renew its charter in 1811. (That renewal was defeated in the Senate by the
casting vote of Vice President George Clinton, whose Anti-Federalist credentials
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that Osborn was before the Supreme Court, this potential became a reality.
State-based assaults became so draconian that the Bank sorely needed the
neutral forum of the federal courts as protection against hostile state
legislatures and biased state tribunals.469 This rationale has frequently been
advanced to explain Osborn.470
If a theory of protective jurisdiction (including the one presented in this
Article) was so clearly applicable to the problems encountered by the
Bank, why did not Marshall rely or even mention it?471 Perhaps because
holding in favor of the Bank on the basis of protective jurisdiction would
have exposed the separation of powers issue that Marshall attempted to
elide. Whether Congress had the protective power to vest the federal
courts with jurisdiction over all cases in which the Bank was a party is a
separate question from whether Congress had exercised that power.
There were two direct ways in which Congress could have protected the
Second Bank from state court prejudices: (1) providing for exclusive
federal court jurisdiction in all cases in which the Bank was a party; or (2)
providing for original federal court jurisdiction in cases brought by the
Bank and authorizing the Bank to remove cases brought against it in state
court. The charter did neither. The “sue and be sued” clause did not refer
to jurisdiction and, most significantly, did not interfere with common law
contract, tort, or property actions against the Bank in state courts. The
clause specifically codified the Bank’s capacity to be sued “in all state

stretched back to the 1788 ratification debates.). In the wake of the difficulties he
encountered in funding the War of 1812, President Madison and other notable opponents
of the First Bank came to realize that its demise was a huge mistake. Hostility to a national
bank was substantially reduced but still dominant in pockets when Congress chartered the
more powerful Second Bank in 1816. Two state constitutions were quickly amended to
prohibit branches from being established. See Scott A. Rosenberg, Note, The Theory of
Protective Jurisdiction, 57 N.Y.U. L. REV. 933, 965–66 (1982).
469. The Second Bank enjoyed a brief period of greater acceptance, but overt and
passionate state-based hostility towards the Bank erupted and spread in the wake of
the Bank’s role in aggravating the national economic downturn starting in 1818. Six
more States enacted legislation that threatened the Bank’s ability to operate in those
jurisdictions. Id. at 966. As for the potential biases of state court judges, recall that
Spencer Roane, the Chief Judge of the Virginia Court of Appeals, was one of the most
strident opponents of the Bank and of national authority in general.
470. See Paul J. Mishkin, The Federal “Question” in the District Courts, 53 COLUM. L. REV.
157, 187–88 (1953); Eric J. Segall, Article III as a Grant of Power: Protective Jurisdiction,
Federalism and the Federal Courts, 54 FLA. L. REV. 361, 373 (2002); Seinfeld, supra note 88,
at 1414–15; Vásquez, supra note 121, at 1737–39.
471. Justice Frankfurter raised this question in challenging Professor Wechsler and
Mishkin’s theories of protective jurisdiction. See Textile Workers Union v. Lincoln
Mills, 353 U.S. 448, 460–84 (1957) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting).
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courts having competent jurisdiction,”472 and nothing in the charter or
any other federal statute authorized the Bank to remove state court
actions.473 The simple fact is that Congress did not enact a policy of
protecting the Bank from the capricious behavior of state court judges and
juries.474 By writing an opinion that concentrated on the Bank’s right to sue
in federal circuit courts, Marshall avoided dealing with the problem at the
core of protective jurisdiction—what happens when the Bank is sued in
state court? Under the statutes then in effect, the dispositive law and facts
would be decided by local judges and juries.
As in the antebellum corporation cases, the Supreme Court applied its
own conception of public policy to expand federal court jurisdiction.
However, by protecting the Bank as much as it could, Marshall’s court may
have performed an act of “statesmanship.”475 That saving grace was not
present in the antebellum corporation cases—or in Osborn’s progeny.
4.

Railroads, the Red Cross, and federal officers
Suppose you are an attorney who is asked which of the following
appear to be strong cases for federal court jurisdiction:
Case A: The congressional charters for intercontinental railroads
provide that the corporations can sue and be sued in federal and state
courts. A common law contract action is filed against one of the railroads
in state court. There is no diversity. The railroad removes the case to
federal district court under 28 U.S.C. § 1441(a), which authorizes removal
of any case over which the federal court would have original jurisdiction.
Case B: The congressional charter for the American National Red
Cross provides that the charity can sue and be sued in any federal or
state court. A slip and fall action is brought against the Red Cross in
state court. Again, there is no diversity. The Red Cross removes the case
to federal district court under § 1441(a).
Case C: A federal tax collector is prosecuted for assault and battery
in state court. The incident giving rise to the prosecution occurred
while the defendant was investigating possible tax evasion. The tax
collector removes the case to federal district court under 28 U.S.C.
§ 1442(a)(1), which authorizes the removal of any civil or criminal
472. Act of Apr. 10, 1816, ch. 44, § 7, 3 Stat. 266, 269.
473. The general civil removal statute was enacted in 1875. Act of Mar. 3, 1875, ch.
137, 18 Stat. 470.
474. But see Segall, supra note 470, at 383 (asserting that Congress explicitly
provided for federal court jurisdiction over all cases involving the Bank).
475. Harry Shulman & Edward C. Jaegerman, Some Jurisdictional Limitations on
Federal Procedure, 45 YALE L.J. 393, 405–06 (1936).
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action against an officer of the United States for any act “under color
of such office.”
Unless you have mastered the esoteric doctrines of federal court
jurisdiction, you would probably think that Case C presents a strong
case for federal court jurisdiction and that Cases A and B are very weak.
The federal officers’ removal statute explicitly vests federal court
jurisdiction, and local biases against federal officials acting under color
of their authority have arisen throughout American history. On the
other hand, the railroad and Red Cross charters did not contain explicit
grants of federal court jurisdiction. One would also think that megacorporations such as the inter-continental railroads could take care of
themselves in state court. And the Red Cross needs special protection?
Has a more sympathetic party existed? Even under a rational basis
standard, the supposition that Congress was concerned that the Red Cross
might be victimized in the state courts strains credulity.
If you thought the Supreme Court would have ruled these ways, you
would be wrong. According to precedent, there would be no
jurisdiction in Case C 476 but jurisdiction in Case A 477 and Case B. 478
These seemingly upside-down results were reached as follows:
In the federal officers’ removal case, the Court applied a two-part
formula. The first part narrowly construed the Article III arising under
jurisdiction. A jurisdictional statute cannot by itself make a case arise
under federal law; if there is no federal law defense, there does not
appear to be any federal question. Consequently, the theory of
protective jurisdiction, as applied to the enforcement of the removal
statute as written, would raise “grave constitutional problems.” 479 The
second part of the formula narrowly interpreted (or rewrote) the
removal statute to require the assertion of a federal defense, which
avoided this constitutional problem.
The Court reached the opposite result in the railroad and Red Cross
cases by using an exactly contrary two-part formula that was inspired
by Osborn. Instead of narrowly construing the statutory and
constitutional grants of jurisdiction, the Court broadly construed each.
Thus, the first part of this formula converted charter “sue and be sued”
clauses from simple affirmations of corporate juridical capacities into
statutes vesting subject-matter jurisdiction. The second part of the
476.
477.
478.
479.

Mesa v. California, 489 U.S. 121 (1989).
Pac. R.R. Removal Cases, 115 U.S. 1 (1885).
Am. Nat’l Red Cross v. S.G., 505 U.S. 247 (1992).
Mesa, 489 U.S. at 137.
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formula broadly construed the Article III arising under jurisdiction: all
common law actions by or against federally chartered corporations were
deemed automatically to arise under federal law. 480
The inter-continental railroad decision was a “triumph of mechanical
logic.”481 So too were the Red Cross and federal officers’ removal decisions.482
The approach presented in this Article rejects the oft-stated but never
applied principle that Congress’s power over federal court jurisdiction
is limited by the enumerated Article III categories. The Constitution
vests the national government with the aggregate power to resolve and
prevent conflicts between the States and between the States and the
United States. When Congress acts to redress potential state court
biases against non-residents or federal entities, that legislation
appropriately effectuates that aggregate power. Focusing on aggregate
powers and their underlying constitutional purposes, instead of the
specific enumerations in Article III, sets the extent and limits of
Congress’s power to vest protective jurisdiction in the federal courts.
D. The Economic Union
Hamilton’s aggregate fiscal power was based on a combination of
the enumerated powers to collect taxes, borrow money on the credit
of the United States, coin money, determine its value and the value of
foreign coin, and dispose of and regulate the property of the United
States. This aggregation is too modest because the economic powers
vested in Congress include every element of a national fiscal, monetary,
commercial, and customs union. 483 The powers to lay and collect taxes
and borrow money on the credit of the United States were foundations
for a national fiscal policy. A national monetary policy was provided in
Congress’s exclusive powers to coin money and set the value of all
money. Congress’s plenary power to regulate foreign commerce
authorized national standards for imports and exports of goods and
services. The interstate and foreign commerce powers not only
provided for national regulatory standards, but also gave Congress the
480. See supra notes 130–33 and accompanying text.
481. Shulman & Jaegerman, supra note 475, at 405–06.
482. Professor Weinberg calls the Red Cross decision an “intellectual muddle.”
Louise Weinberg, The Power of Congress over Courts in Nonfederal Cases, 1995 BYU L. REV.
731, 801. She is more sympathetic to the specific result in Mesa because the federal
employees in that case did not make a claim of bias. Id. at 807. But Congress typically
enacts over-inclusive laws to protect federal interests, and potential state court bias
cannot realistically be ferreted out on a case-by-case basis.
483. See supra notes 383–85 and accompanying text.
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power to nullify protectionist practices of the States. Only Congress
could impose tariffs and duties on imports, and those tariffs and duties
must be uniform throughout the United States. The prohibition of all
state taxes on interstate transactions established a national customs union.
And the Privileges and Immunities Clause guaranteed that citizens who
travel to another State would have the same rights to live and work there
as the citizens of that State.484 The creation of a national economic union
was an astonishing accomplishment of the Convention,485 and this is the
fourth aggregate power of the United States.
The old British Empire again provided a model for the
Constitutional Convention in establishing an economic union.
England and Scotland had been independent nations, governed by
their own parliaments and subject to the superintending prerogative
powers of a common monarch. The 1707 Acts of Union consolidated
these nations into the United Kingdom governed by the King-inParliament at Westminster. 486 Members of the Convention were
knowledgeable of and influenced by the Scottish experience, 487 from
which they could draw negative and positive lessons. On the negative
side, the elimination of the Scottish Parliament and the consolidation
of the two nations extinguished Scottish autonomy. Scotland was
allowed only forty-five members in the House of Commons.488 Through
an inexorable process of legislation Parliament reduced Scotland to a
subordinate province, which reinforced the Convention’s commitment to
federalism.489 However, the Acts of Union also provided a positive
model for economic integration. All subjects of the Kingdom were
guaranteed equal freedom of movement and rights of commerce,
trade and navigation. 490 With temporary exceptions during the
transition to consolidation, the same regulations, prohibitions, and
484. See Corfield v. Coryell, 6 F. Cas. 546, 551–52 (C.C.E.D. Pa. 1823) (No. 3,230)
(Washington, J.); Julian N. Eule, Laying the Dormant Commerce Clause to Rest, 91 YALE L.J.
425, 446–55 (1982).
485. It is astonishing given that the individual colonies and States had independent
authority over tariffs, duties, money and commerce for more than a century prior to
the Convention.
486. The treaty was executed through the Union with Scotland Act 1706, 6 Ann, c.
11 (Eng.), and the Union with England Act 1707, c. 7 (R.P.S.) (Scot.) [collectively
hereinafter ACTS OF UNION]. See J.D. Ford, The Legal Provisions of the Acts of Union, 66
CAMBRIDGE L.J. 106, 106 (2007).
487. See Pfander & Birk, supra note 219, at 1631–42.
488. ACTS OF UNION, supra note 486, art. XXII.
489. LACROIX, supra note 185, at 120–24.
490. ACTS OF UNION, supra note 486, art. IV.
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restrictions of commerce and trade applied to both parts of the
Kingdom. 491 Direct taxes would be based on a formula of
proportionality, and excise taxes and customs and duties on imports
and exports would be uniform throughout the Kingdom. 492 A common
currency (the English coin) and its value would apply to the entire
Kingdom, 493 as would the same standards of weights and measures. 494
The Acts of Union contained every element for a fiscal, monetary,
customs, and commercial union, and these are almost precisely the
provisions for economic union contained in the Constitution. 495
The aggregate power of the United States to establish and maintain
a national economic union can explain the validity of the Bank of the
United States as an implied national power. Central fiscal and
monetary policies are integral components of a complete economic
union. Hamilton emphasized to Congress the intimate relation of the
Bank to commerce and how the nation’s fiscal powers could be used
to increase the commerce and wealth of the United States. 496 The Bank
expanded national power by operating in a way that Congress could

491. Id. art. VI.
492. Id. arts. VII, VIII.
493. Id. art. XVI.
494. Id. art. XVIII.
495. The one exception was the prohibition on export taxes—a concession to the
South. The Constitution does not require that all laws regulating interstate and foreign
commerce must be uniform throughout the nation. However, navigation was the
primary conduit of interstate and foreign commerce, and the prohibitions of duties
on the interstate coastal trade and of regulatory or taxation preferences for “the Ports
of one State over those of another” effected a substantial degree of uniformity. U.S.
CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. 6.
496. In his report to the House of Representatives, Hamilton stressed the “two fold
evidence” of why national banks were important: “[t]rade and industry, wherever
[national banks] have been tried, have been indebted to them for important aid,” and
national banks have assisted governments to overcome “dangerous and distressing
emergencies.” Alexander Hamilton, Final Version of the Second Report on the
Further Provision Necessary for Establishing Public Credit (Dec. 13, 1790), in 7
HAMILTON PAPERS, supra note 165, at 306 [hereinafter Hamilton, Report on a National
Bank]. Hamilton told Congress that the Bank was needed to redress the most serious
problem in the nation’s economy—the dispersion and consequent shortage of money
that could be used for productive purposes. The Bank’s consolidated capital would
“augment[] . . . the active or productive capital of a country” and have a multipliereffect on trade and commerce. Id. “Banks in good credit can circulate a far greater
sum than the actual quantum of their capital in Gold & Silver.” Id. at 307. And a
profitable Bank would be a magnet for foreign investment in American industry. See
id. at 309. See also Knox v. Lee, 79 U.S. (12 Wall.) 457, 537 (1870) (stating that the
commerce power was employed in establishing the Bank).
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not: as a private bank, it could make for-profit loans that were unrelated
to any governmental transaction.497 Cumulatively, however, the Bank’s
loans could help realize the Federalists’ vision of a prosperous economic
union: “[B]y contributing to enlarge the mass of industrious and
commercial enterprises, banks become nurseries of national wealth.”498
An economic union also requires an effective national currency. The
necessity of using paper money as that currency first became evident
during the Civil War, when the Treasury quickly ran out of specie to
support the war. That necessity continued into the post-war era when
the economy grew at such an exponential rate that the United States
surpassed Great Britain in having the largest economy in the world.
This national economy could not be adequately supported by an
insufficient supply of precious metals. The only pragmatic solution was
to use paper money as the national currency. And for the currency to
be credible and effective, it had to be backed by the credit of the
United States as legal tender for all private and public debts. The legal
tender cases present a second example of Congress using an implied
power to maintain and enhance the economic union. In creating the
Bank and in issuing paper money as legal tender, Congress was
“carry[ing] into execution” powers “vested by this Constitution in the
Government of the United States.”
CONCLUSION
The specific enumerated powers of the national government are not
separate grants of self-contained powers. In combination, they create
four clusters of comprehensive powers in the national government—
common defense, foreign policy, national and interstate relations, and
economic union. These aggregate powers are “ends” or “objects” of
national power, and the enumerated and implied powers of Congress
can be “means” that are necessary and proper to effectuate those ends.
The theory presented in this Article explains the constitutional
validity of certain non-enumerated national powers and of
congressional legislation that has been used to carry those powers into
effect. This aggregate view of the enumerated powers also respects
497. In Osborn, Ohio argued that it should be able to tax those for-profit transactions of
the Bank that were not related to any governmental function or activity. Marshall’s answer
was that, pursuant to the Necessary and Proper Clause, those loans were integral to the
Bank’s ability to become a powerful institution and consequently more effective fiscal agent
of Congress. Osborn v. Bank of the U.S., 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 738, 861–64 (1824).
498. Hamilton, Report on a National Bank, supra note 496, at 309.
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federalism by acknowledging the supremacy of national power in four
discrete areas of essential importance to the Union. But if this theory
is correct, other important issues are left open: Are other nonenumerated national powers (such as plenary congressional regulation
of Native American tribes and federal sovereign immunity) justified as
aggregate or implied powers? Are there deeper implications of this
theory for the separation of powers? As related to the national
economic union, would this theory expand or contract congressional
power? How should the theory be reconciled with the enormous
changes that have occurred in the national (and international)
economy? What are the impacts of the Civil War Amendments, which
profoundly changed federalism? Should the five clauses of Sections 1
and 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment be construed in the aggregate as
creating an additional cluster of national power? These issues raise
promising avenues for future scholarship.

